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PREFACE

Urban hiato17 has attracted the interests ot JD8D7 contemporary American
historians. The majority- ot research haa been concentrated on the urbanization process ot the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but a tew scholars
have tumed their attention to the more tormative periods ot town or cit7
developnent. Richard

c.

Wade's The Urban Frontier (Chicagoz 1959) provided

a new tramework in which to view both wstward expansion and cit7 developnent.
According to Wade, the towns were often the tirst outposts ot civilization on
the trontier around which agricultural. cCID1l1Ullities -were later established.
Wade's theme of the urban trontier is a controlling idea in the tollowing
study.
In 18151 the wstern ahore of Lake Michigan was a frontier area.

In

previous decades, the region had been under control ot the British governaent.
But the War ot 1812 marked a signif'icant stage in wstward expansion, tor now
the American government prepared to secure milit&1'7 and political control ot
the Old Northweat. In the period f'ran J.815 to 183.3, Green Bq and Chicago
-were the two major settlements along Lake Michigan's western shore.

At areas

known todq as Kewaunee, Manitowoc, Milwaukee, and Racine, tur traders and

Indians occasionally met to exchange turs, but perm.anent settlements never
developed.

In this period, the tur traders, the American govemment, and the

American Fur C(D.J>any were the principal participants of trontier life. In
describing the operation of the tur trade, particular attention is devoted to
the nature ot the tur trade society- and its relationships to the later growth
of' tollln8.
1

Beginning in 183.3, frontier society changed radically.

F.migrant~

from

the East moved into the territory from Green Ba;y to Chicago as townsites
developed where fomerly there were only simple fur trade villages.

Leading

the march westward were eastem financiers anxious to speculate in towns along
Lake Michigan's westem shore.

In the next decade, these eastem capitalists

in partnership with westem entrepreneurs established to'Wfls, constructed

buildings, and initiated intemal :improvement projects.

Chicago and Milwaukee

soon became the pre-Elllinent camnercial centers, but secondary townsites at
Green Ba\v', Racine, and Kenosha also underwent rapid developn.ent.

By

184.3,

the westem shore ot Lake Michigan was no longer a frontier region as the
agricultural interior

w~

brought under cultivation and townsites from

Green Ba;y to Chicago emerged as thriving cammerci&l centers.
This study relates the developnent or these towns trcm their origins as
fur trade villages.

In an effort to refine the techniques ot investigating

the history or towns, I have stressed the :importance ot entrepreneurial leadership and the significant involvement ot eastem capital in establishing the
westem towns.
For assistance in the preparation of this study, I wish to thank

Mr. Archibald Motley ot the Chicago Historical Society, Miss Josephine Harper
of the State Historical Soc1et7 ot Wisconsin, and Dr. Robert McCluggage who
directed the research and writing ot the dissertation.

A speci&l thanks is

due to the Illinois State Historical Societ7 and the Illinois State Sesquicentennial. Camnission tor a grant which enabled the author to devote his tul.1-

time to the writing or this sti.¥iy.
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CHAPTER I
The Struggle tor Frontier Daninanee: The National.
Government and the American Fur Canpany, 1815-1822
The War or 1812 was owr. Along the westem shore ot Lake Michigan, the
frontier inhabitants, with some trepidation, prepared to retum to their
normal pattem of lite. For years, the area had been a wildemess in which
the only occupation was the .fur trade. Green Bq with approxima.tely 250
people was the most populous area including such refinements of civilization
as two trading stores, three blacksmiths, and a carpenter. 1 Green Bq was
hardly an American settlement, for its population consisted ot families or

English and French extraction still loyal to the British gowmment. The most
important residents were tur traders, such as Jacques Porlier, a native ot
Montreal who settled at the Ba.y in 1791. John Lawe, the recognized leader of
the mnall canmunity, was a native Englishman, who had first traded in Mackinac
and then moved to Green Bq in 1797. 2
Their society and the conduct of the fur trade was simply organized.
Before the War of 1812, the traders received manufactured products .from the
North West Company- in Canada to exchange for the animal pelts collected by
the Indians. Jacob Franks 1 an tmcle of John Lawe 1 served as the middleman
betwen the Canadian canpany and the Green Bq traders.

Both the white

traders and the Indians thrived on the fur trade and the two societies co~xisted

in relatiw hamony.

Numerous traders married into the neighboring

Indian tribes.

l

2

In 1815 1 Green Bay was the oncy penna.nent settlement on the we stem shore
of Lake Michigan.

Milwaukee had no established residents.

Occasionally a fur

trader located there for a season to trade with the Indians. 3 The same was
true of numerous points between Qreen Bq and Chicago. ·where rivers nowed
into the Lake such as at present-day Kewaunee, Manitowoc, Sheboygan, Kenosha,,
and Racine,, an occasional trader would establish a post at the confluence of
the waterways,, but pennanent settlements never developed.

Lake Michigan's

westem shore was virtually unaffected by American influence and the tide of
westward expansion.
Chicago differed little .f'ran the other points on Lake Michigan.

Before

the War of 1812,, Chicago's population consisted of a few traders,, chief' of'
whan was John Kinzie, and a small contingent of American military personnel.
While the presence of Fort Dearborn meant that the Chicago area was exposed
to American influence, this pressure had little real effect.

The fur traders

were supplied by British finns and the Indians consistently remained loyal to
their British contacts.

During the War of 1812,, the Indians under the in-

fluence of their British al.lies massacred the military personnel at Fort
Dearborn indicating that American presence had little influence on the
lliinois country.

With the War's conclusion, the few inhabitants of Chicago

drifted back hoping to re-establish the fur trade.

John Kinzie, the most

notable of these traders, retumed in 1815. 4
The scene was the same all along the westem shore of Lake Michigan.

The

traders retumed to their small settlements hoping that the War of 1812 had
not changed the familiar pattem of frontier life. Yet the frontier was to
change, and to change radically.

Decisions affecting the destiny of the

westem shore of Lake Michigan were now made in places far away from Green Bay
or Chicaro. at Washiru?:ton in Congress and at New York in the office of John J.

3
Astor and Canpa.ny.
In Washington, statesmen and government officials reelized that the

Northwest frontier was anything but secure for settlement or free from
British influence.

The responsible parties were accurate in this judgment.

During the \';ar of 1812, the predaninantly French-Canadian population of

Green Ba;r had actively aided the British forces.

Robert Dickson, a Canadian

fur trade agent for Green Ba.y before the War, successfully recruited numerous
Green Ba.y traders and used the Bay as a depot for British supplies and troopa. 5
The Fort Dearborn Hassacre at Chicago contributed further evidence of .American
insecurity on the frontier.

The War itself had accomplished very little for

the United States in the areas bordering Lake Michigan, for the government was
still confronted with the tasks of securing the area from British influence
and pacifying the Indians.
To these problems Lewis Cass, Governor of the Hichigan Territory and
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, :immediately turned his attention.

In

September, lSJ.4, Cass commissioned the Chicago trader, John Kinzie, to act in
behalf of the United States and visit the Indian tribes of the Illinois and
Indiana country to urge their allegiance to the American government.

6 Early

in 1815, Kinzie completed his tour and reported to Governor Cass a series of
proposals designed to secure American control of the frontier.

Kinzie en-

visioned a system of military posts and Indian agencies to control the British
influence.

He also suggested a strict supervision of the Indian trade with

only licensed traders allowed in the Indian territory.

The first step,

according to Kinzie, was the establishment of military posts at Green
Chicago.

B~

and

Speaking from experience, Kinzie informed Governor Cass that the

British deliberately created animosity between the Indians and the American
govemment.7

4
Utilizing the counsel of many westeni citizens, Gass formulated his own
plan for frontier security.

Writing to the Secretary of War in June, 1815,

Cass claimed that the government's primary task was to exclude British participation in the Indian trade.

The most feasible solution to this problen.,

Cass suggested, was to block the main camnunication arteries through which
British goods reached American territory.

Cass therefore recamnended the

establishment of a fort at Green Bay blocking the Fox-Wisconsin waterway and
at Chicago cutting off the transshipment of goods fra:n Lake Hichigan to the
8
Illinois River.
Other govenunent officials did not approach the problem with the same
clear perspective.

General Jacob Brow, Commander of the Northeni Division

of Military Departments in the United States, recommended a wholesale exclusion of British traders from the Northwest Territory. 9 Govemor Ninian
Edwards of the Illinois Territory suggested that all the residents of Green
Bay should be driven !ran the colll'l.try and their places filled with American

citizens.

10

Washington officials did not accept the advice of General Brown or
Governor !::dwards but followed the recommendations of men like Lewis Cass.
The govenunent now moved to secure American control of the frontier.

This

movement signaled the end of the simple economic and social frontier life.
The government was as large a business and regulatory organization as existed
and it, not the individual trapper or farmer, made the first steps towards
American expansion.

Unfortunately, government policy alienated a generation

or frontier inhabitants.
Governnent action in the Old Northwest consisted of three different
policies.

The first step was to establish military posts at Green Bay and

5
Chicago.

In 1816, Captain Hezekiah Bradley arrived in Chicago to beg;i.n the

construction of the new Fort Dearborn while Colonel John Miller commanded the
troops sent to Green Bey to erect Fort Howard. 11 Realizing that frontier
security demanded more than military control, the government established
Indian agencies at both Green Bey and Chica.go.

In 1816, Charles Jouett headed

the Chicago Indian Agency while Colonel John Bowyer assumed the same duties
a.t Green B8\f •

In general, the Indian agent was to prepare the way for the

purchase of Indian lands before the tide of white settlement and when possible
advance the civilization of our primitive red brothers.

Host importantly,

however, the Indian agent was to undermine British influence among the Indian
tribes.

He was therefore charged with the responsibility of regulating the

Indian trade through the issuing of licenses to selected traders. 12 To the
fur traders at Chicago, Milwaukee, and Green Bey, who, for over a hU11dred
years, had conducted their trade with the Indians unfettered by the intrusions of supervisory personnel, the Indian agents could only represent a
threat to their nom.al patterns of conducting the Indian trade.
t~aders

Indeed, many

realized that the era of the individualistic exploitation of the fur

trade was at an end.
If the presence of military posts and Indian agencies to control the
areas west of Lake Michigan seemed to represent an econoodc threat to the
fur trader, :imagine their reaction to the establishment of government factories at both Green BS3' and Chicago in 1816.
a new institution on the frontier.
to regulate the Indian trade.

The government factory was not

The system was originally devised in 1795

Its most distinguished aim was admittedly

humanitarian, for the factory hoped to eliminate the impoverishment which the
Indian suffered in dealing with the supposedly unscrupulous fur traders.

6

Stocked with money and supplies to exchange for the Indian's furs, the factory,
in reality, was a government business intending to undennine independent control of the Indian trade. 13 Needless to s~, the trader v:iewE.'Cl the .factory
with some trepidation, for it was in direct competition with his only source
of economic livelihood.

~Jhile

the military posts and Indian agencies were

regulatory institutions, the government .factories were large-scale business
enterprises.

At Chica.Go, Jacob Varnum assumed the duties of government factor

while Matthew Irwin was appointed to head the Green Bay factory.

The outside

influences which were to change the character and path of settlement along the
lake shore were now firmly entrenched at the two most critical junctures of
trade and commerce.
The initial policies of the government in establishing militacy posts,
Indian agencies, and factories were
and Indian pacification.

:i.r.~~ediatc

:measures for military security

Yet the &overnment was never certain about the

future use of the lands borderinc Lake r:ichigan until late in the 1820 1 s.
Illinois and the region of Chicago was seemingly destined for white settlement
since by 11330 the t:;over.nment had purchased ;":ost of the Indian lands in that
area. 14

In '.Jisconsin, however, the ;:~overnment was not im;ilediately corn.':l.itted

to clearing title to the land for white settlement.
\'iar,

In 1825, Secretary of

John Calhoun, suggested that the Indians of northern Illinois, Indiana,

Ohio, and New York be r..1oved to areas north of the Illinois state line and
west of Lake l.lichi;an. 15 Calhoun's suggestion was never completely followed
even though a group of New York Indians was removed to an area south of
16
Green B~ in 1825.
The pressure of white settlement in the early 1830 1 s
finally brou3ht an end to any ideas of 1/isconsin as a permanent Indian

reservation.

7
If the residents on the western shore of Lake Hichigan only had .to
confront the confused and often contradictory policy of the national governoent, perhaps their role in frontier expansion would have been greater.

The

story, however, now switched from government departments in ·11ashington to the
business district of New York and the of :~ice of John J. Astor and Company.
For some years previous to the

·;~'ar

of 1812, John Astor had dreamed of convert-

ing the American fur trade into a major capitalistic investment.

Astor knew

of the rich harvest of furs garnered in the Lake Eichigan area.

Before 1Hl21

this trade was controlled by several Canadian firms with only a limited capital
investment.

Astor envisioned a centrally organized fur trade company with

access to a large supply of goods, employing thousands of traders, and
utilizing the market techniques of a large corporation.

In 18ll, he took the

first step by entering into partnership with several. Canadian firms which were
trading in the Green BC\Y and Chicago areas.

Astor thought, or at least sus-

pected, that someday these areas would be under American control and that
British interests would be curtailed leaving Astor the bulk of the fur trade
in the Old Northwest.

Astor's plan worked exceedingly well, for after the

War of 1812 British interests in the Old Northwest were excluded.

Astor

therefore turned to the organization of a large corporation to exploit this
trading territory.

He first set up the American Fur Company and appointed

two dynamic businessoen, Ha'Tisey Crooks and Robert Stuart, to establish western
headquarters at Uackinac.

From Mackinac, Crooks and Stuart gradually incor-

porated the independent fur traders into one of the first major business
enterprise on Lake Hichigan's western shore. 17
Fran 1815 to 1817, Astor, Crooks, and Stuart were involved in arranging
the administrative details of the American Fur Company and its presence was

8

not :ir..1li1ediately felt in the interior.

The government acted more promptly.

In addition to establishing military posts and Indian agencies, the government
also enacted legislation to regulate the trade.
Congressional

cor:i.~ittee,

After deliberations by a

Congress passed the following law designed to curtail

British influence in the trade.

The trade law of 1816 stated that:

Licenses to trade with the Indians within the territorial boundaries of tho United ~>tates shall not be granted to any but citizens
of the United States, unless by the express dir~ction of the
President of the United States, and upon such terms and conditions
as the public interest in his opinion require • • • •
The law also prescribed penalties of forfeiture, fine, and .imprisonment for
any foreigner introducing merchandise into the Indian country or entering
the Indian t~rritory without a passport.18 The law of 1816 was designed to
eliminate British influence in the interior and to encourage the exploitation
of the fur trade by American citizens.
Through the influence of John Astor, the government was made aware of
the fact that iunerica.n business interests were not sufficiently developed nor
suitably trained to conduct the fur trade without the aid of selected British
personnei. 19 Astor succeeded in convincing national and local officials that
the law of 1816 should be interpreted liberally.

William H. Crawford, the

Secretary of War, indicated the general attitude of the government in the
following comraunication to Governor Cass:
It is therefore wholly improbable that the enterprise of .American
citizens will futnish an adequate supply to those remote tribes.
The want of capital in the hands of men accustaned to the trade,
and who have enterpr:i.se to bear the fatigues, and brave the dangers incident to its prosecution will it is believed, render it
necessary for the present to pennit foreigners to carry on this
trade, under such regulations as shall subject them to a strict
observance of the laws of the United States on this subject .••• 20
Governor Gass COim!lunicated this infonnation to the Indian agents at the
local posts.

He mentioned the efforts of Hamsey Crooks, the American Fur

9

Company agent, to establish a canpany for the exploitation of the trade and
advised extreme liberality in licensing British traders for the American Fur
Canpany. 2J.
While Cass and other national officials acknowledged Astor's requests
for a liberal licensing policy, 22 the Indian agents at certain key points,
Mackinac and Green Bay, enforced the law more stringently.

Major

Willjam

H.

Puthuf'f, the Indian agent at Mackinac, who issued licenses to traders joumeying from Mackinac to the interior, considered the employment of British
traders a threat to American control. 23 Puthuf'f was against the licensing of
the Green Bay traders because of their close cormections with the British
before the War of 1812. 24 He al.so claimed that Astor's American Fur Ca.npany
was primarily staffed by British personnel and was therefore a threat to
American interests. 25 Acting on these judgments, Puthuff consistently refused to grant licenses to the Green Bay traders and encouraged Colonel Bowyer,
the Green Bay Indian agent, to follow the same policy.

In one case, Puthuff'

seized Jacques Porlier•s winter collection of furs claiming that Porlier had
never received a trading license. 26
Local government ofticials were extremely inconsistent in their interpretations of the 1816 trade law.

While Y.lilliam. Puthuff followed a strict policy

at Mackinac, Colonel Bowyer at Green Bay vacillated.

At one point, Bowyer

issued licenses to any trader who applied, leading one Green Bay resident to
speculate that

11

I believe there will be as many traders as houses. 11 2:"/ At

other times, Bowyer followed a stricter policy.

In October, 1817, he expelled
a long-time Green Bq trader from the territory. 28 The vacillations of local
Indian agents left the traders in a state of constant confusion about their
ability to trade in the coming season. Gradually they began to resent the
regulations of this new govemment. 29

10
Inconsistency was not alone the province of local officials, for the
national government also shifted its interpretation of the 1816 law.

In

January, 1818, Governor Cass informed the local Indian agents of a major
policy change which called for the canplete and total exclusion of all but
American citizens fran the fur trade.

Exceptions were no longer to be granted,

not even to the American Fur Company.JO The Green B~ traders were astounded
the law and questioned the advisability of even rema:injng residents of
Green Ba.v. 31 A far more powerful interest, the American Fur Company, also
by

found the new directive objectionable. Without the aid of trained British
personnel, Astor could not hope to quickly and effectively establish a trade
monopoly.

By prohibiting all British interests from the trade, the government

was virtually excluding the majority of traders then in the Northwest
Territory.

Since before the War of 1812, the area had been a fur trade ter-

ritory exploited only by traders joumeying south from Canada or living at
Green

Ba.v.

After the War, thsse traders were, in the eyes of the American

government, still British citizens and thus not legally allowed to participate in the trade.

Faced with the possible ruin of their Canpany 1 Astor,

Crooks 1 and Stuart exerted tremendous pressure on the national level and
succeeded in obtaining an almost instant repeal of the new directive. 32 Under
new instructions £ran Governor caS's, the Indian agents were now allowed to
license British traders but only to serve as employees of trading outfits
headed by American citizens.33
The changing character or government policy indicated two salient points
about these initial years of American involvement on the frontier west of Lake
Michigan.

First, the American Fur Canpany seemed to wield enormous power

both upon national official.a and upon the lesser territorial. agents.
trant Indian

ents such as l

Recalci-

or Puthuf.t' and Colonel Bo er who refused to

11

license traders desired by the American Fur Company were removed from.their
posts a short t:hne later. 34 Secondly, the government increased the hostility
between its officials and frontier residents.

By 1818 1 Jacques Porlier ex-

pressed the general sentiments of the traders when he remarked that

11

I begin

to perceive the word libertz in the language of politics or of the Governments
does not mean the same thing as we comoonly suppose. ,i3 5
Porlier was not the only Green Bay trader to feel the effects of the
government's presence.

John Lawe continually complained that he was rapidly

losing money because he could not obtain a license.

"This is three years

nearly, 11 Lawe explained, as:tnce peace has been made and I have been in hell
ever since. 1136 Frustrated by their inability to pursue the fur trade free
ran regulations, several. of the Green Btzy traders seriously considered moving
to lands recently purchased by a Canadian friend., Lord Selkirk, in the Red
ver district.

Before his plans were completed, Lord Selkirk died, forcing

he traders 1 such as John Lawe and the Grignons, to accept their plight at
1reen Bay. 37 In late 1819, the traders at Green Bay finally applied for
erican citizenship realizing that such action was their only hope of
ceiving permanent licenses for the Indian trade.3 8
The entire license controversy indicated a great deal of government
consistency, but the dispute al.so revealed the tactics and power of Astor's
erican Fur Company.

The company utilized the confusion surrounding the law

r 1816 to increase their control over the fur trade.
While Astor spent the years .fran 1815 to 1817 organizing the arlm1njatraive aspects of the company, a Detroit merchant, David Stone, obtained a large
upply of goods and sent traders into the interior.

Stone employed Jacob

•ranks, the uncle of John Lawe, who employed many of the Green Bay traders
or Stone's com

39

•

traders

12
experienced great difficulty in ob~~ing trading licenses. 4u By 1818 6
however, Ham.say Crooks and Robert Stuart were prepared to actively oppose
David Stone in the territory west of Lake Michjgan.

Because of the American

Fur Company's power over local officials, Stuart and Crooks made the law of
1816 work to their advantage.

Posing as friends of the Green Ba.y traders,

Crooks and Stuart assured them that they would consult with the proper
Washington officials a.bout obtaining licenses. 41 Robert Stuart personally
wrote to Govemor Cass explaining that the innocent residents of Green Bay
had suffered terrible hardships because the local Indian agent had failed to
grant licenses.

Stuart further counselled Cass that

such oppression
and inconsistency will I am convinced be speedily remedied by you Sir. i/+ 2
u •••

By 1821 1 the Green Bay traders received annual trading licenses because
of the /unerican Fur Company's influence.

'l'hus the Green Bay traders naturally

tenninated their business relations with David Stone in favor of the more
powerful American Fur Company.

The independent fur traders, confused and

victimized by the govennnent 1 s regulations, willing!y attached them.selves to
the American Fur Company which slowly increased its control of the fur trade.
In time, traders frcm Green Ba.y to Chicago would find themselves helpless
employees of a frontier monopoly.
The .factory system was the final phase of the govennnent's frontier
policy.

:~stablished

at both Chicago and Green Bay in 1816 to regulate the

Indian trade of the Illinois and Wisconsin areas, those factories provided
the context for the most bitter and sustained conflicts of the period.
existence, of course,

threat~fied

Their

the economic livelihood of the regular fur

trader in addition to providing canpetition for Astor's American Fur Company.
From 1816 to 1S22, the American Fur Campany waged their o'Wl'l private war on .
the factories and the scene on the frontier was a picture of one business

13

enterprise vying for trade hegemony over the other.

In the interim, the

previously independent trader was caught between the .factory and the .American
Fur Company. By 18221 when the factory system collapsed partial.ly the result
of the competitive and political practices of the .American Fur Company and
partially due to the inept and inconsistent fo:nnula.tion of the system, the
small trader was more than ever convinced that he was at the mercy of forces

outside his control.

The entire story of the factory system was an example

of the frontier's dependence and connection with eastern capital involved in

the American Fur Canpany, big government, and the canpetitive economic practices which existed between them.
In 1816, Thanas L. McKenney was appointed director of the factory system

with the title of Superintendent of the Indian Trade. 43 Later with the consent
of the President, McKenney selected his factors for the posts at Chicago and
Green Bq.

Jacob Vamun, a native of Mew England, was appointed to head the

Chicago factory.

Before the War of 18121 he had directed a factory at Sandusky,

Ohio, and was presumably well-acquainted with the system. 44 Similarly Matthew
Irwin, who was to supervise the Green Bay factory, had previously operated the
Chicago factory from 1810 to 1Sl2. 45 Vamum's salary was $800 per year while
Irwin received $10oo. 46 The difference in salarJ reflected the more difficult
task which faced Irwin at the Bay. Before the War of 18121 Chica.go was exposed to the factory system and American military personnel, but .American
institutions had never been established at Green Ba\Y" until the arrival ot
Mat thew Irwin.
Jacob Vamum, Matthew Irwin, and Thanas McKenney embarked upon the project
with great enthusiasm.

In its first year of operation, McKenney sent to the

Green Bq factory approximately $15,500 worth of trade goods.47 By January,
1817. McKenney seemed very disturbed by Irwin's conduct of the .factory:

14
Since you have been at Green I3ay your returns have been very
much irregular and the business you have been doing very limited.
The whole amount of your sales appears to be only $538.40 and of
this sum it would seem about $180 had been sold to the Indians.
Disillusioned, McKenney considered closing the factory unless Irwin :immediately
explained the causes for its poor business.48
Matthew Irwin soon responded to McKenney•s request in tones of despair
about the future of factories in that area.

The great number of British

traders in the area, the use of liquor in the Indian trade, and the hostility
of frontier residents, Irwin explained, were the principal deterrents to a
successful factory. 49
Irwin did not immediately succumb to frontier hostility.

For the next

several years, he waged an econanic and political war against the traders and
the American Fur Canpany.

Irwin's efforts to save the Green Bay factory

illuminated the dl.ltiple causes of the factory's decline and also the tactics
and practices of the American Fur Canpany.
Irwin first asked Colonel John Bowyer, the Green Bay Indian agent, for
aid.

Attempting to utilize the law of 1816, which prohibited foreigners from

participation in the trade, Irwin presented Bowyer a detailed list of traders
of known British affiliations.
Green Bay traders.

The list included the names of many praninent

Irwin requested Bowyer to withhold trade licenses from

these individuals and mentioned the consequences of failure to act:
It may be proper to rEm&rk that whilst these and other British
subjects are suffered to enter and continue in this country as
traders, it will be useless tor the Government to continue this
factory here; principally rran the ascendancy which an uninterrupted intercourse of many ;rears had enabled thEIIl to acquire
over the minds of t~0 Indians, supported by extensive family connections with them.
At different times, however, Colonel Bowyer licensed the Green Bay
traders.

Irwin considered such policies as a deliberate attempt to undercut
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the factory.
contradiction.

In truth, the govemment•s Indian policy was burdened by a basic
The Indian agents regulated the tur trade by issuing licenses

and were compelled to give licenses to American and selected British traders
of reputable character.

Moreover, the Indian agents charged fees for licenses

providing them with a vested interest in the nl.lllber of traders in the territory.

The Indian agents often sympathized with the private traders and the

American Fur Company.

The government factor, on the other hand, conducted
his own Indian trade in direct competition with the private tra.ders. 51 The
government factor could not hope to succeed when the Indian agents continued
to issue licenses.

Matthew Irwin perhaps best characterized the frustration

of the govenunent factor:
There appears a palpable incongruity in the manner of conducting
the Indian trade; the factors are sent to supply the wants of the
Indians, and the Indian agents can adopt such measures as to defeat
all their plans to that end. It is very certain that the authority
vested in then to issue licenses is well calculated to destroy ~
the benefits that might be expected tram the Factories • • • •
Matthew Irwin and Tham.as McKenney realized that the factory's success
necessitated the total exclusion of private traders where factories existed. 53
Irwin and McKenney urged such action, but the interests of the private
traders, the American Fur Canpany, and the bureaucracy of an established
system precluded any major change.
Unable to awake Washington to the contradictions of frontier policy,
Irwin attempted to increase the effectiveness of the Green BB\V' factory.

The

factory was located at Green Bay which was a considerable distance fran the
actual trading country.
The private traders and the American Fur Company had the advantage of
selling goods to the Indians and collecting their furs before the factory
exerted any influence.

Irwin therefore decided to use the techniques of the
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American Fur Company by sending agents of the factory (sub-factors) into the
interior where they could c0t1pete directly with the traders.

Thomas McKenney

was skeptica1 of the feasibility of Irwin's plan, but he consented, in desperation, to save the Green Bay factory.54
The plan did not ir:lprove the financial condition of the factory, 55 but it
d1.d bring into the open the hostility of the

f~erican

Fur Company.

Located at

their headquarters in Hackinac, Ramsay Crooks and Hobert Stuart were besieged
by

complaints fran traders in the interior of the difficulties which the fac-

tory and other government policies placed upon their trade.

Accordingly

Crooks and Stuart comr:nmicated the details of the trade situation to John
Astor so that he could apply political pressure in Washington.

Crooks and

Stuart even suggested that ii.stor speak directly to the President.

The facto-

ries were stifling private initiative, Crooks and Stuart e..xplained, and thus
they must be abolished.

According to Crooks and Stuart, Matthew Irwin's

attempt to send sub-factors into the interior was a misuse of the factory
system.

Moreover Crooks and Stuart claimed that the factory was no longer a

benevolent institution to aid the unfortunate Indians, but it was now a government business in direct canpetition with the private traders.
always been the intention of the government system.)

(This had

Crooks and Stuart

therefore concluded that the government had entered into the field of private
enterprise; and, because of its power, was not operating on equal grounds with
the local tra.ders. 56 This appeal. by the two chief agents of the American Fur
Canpany to Astor was only the first step in the company's campaign to end the
factory system.

The seed of dissent was planted in Hashington•s political

circles by John Astor while on the frontier the American Fur Company and the
factory waged more open warfare.
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While Irwin admitted. that many British traders were, at various times,
excluded. fran the trade, he com.plained that Astor's American Fur Ccmpany
enjoyed virtual :immunity to such lawso

The American Fur Ccmpany, according

to Irwin, was staffed by British traders and in many instances degraded
American interests in favor of the British. 57 Irwin wrote many letters to
his superiors about the tactics of the American Fur Canpany, but letters
were of little value in his struggle on the frontier.
The iunerican Pur Company adopted various tactics to dispel the factory• s
influence at both Chicago and Green BSiY• The company often reduced the price
of goods to undersell the factory. 56 At other times, advance agents of the
canpany journeyed far into the interior to dissuade the Indians £rem trading
at the factory.

The factories also faced an abnormal manpower shortage.

To

trade with the Indians, the factory employed a number of interpreters,
traders, and clerks.

The American Fur Company often hired all the traders

and residents of a particular area merely to stifle the effectiveness of the
factory. 59 The company's most effective stratagem was its ability to influence local and national officials. Both Major Puthuff and Colonel Bowyer,
who had refused to accede to the canpany's demands, were eventually removed
from office due to pressure on national and local officials by the American
Fur Company.

Indian agents and military officials thus were more likely to

aid the c0t1pany rather than the factory.

Irwin became increasingly cognizant

of the .American Fur Company's tremendous power and observed that
• • • The agents of Mr. Astor hold out an idea that they will ere
long be able to break the factories; and they menace the Indian
agents, and others who may interfere with them, with diamission
from office, through Mr. Astor. They say that a representation
fran Messrs. Crooks and Stewart (sic) (Hr. Astor's agents) led to
the dismission of the Indian agent at Hackinaci, and they also say
that the Indian agent here is to be dismissed. 0

18
The hostility against the facto?"'J was often of serious proportions.

In

1820, Major Irwin reported an incident which seemed to indicate the enormous

depth of feeling on the part of frontier traders and the degree to which this
feeling was transferred to the Indians.

In 1H20, .Mr. Armitinger, an indepen-

dent trader, went into the neighborhood of Lake Winnebago and was fired upon
by the Indians.

When Captain Whistler from Fort Howard ventured to the same

area, he was also attacked.

Jacques Parlier and Louis Grignon, traders of

the American Fur Company, also entered this area, but they were unmolested and
traded for a large number of furs. 61 To Matthew Irwin and Thanas McKenney,
the incident was sufficient proof of the hostility between American officials
and the traders and Indians controlled by the American Fur Company.
HcKenney and Irwin might have leamed another lesson from the incident
at Lake Winnebago.

While the American Fur Company encouraged opposition to

the factory, the frontier trader was naturally opposed to the system.

It was

in direct economic competition with traders such as John Lawe, Louis Grignon,
and Jacques Porlier in an occupation which for years they had pursued with the
Indians relatively free from competition or regulation.
business, a prominent Green
profit

11

•••

B~

The factory was a

trader surmised, which attempted to make a

l.lllder the cover of care for the savages and of the pretended

benefits that they receive from the factories •••• 1162 Thus the American Fur
Canpany received the willing assistance of the private traders in the struggle
against the factory.
\'ibile considerable anphasis has been placed upon the Green Bay factory
primarily because of the greater population and fur business at that point,
the history of the Chicago factory illustrated many of the same conflicts.
Under Jacob Varnum, the Chicago factory from 1816 to 1818 experienced a limited
degree of success.

i!Arly in 1817. McKenney recommended that Jacob Va.mum
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receive a raise in salary because of the increase in the volume of trade at
the Chicago factory.

Vamum's salary was raised fran $800 to $1000 per year. 63

From the inception of the Chicago factory in 1816 to Harch 31, 1818, the fac~ory

gained $2253 in the trade.

The expense of running the establishment,

however, amounted to $4093.

Despite a total loss of $2000 1 the Chica.go factory
6
was more successful than the factory at Green Bay. 4
There are several explanations for the greater success of the Chicago
factory.

The most probable reason was the influence which the Chicago factory

iexerted before the har of 1812.

The Indians had faith in the Chicago factory

while the independent traders were still disorganized due to the \iar.

The

Chicago factory, from 1816-1818, proviled the only outlet for furs and the
purchase of merchandise.

By 1818, however, the American Fur Company had moved

numerous traders into the Chicago area.

By December, 1818, Jacob Varnum

iacknowledged the presence of a large number of British traders presumably
representing the American Fur Comµany.

Vamum commented that

The indiscriminate ad.mission of British subjects to trade with the
Indians, is a matter of pretty general complaint throughout this
section of the country. There are five establishments within
limits of this agency headed by British subjects.65
II'hese establishments to which Varnum referred, most likely were the American
l"ur Company's posts along the Illinois . Liver headed by Antoine Deschamps and
the Chicago post directed by Jean Beaubien.

The presence of this canpetition

seriously hindered Vanium 1 s factory to the point where he doubtod whether he
could afford the services of an interpreter for the coming year.

66

The factories both at Chicago and Green BB\Y' received their most serious
opposition not so much from the British traders themselves as from the goods
they traded.

The private trader effectively distributed whiskey to the

Indians, and in this lay one of the chief causes for the poor business of the

factories.

At the Chicago factory, however, the liquor problem was the most

serious, and its exposure provided the most clear example of the American Fur
Company's involvement.
Liquor sales to the Indians always had been a problem on the American
frontier.

In 18021 the Congress had passed a law authorizing the President

to take such measures as appeared proper " • • • to prevent or restrain the

vending or distribution of spiritous liquors among all or any of the Indian
tribes. 1167 Yet this law did not actually prevent the use of liquor.

In 1Sl6

Governor Ninian Edwards of the Illinois Territory attempted to rectify the
situation by obtaining passage of a territorial law which forbade the sale of
liquor to the Indians.6S The Green Bay traders were promptly informed of the
new law and the penalties attached. 69 Yet they found the law both impractical
and impossible for officials to enforce:
You will notice, Sir, that liquor having once been allowed among
the savages it is not possible to restrain them from it, and that
moreover th7()0 is not force enough here to sustain such a
regulation.
Knowing that the law would be impossible to enforce, the traders
carefully avoided the spirit of the law.

The law only forbade the sale ot

liquor to the Indians so that the traders, before going into the territory,
would claim that any liquor in their packs was merely for private use. 71 The
law did not ban liquor from the Indian lands 1 and thus a large quantity was
always kept by the traders themselves and at their depot at Green Bay.

J0hn

Bowyer, the Indian agent at Green Bay, attempted to ban the storing of liquor
at Green Bay 1 but Governor Cass informed hlm that such action 1 although
desirable, would be illegal.7 2
Many

times Irwin complained bitterly of the use of liquor in the Indian

trade which induced the Indians to becane intoxicated and to sell their .furs

at poor prices.

Irwin explained why it was impossible to prosecute traders

for selling liquor illegally to the Indians:
A return to reasc.n will induce many of them (the Indians) to mention
who sold them the whiskey; but it is deemed illegal to accept
Indian testimony, so that the British and .American traders •••
may deal in whiskey without the smallest chance of detection.73
Although the American Fur Company was not in full control or the territory
before 18221 it was involved in the whiskey trade.

The American Fur Company

would have preferred not to deal in liquor because it was a.n expensive commodity for a trading outfit.

Furthennore, liquor destroyed the India.n's

desire and ability to hunt.

These considerations have led sane authors to

surmise that the .American Fur Campany refrained fran its use. 74 Nevertheless,
liquor was a valuable item in competing with the factory a.nd the independent
traders, tor the Indians often traded onJ.y with individuals who supplied the
canmodity.

In the Company's Account Books for 18211 the following items were

shipped to Green Ba\Y' and Chicago:

418 gallons of High Wine, 30 gallons of

Jamaica Spirits, 8 gallons of Brandy, and 35 gallons of Rio Wine. 75
A more damaging example of the American Fur Company's connection with
the whiskey trade .occurred in 1821.

At this time, Dr. Alexander Wolcott, the

Chicago Indian agent, refused to grant James Kinzie a trading license for the
z,:ilwaukee area.

Wolcott was infonned by Matthew Irwin that Kinzie regularly

sold liquor to the Indians. 76

Irwin told Wolcott of the incident so that

Kinzie could not obtain a license at Chicago.

H.amsay Crooks, with wham

Kinzie was employed, detested the actions of Indian agent Wolcott.

Wolcott,

Crooks said, refused to grant Jam.es Kinzie a license on mere suspicion.

To

correct such an injustice to his agent, Crooks obtained a license for Kinzie
from Colonel Boyd at Mackinac. 77 Crook's ability to obtain a license :tran
Colonel Boyd, despite the objections of Wolcott and Irwin, was typical of the

enomous power of the American Fur Campany.

Colonel Boyd, who issued the

license to Kinzie, had been Crooks 1 s choice for Indian a.gent at Mackinac to
replace the recalcitrant Major Puthuff.

In 1818, Govemor Cass, realizing the

problems caused by an agent licensing a trader in Mackinac for trade in the
Chicago area, had outlawed such procedures without the consent of both agents
concemed. 78 Despite the action of Boyd, then,

~•olcott

ordered Kinzie to

close his trading outfit within sixty days and leave the territory.

Irwin

realized that the absence of Kinzie from the Milwaukee area would leave the
Indians without a trader, and he was more than happy to enter this country
controlled by the American Fur Ga:npany.

Irwin, therefore, commissioned

Jacques Vieau as an agent of the Green Ba.y factory.

Vieau was an American

citizen; and, according to Irwin, he was of impeccable character.

Irwin gave

him goods amounting to $2 1 228.25 with which to deal with the Indians. 79
Thomas HcKermey, the Superintendent of the Indian Trade, did not allow

this incident to go unnoticed.

On December 71 1821 1 he strongly criticized

the American Fur Company in the Dai.l,y National Intelligencer with the case ot
James Kinzie as an example.

"

The people now knew, he said, the identity or

• • • these invisible nobodies ••• dealers in whiskey, furs, and Indian

blood • • • agents of this same American Fur Canpany. 11so
Crooks and Stuart were hardly pleased over the Kinzie affair.

In 1821,

Stuart accused Irwin of exaggerating the case against Kinzie in order to
improve the national image of his facto:ey.

Stuart threatened that, despite

the attempts ot Irwin and 'Wolcott, the facto:ey system would be abolished
within a year. 81 Once the Kinzie affair reached the public news media.,
Robert Stuart and the American Fur CompaJ'lY' did a notable about race.

Stuart

was no longer willing to protect James Kinzie because he reared creating

public antipathy toward the company.

Thus Kinzie soon became the scapegoat.

In 1822, Stuart suddenly found that James Kinzie was less than a reputable

character and considered relieving him of his position.

82

In April, 1822,

Robert Stuart told James Kinzie to leave the Milwaukee area to another trader
and return to Chicago. 83
To save the image of the American Fur Company, Stuart next tried to claim
ignorance of any of Kinzie•s activities. He told Govemor Cass that

11

•••

whenever any person either employed by, or having dealings of whatever nature
with us does not conform to the laws • • • governing the trade • • • we will
al~s

be willing and happy to have them entirely excluded from the country."

Stuart then suggested that Kinzie be expelled from the territory.

The only

reason the company had been reluctant to act, Stuart explained, was because
James Kinzie was the son of John Kinzie, an important and loyal trader in the
Chicago area. 84
Fran a perusal of the Account Books and Letter Books of' the American Fur
Company, there seems little doubt that the company used liquor in the Indian
trade to compete with the factory and opposing traders.

Because of the

can.petition of the American Fur Company, the continued operation of the factories at Green Bay and Chicago could only prove a financial liability to the
government•
On the national level, the factory system was under constant attack by
the American Fur Campany and numerous national. officials.

Congressional

action was underway by 1818 when the House of Representatives requested
Secretary of War, John Calhoun, to report on the feasibility of instituting a
new plan for the conduct of the Indian trade.

Calhoun iimnedia.tely wrote to

those connected with the system soliciting their advice and recommendations.

Thanas L. McKenney, whose concem for the Indians took precedence over any
financial or political considerations, felt that the abolition of the factories
could only bring harm to the Indians for the sole purpose of aiding fur
traders to reap greater profits. 85 Lewis Cass, on the other hand, approached
the problem more realistically.
Indian trade.

Cass favored a new system to regulate the

Since private enterprise was now sufficiently established in

the Indian trade, benefiting the whole economy, Cass explained, the government
should withdraw.

In the place of government factories, Cass suggested that

more stringent trade laws be enacted to control the traders and the use ot
liquor. 86 From these and other recommendations, Calhoun issued his Report
in 1818 calling for the abolition of the factories.

suggested several new laws.

In their place, he

Calhoun recanmended that trading licenses cost

from $100 to $500 1 thereby limiting the m.unber of traders in the territory.
Traders were also to be confined to designated locations assuring closer
supervision by government officials. 87 Calhoun's Report was not immediately
accepted by the Congress, and the factories ranained in operation.
Opposition continued to grow against the factories in 184> when the
Secretary of War sent the Reverend Jedediah Morse to investigate the operation
of the factory system.

Upon his return in 18Zl., Morse reported his findings

to a congressional canmittee.

Morse was not impressed by the operation of

the factories at either Green BSiY or Chicago.

Interviewing Matthew Irwin,

Morse discovered that the Green BSiY factory conducted the majority of its
business with the white traders and the military personnel at Fort Howard.

Annual trade with the Indians did not exceed $1600 1 Irwin estimated, while
trade with Fort Howard and people of mixed blood accomted for $5 1 500.

Irwin

placed primary blame for the failure of his factory upon the large number of
traders in the territory1 thus causing him to sell to white inhabitants. gg
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Turning to Chicago, Iforse found that Vamum, for the past year, had traded
for fUrs amounting to only $25.

Although recognizing the influence of

whiskey upon the trade, Morse said the Indians were not actually maltreated
by

the trader.

to and

r: • • •

The Indians dealt with the private traders because they wanted
it is evident, that by some means, the Indians have not con-

fidence in the government, as fair and upright in their trade. 11B9 Morse
cited several reasons for the distrust of the factory by the Indians:

the

inferior quality of its goods, prior influence of British traders, and the
harmful effects of whiskey.

Morse concluded that the principal aim of the

factory system, the civilization of the Indians, had been a total failure.
Rather than advancing the Indians, horse said, the factory kept them in the
hunter stage of' civilization by increasing their dependence on the fur tra.de. 90

In 1821., the Canmittee on Indian Affairs in the Senate, held final
hearings before abolishing the factories.
Fur Company of ruining the factory.

Irwin again accused the .American

He stated that his sub-.facto?1', Louis

Rouse, was dispatched to the interior where Crooks deliberately sent three
men to oppose him. 91 Crooks rebutted such accusations by a.gain illustrating
that the supplying of private traders was against the purpose of the factory.
He claimed thc'1t Irwin supplied Rouse with goods totaling $3000 and that
Rouse, in order to derive a profit, sold the goods at prices higher than
required by the factory. 92
John Biddle, the new Indian agent at Green Bay, presented testimony
which showed a definite hostility to the factory system.

Biddle stated that

the goods supplied the factory were inferior in quality to those of the private
traders.

or

Further, he cla.ir:ied that Irwin had not only supplied large amounts

goods to sub-factors but also sold goods to private traders on credit.

aum. factors such as Vamun and Irwin

had overstated their case against the

In

British, Biddle
own goods.

e~lained,

and had failed to realize the inadequacy of their

The .factory was of no use to the frontier community, Biddle said,

and its end would be a blessing to the Indians.93
As congressional action neared for the closing of the factories, Thomas
Hart Benton was the most outspoken critic in Congress.

Benton wielded con-

siderable influence since he represented a frontier state and was a ranking
member of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.

Benton was also a confidant

of the American Fur Can.pany nnd worked closely with Ramsay Crooks and Robert
Stuart throughout the struggle. 94 Thomas McKenney could not delay congressional action indefinitely, and in 1821 he ordered Varnum and Irwin to begin
preparations for the eventual close of the factories. 95 McKenney, however,
steadfastly refused to accept the reasons advanced by Congress for such action.
The factories were not ineffective because of the inadequacy of goods or
Indian hostility, he claimed.

Their decline could be attributed to the com-

petition of the American Fur Company, the efforts of Thomas Hart Benton, and
the
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•

•

•

unsuitable provisions which exist for the regulation of the trade.

Hord.es of private adventurers, availing them.selves of the looseness of the
system have crowded into those parts on account of the superiority of furs
which are taken. 1196 The closing of the factories, according to McKenney,

would result in the alienation of the Indians fran the white population and
eventual bloodshed.
The final closing

or

the factories was a confused and tragic event.

In

1821, HcKenney ordered Vamum. and Irwin to begin the sale of their remaining
goods on a cash or credit basis.97 This policy was in accord with John
Calhoun's Report of 1818 that the .factories should be liquidated over a period

or

time.

Thomas Hart Benton, however, urged on by the American Fur Can.pany,

demanded their closing within two months.

Several Washin£rton businessmen

were cormnissioned to take charge of the final accounting.

These men, ·Caning

from the East, were totally unacquainted with the factory and the type of
business conducted. 98 Needless to 8837 1 Benton's hasty action caused a loss
of goverrmient funds and added credence to those who had claimed the .factory
had always been an impractical scheme.

In Chicago, Jacob Varnum had mer-

chandise t«>rth nearly $13 1 000.

A. B. Lindsley, who was canmissioned to close
the factory, eventually realized only $1 1 250 in cash from this merchandise. 99

He took the goods to Detroit where they were sold at prices .far below cost.
Lindsley totally ignored the outstanding debts of the Indians and whites in
the Chicago area. 100 Varnum, the Chicago factor, characterized the policy
of Thomas Hart Benton and the Congress as completely inept:
Hr. Benton had his own way. It was not probable that one in ten
in Congress knew much about an obscure system for the benefit of
the Indians, inaugurated long before a large portion of the members were elected. He debated it alone ••• carried all measures,
one of which w:as so absurd as to require a new set of agents to
relieve the old one and whose duty it would be to wind up the concerns. The effect of this measure, so far as the Chicago factory
was concerned was a total loss of all goverrmient property. A. B.
Lindsay (sic), a hanger-on about the offices for an appointment
for years, obtained the situation • • • .101
What was the basic cause for the failure of the factory system?

Through

the years scholars have advanced many reasons. 102 The factory, it is true,
was stocked with interior goods compared to the British manufactured products
offered by the American Fur Canpany.

The factory was also handicapped. by its

inability to advance goods on credit to the Indians which was a practice of
the private traders.

Ordinarily, the factory was located at a central point

such as Green Bay or Chicago where the factor waited for the Indians to bring
his furs.

The private trader, on the other hand, followed the Indians into

the actual trading area and conducted his business long before the factory's
influence was exerted.

The employment of whiskey in the Indian trade by the

.American Fur Company offered the Indians a canmodity they could not obtain
at the factory.

To a certain extent, the factory's personnel, compared to

that of the American Fur Company, was inferior.

Relative newcomers to the

fur trade and the region, the factors could not hope to compete with the established traders.

A resident of Green Bay perhaps summed up most accurately the

numerous problEID.B facing the Green Ba\Y and Chicago factories.

Speaking of

Major Irwin's Green Bczy- factory, Albert G. Ell.is observed that
Major Irwin was a gentleman of intelligence, culture and integrity,
and as well fitted for the trust as any citizen totally unacquainted
with the Indian country, its trade and inhabitants, could be - that
is, not fitted at all; and moreover, being furnished by the govemment with goods unsuited to the Indian trade, and coming in competing contact with lifelong experienced, astute traders, of course the
effort to gain confidence, trust and influence with the Indian was
a total failure. His sleazy, woolen blankets, cheap calico, and
worst of all his poor unserviceable guns, were all rejected by the
Indians; and during his four yea.rs trade, he did not secure fif'ty
dollars worth of peltries.103
Granted that all the above causes did eventual.ly contribute to the
.failure of the factories, they do not mirror the basic f'law of the factory
system.

From the very begirming, the success of the factories was impossible

because of the government's inability to establish a consistent policy in
relation to the Indian trade.

In both Green Bay and Chicago, the Indian

a.gents were licensing private traders while the factories were trying to
establish Indian trade relations.

By

allowing private traders in the terri-

tory, the government provided the can.petition which ruined its own factories.
Moreover, the factory was an organized business competing with frontier
traders.

Government policy seemed to have completely ignored the obvious re-

action of the frontier traders at Green Ba\Y and Chicago.

Residents on the

frontier for many years, the traders canpletely depended on the fur trade for
their economic livelihood.

Obviously, they would oppose with all the means at

hand, this competing economic enterprise.

The most important ingredient for
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the success or failure of the factors was the confidence of the Indians, and,
with the Indians, the traders held absolute influence.
This was a period of great change on the frontier.

The factory was not

only faced with the problems of its own contradictions, but it also had to
contend with the emergence of the American Fur Gompa.ny.

In the years between

1816 and 1822, the frontier, on the western shore ot Lake Michigan, witnessed
the competition ot two business enterprises both outside its economic and
political control.

From the beginning the government was handicapped in its

battle with the American Fur Company.

How could a government business with

appropriations ot only $300,000 compete with the emerging million dollar
capital of the American Fur Company? 104 With the abolition of the factory
system, the government finally acknowledged. its inability to follow a dual
policy.

Now the government merely sought to control and regulate the traders

and the American Fur Company, not compete with them.
With the withdrawal of the factories, the field for private enterprise
was left wide open for the American Fur Company.

In 1822, the American Fur

Company already had taken several long strides in the f onnation of a frontier
monopoly.

Yet they were aided by the government in their efforts to capture

the services of the independent traders.

The trader could more easily oppose

the factory with the f.ine supply of goods supplied by the American Fur Canpa.ny.
Independent traders received. licenses under the law of 1816 primarily through
the efforts of RamsBi.V Crooks and Robert Stuart.

Thus the independent traders

fell increasingly under the sway of the American Fur Ccmpany.
In addition, there was a general dissatisfaction and a sense of help-

lessness among the traders as they faced the various government institutions
driving them more quickly into what appeared to be the beneficent arms of the

30
American Fur Company.
Bay

For example, the military posts at Chicago and Green

only interfered, as far as the traders were concerned, with the nonnal

pattern of frontier life.

A regulatory agency, the military enforced many of

the laws relating to the tradeo

Furthemore, military posts did not serve as

an economic stimulus to areas surrounding the forts in these early years
because agricultural surpluses were not sufficient to supply the posts.

Until

the middle 1H20 1 s, moreover, contracts for the supply of the forts were issued
to eastern merchants.

When contracts were first handled by frontier residents

in the late 1820 1 s, these were filled by a few frontier merchants, not the

fur traders. 105 While the military was supposed to protect the settlers from

the Indians, the fur traders were hardly in need of protection from an Indian
society with which they had lived in harmony for years.

Testimony to this

disaffection between the military and the traders was frequently evident in
the letters of traders such as John Lawe:
There has been a great nwnber of United States troops garrisioned
or that are stationed at Green Bay but what good does that do me
it is only to assist in the ruining of me and the Pilfering or
general stealing, Killing of cattle, and corrunitting of every kind
of depredation that they can & do still continue that is the good
they do for all there is upwards of 20 officers in that Station
one would suppose that would keep the men in good order & at the
sentries & throw a good deal of Cash and make the place lively
but far from that they are only paid once a year & it is onl.y one
man that benefits by it. I can assure you that I do not get one
dollar in a month. They B.r'.:J a nuisance to society & in place of
being put there for the £5gtection of the place they are the
destruction of it • • •
In the total picture of the hostility between frontier residents and

governmant institutions, perhaps one of the most revealing episodes was the
handling of private land claims at Green

B~

in 1820.

:'11th the imposition

of American control, the government passed several laws regulating the title
to land of fonner British traders.

The whole process was disquieting to the

31
traders.

They had lived at the Bay for many years, built houses, and ..f'a.rrn.ed

sr:iall tracts of land.

Now they were required to explain and prove to Isaac

Lee, the government commissioner to investjgate the titles at Green Bay, the
validity of their claims to the lanct. 107 For a number of' years, the rumor
circulated among the Green Bay residents that the gove!"n!llent would not approve
their claims.

In February, 1Sl9, they petitioned Washington for an :immediate
108
confirmation of their land titles.
By September, 1820, the goverrnnent
still had not taken final action and many of the traders feared that they
would lose the land. 109 At this juncture, the traders were aided by the
political power of the fil'llerican Fur Company in

~·Jashington

and the land titles

were r.iore quickly conf'inned. 110 Once again, the American Pur Canpany, taking
advantage of a frontier problem, utilized political power to strengthen their
hold on the traders.
From 1816 to

182~,

the government employed military posts, Indian

agencie~

factories, and national legislation to pacify the Indians and secure the
frontier on the western shore of Lake :Michigan.

This was the first exposure

of future townsites at Chicago, Hilwaukee, and Green Bay to American in.fluence, but the frontier inhabitants reacted negatively.

At the same time,

the American Fur Company moved into this region in order to exploit the fur
trade.

Utilizing the contradictions of government policy and the trader's

discontent, the American Fur Company slowly established a monopol.y over the
fur trade.

From 1822 until the arrival of whi'te settlers in the 18.30's, the

American Fur Company was the controlling force over the whole of the we stem
shore of Lake : :ichigan.
1

The period of American Fur Company dominance was the

next stage in the history of future townsites on Lake Michigan's western shore.
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CHAPTIB II

An Era of Frontier Exploitation:

The American
Fur Company in Chicago, 1817-1835

In the years after the 't,'ar of 1812, the frontier on the western shore

of Lake Michigan attracted the attention of both government and private
enterprise.

For approximately eight years, the government hesitated, experi-

mented, and faltered in an attempt to devise a suitable frontier policy.

The

American Fur Campany was present throughout the period, having been attracted
to the area by the fur trade.

For several years, the company contested govern-

ment policies, such as the license law of 1816 and the factory systan, in an
effort to secure a monopoly over the trade.

By 18221 when the factories were

abolished, the fur trade was thro'Wll open as a field for private enterprise.
But this was only half the story.

Contemporaneous with its struggle with the

government, the lunerican Fur Company moved slowly into the fur trade itself
by devising business procedures, organizing traders and trading territories,
and competing with other business enterprises.

Along the lake shore at

almost every juncture of rivers and Lake Michigan, fur trade posts were
eventually established by the lunerican Fur Company; if occupied earlier by
British or independent traders, such posts came under their control.

These

posts were the first establishments of lunerican business enterprise at the
cities we lmow today:

Green

Racine, Kenosha, and Chicago.

Ba.Y,

Kewaunee, Manitowoc, Sheboygan, llilwaukee,

At the smaller junctures, such as Kewaunee and

Racine, these posts were occupied only during the summer months when the
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Indiana returned from their winter hunt.

At other points, notably at Green

Bay and Chicago, more permanent settlements developed.

Few areas of American history, however, have been as shaded by ranantic
illusions as the fur trade. 1

linages of the traders blaz:lng the first trails

in the wildemess, of the independent traders bartering with the wily Indians,

of great cities springing up where fur trade villages had once existed have
become part of American folklore.
generalization about the trade.

The last is perhaps the most persistent
In 1$93, Frederick Jackson Turner, :in his

famous essay on ''The Significance of the Frontier :in American History, 11
·wrote that
.. • • The Indian trade pioneered the way for civilization. The
buffalo trail became the Indian trail, and this became the
trader's 11trace 11 ; the trails widened into roads, and the roads
into turnpikes, and these in turn were transfonned into railroads • • • • The trading posts reached by these trails were on
the site of Indian villages which, situated as to coomand the
water systems of the country1 have grown into such cities as
Albany, Pittsbur~h, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Council Bluffs,
and Kansas City.
Perhaps Turner• a essay was merely suggesting to scholars to embark on more
detailed studies of the trade, yet nearly sixty years later a two-volume
history of the fur trade concluded with al.most the same generalization that
Turner had expoundedz
The physical remains of this magnificent effort (the fur trade)
are often quite imposing, for many important cities owe much to
the tradin~ which took place in their vicinity. Among the best
known are Montreal, Quebec, 1<.doonton, and Victoria; Chicago,
Niagara, Detroit, fbany, Pittsburgh, Augusta, Mobile, New Orleans,
St. Louis, Pierre.
But was the fur trade the catalyst which led to the emergence of cities
such as Chicago, l'1ilwaukee, Green Bay, or any number of secondary cities on
the shores of Lake Michigan?

Was the trade an independent and individualistic

frontier business? What was the true role of the fur trade and the Ar.nerican

42
Fur Canpany in frontier expansion? Was there any positive econoudc or social
connection between the fur trade era and the following period of town growth?
The western shore of Lake Michigan provided a perfect opportunity to analyze
not only the conduct of the fur trade as the first economic enterprise or
future towns, but al.so to study the relationship between the fur trade and the
towns it supposedly fostered.
\·lhile John Astor and his two lieutenants, Robert Stuart and Ramsay Crooks,
battled and cajoled national and local officials, they also took the first
sure steps in creating an effective fur trade organization.

John Astor always

remained in New York to oversee the buying of goods for the trade and the
selling of furs in the markets of America and throughout the world.

Ramsay

Crooks and Robert Stuart directed the actual conduct of the trade from their
Mackinac headquarters.

Fran Mackinac outfits, or the supply of goods for a

particular post, were assembled and then loaded into boats called batteaux for
transfer to the interior.

The goods canpiled for the trade included every-

thing from i.mglish playing cards to tomahawks.

Silk, gloves, breeches, and

wrist bands were exchanged for the pelts of raccoon, mink, otter, bear, martin,
red fox, deer, and muskrat. 4 Prices in the markets of the United States and
foreign countries determined the amount of business transacted for any type
of fur.

Fran his offices in New York, John Astor kept close watch on the

major markets of the world and regularly inf'onned Crooks and Stuart at Mackinac
of price changes.

Through Crooks and Stuart such infonnation t.;radually reached

frontier traders little acquainted with the fluctuations of a world market
affecting their trade.5
Traders with the company were employed in different capacities and paid
not only for the skill of the task but aJ.so for their knowledge of the Indians.
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Clerks and boatmen received from $150 to $200 per year.

In 1821, Gurdon

Hubbard, a prominent Chicago trader, received $125 for his services as a
clerk. 6 The more important traders who headed an entire territory, such as
Jean Beaubien and John Crafts of Chicago, received from $800 to $1000 per
year.

Most traders hoped for a salary since it guaranteed them against per-

sonal losses from the trade.
American Fur Ccmpany.

Salaried individuals were rare, however, in the

Two alternative methods of compensation were introduced.

The first of these methods was to supply independent traders with goods at
slightly higher prices.

These traders then could sell the furs they collected

to whomever they wished. 7

this scheme.

For a long while, the Green Bay traders operated on

Finally, the traders could share the profits and losses of the

trade with the company.

These men would either receive one-half the profits
of their outfit or suffer one-half the losses. 8 Eventually, the Chicago outfit operated on this scheme.

The American Fur Company preferred its traders

to work on the pro.fit-sharing scheme since any losses sustained would not be
completely bome by the company.
Since the trade was mainly conducted with the Indians, the connections
of the traders with the Indian population were especially important.

The

Chicago area was inhabited by the Fox, Potawatomie, and Ottawa tribes.
Alexander Robinson and Billy Caldwell, who lived in the settlement at Chicago,
were half-breed Indians acceptable to both the white and Indian populations,
and who worked closely with the traders of the American F'ur Canpany.

Such

ties were essential for the successful operation o! the Indian trade.

The

Green Bey region, on the other hand, was occupied by the Menominee and the
Wisconsin River Winnebago.
Menominee.

Milwaukee was a mixed village of Potawatomi and

The Green Bay traders, who controlled both these areas, had
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married into the tribes.

Leading traders 1 such as Jacques Porlier and
10
Because of the closeness of the two
Augustin Grignon, had Indian wives.

societies, the Indians ordinarily placed a good deal of trust in these
traders and their goods.
With the arrival of the American Fur Company, the independent and rather
haphazard conduct of the fur trade came to an end.

Astor employed large

capital resources and the harsh business practices of an organized company.
The company was often ruthless in its takeover of a trading territory.
petition was usually handled in two basic ways.

Can-

First, the independent trader

was forced out of business by cutthroat practices, such as price wars, or
political pressures on national or local officials.

On occasion an indepen-

dent trader was offered employment in the American Fur Company either by
salary or profit-and-loss.11 With a large capital and extensive organization,,
the company gradually monopolized the whole trade on the western shore of
Lake Michigan.

Chicago was the first area to attract the attention of the .l'\.merican Fur
Company.

If the canpany was to dominate the trade of the Illinois country,

it had to control Chicago.

1''rom Chicago trade goods could easily be carried

to the interior by utilizing the water connections frcm the Chicago River to
the Illinois River and fran there to the Mississippi River.

Chicago was also

one of the two sites on Lake Michigan of pennanence, Green Bay being the
other, where the Indians and whites had carried on trade for years.

Chicago

itself was not a rich fur trading area, but it was a depot for the collection
and packaging of furs from the territory and a point where goods could be
transshipped frcm the lake to traders in the interior.
praninent Illinois trader, was led to remark that
~as

Gurdon Hubbard, a

by this time (1820) there

11

a very limited trade here, in fact, this place never had been preeminent
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as a trading post. 1112 Realizing this fact, Hamsa.y Crooks and Robert Stuart
took the first step toward controlling the Chicago area by appointing John
Kinzie to head the Chicago outfit. 13 Kinzie annually received a large supply
of goods fran Mackinac which he then sold to independent traders who filtered
into the Indian country fran their Chicago base.
To build an effective monopoly, the American Fur Company also established.
the Illinois outfit which traded along the Illinois H.iver deep into the
interior of the country.

Under the leadership of Antoine Deschamps, the

traders of this outfit assembled their trade goods at Hackinac and then
travelled by boat to Chicago.

The small boats skirted the east side of Lake

Michigan averaging about forty miles per day.

Once arriving in Chicago, the

traders proceeded up the south branch of the Chicago River.

The boats then

had to be portaged or pulled through Mud Lake to the Desplaines River.

The

outfit next travelled down the Illinois Iliver on which trading huts were located every forty to sixty miles.

Throughout the winter, the traders bartered.

with the Indians arriving at their huts or journeyed into the Indian country
for trade.

When spring came, the outfit, with the winter's supply of furs,

again travelled up the Illinois River to Chicago for the return voyage to
Mackinac. 14 With the establishment of both the Illinois and Chicago outfits
in 1817, the American Fur Conpany exerted control over the fur trade.
They were not, however, the first American business interest to reach
the Chicago area.

In 1816, the Detroit based !inn on Conant and Mack had

sent John Crafts to Chicago with a large supply of trade goods. 15

Crafts was

the first to supply the fonner British and independent traders with goods.
When John Kinzie entered the area for the American Fur Company in 1817, his
first task, of course, wa.s to overthrow

Craf~s

control of the trade.

Grafts

,.
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roved to be a stubborn opponent, and by 1019 the company transferred a
'-tilwaukee trader, Jean Beaubien, to Chicago to provide increased competition
for John Crafts. 16 Gradually Cra..ft 1 s profits from the trade dwindled to alost nothing.

Facing the competition of the American Fur (;ompany not only at

hicago but at other locations, Conant and Mack eventually sold out to Astor's

ti:nn. When this occurred in 1822, John Crafts turned to seek employment with
the American Fur Campany. 17 Thus the American Fur Campany had el.iminated its
jor rival from the Chicago trade by applying direct can.petition and also by
el:iminating the source of' supply.
To insure control over the trade, the company also engaged independent
traders who might otherwise be supplied with goods from other trading concerns.
Conant and Mack, for instance, supplied an independent trader, Jean Chandonnai,
with a small assortment of gocx:ls for the Chicago trade.

R.ams8'}" Crooks offered

Chandonnai a wider selection of goods at better prices, and soon Chandonnai
contracted to trade for the American Fur Company. 18 A sjrnj)ar incident
occurred along the Illinois River where Gurdon Hubbard encountered the competition of Antoine Bourbona.is.

In a short time Bourbonais, enticed by a more

liberal off er from the company and fearful of their competition, joined the
American Fur Campany.19
Throughout the trading territory adjacent to Chicago, the company
established trading outfits.
area.

Several traders were employed in the Milwaukee

Solomon Juneau was given charge of the I::ilwaukee outfit in 1818, 20

but numerous other traders were sent there from both Green B8'}" and Chicago
during the season.

James Kinzie and Jean Beaubien regularly participated in

the Milwaukee trade from their base at Chicago. 21
For years the traders had filtered throughout the Indian country
haphazardly seeking a profitable Indian trade, but now the .American Fur
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company brought a new organization to the fur trade.

The Indian coun1;,ry was

divided into specific trading territories with men assigned to each locality.
In this way, the company could reach all the various Indian tribes and hunting

grounds.

Desertion from one's trading area or infringement on another trader's

territory was frowned upon by Crooks and Stuart..

After opposing John Crafts

in Chicago, Jean Beaubien returned to nuwaukee in 18Zl.1 an area which he

considered his own private territory.

To his dismay, Beaubien discovered that

the company had moved both James Kinzie and Solomon Juneau into the area.
Disgusted with the arrangement of Stuart and Crooks, Beaubien fonned an
association with two or three independent traders to oppose the American Fur
Company at Milwaukee.

Beaubien's scheme lasted only a short time, for Crooks

and Stuart warned him that the company could bring considerable business
2')

pressure on this venture. ·-

Dissatisfied, but unable to form any other

business connection, Beaubien was soon back in the employment of the American
Fur Company sharing the Milwaukee area with many other traders.

By 1823, the monopoly of the Chicago trade was beginning to take shape.
John Kinzie withdrew from the burdensome duties of director of the Chicago
outfit to undertake the post of Indian sub-agent at Chicago.

Robert Stuart

therefore needed a responsible trader to direct the Chicago outfit.

Crafts,

the former agent of Conant and Hack, was the logical choice 1 but he was
difficult to bring to contract terms.

Crafts demanded a very large trading

area extending fran Milwaukee to areas along the Illinois H.iver.

Stuart

could not agree to such terms because these areas were already divided among
other traders. 23 But Stuart could not afford to lose the services of John
Crafts.

He knew the Chicago trade and many independent traders who, i!

supplied from anoth<:r source, could always provide cam.petition.

Thue Stuart
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offered Crafts a limited trading area but at a salary of $1000 per year.21+
Stuart would have preferred that Crafts work on a profit-sharing scheme
dividing the profits and losses of the trade with the company, but exepdiency
demanded that Crafts be given a more liberal trading agreement.

Crafts

joined the compan:'.', but Stuart remained displeased with the contract tems. 25
Many traders did not obtain the same lucrative terms obtained by John
Crafts; in fact, the general rule was poor wages for traders.

Gurdon Hubbard,

who traded with the Illinois outfit since 1818, received only $26o as a clerk.
Hubbard became disenchanted with the company's wages, and in 1823, threatened
26
to quit unless he received a substantial salary increase.
Hubbard talked
with representatives of the fur trading interests in St. Louis, but Stuart
acted quickly.Zl

Realizing that Hubbard had been employed with the Illinois

outfit for five years and was well-acquainted with the trade, Stuart appointed
28
him director of the Illinois outfit.
The patteni of the American Fur
Company was clear; important traders who controlled a territory or traders
who

:~ight

otherwise provide competition received liberal wage contracts to

join the company.
monopoly.

All policies were directed toward establishing a trade

The traders, nevertheless, rarely derived large profits or were

they adequately compensated for their services.
Under John Crafts1 s leadership, the fortunes of the Chicago outfit
steadily advanced.
the territory.
purchased his

Yet, as always, competition occasionally filtered into

In 18241 Captain Henry i•Jhiting, a retired army officer,
O'W?l

stock of goods and attempted to set up an independent

operation in the Chicago area. 29 The American 1',ur Canpany moved in swiftly.
At first, Stuart tried to employ Whiting at a specific location.JO ·whiting
rejected this offer, and John Grafts was given the responsibility of dealing
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with the problem. 31 Crafts debated two alternatives; he could c01~pete "'lith
.whiting for furs and the services of traders, or he could purchase
entire business.

~Jhiting'

s

Stuart refused to make the f:inal decision and told Grafts

that 11you know the resources of the Country and the extent of injury you are
likely to sustain from his winter operations. 1132 Eventually Crafts purchased
1dhiting's operation much to the dismay of

~villiam

B. Astor in New York.

To

William B. Astor, the ccrnpany could not a.f'ford to buy out every competing
trader.

Robert Stuart, however,, defended Craft's action because competitive

business procedures were often more expensive over several seasons. 33

The

Whiting affair nevertheless exemplified the business tactics of the company;
independent operations in the fur trade were quickly
~:ben

~prooted.

the government factory system was abolished in 1822,, the government

assumed a regulatory role over the Indian trade.

The American Fur Canpa.ny

thus was forced to maintain friendl..v relations with Indian agents and the
military in order to temper government policies for the benefit of the canpany.

In Chicago,, they met varying degrees of success in controllJng local

officials.

Control or influence of the Chicago Indian agent was of great

importance.

In 1821,, the cor.:tbined lt.tstions of the Potawatomi, Ottawa, and

Chippewa had ceded five million acres of land t.o the United States.
return for this land, the government agreed to
subsidy in currency at or near Chicago. 34

p~

the Indians an annual

These annuity pccyments were con-

trolled and administered by the Chica.go Indian agent.
trade was actually conducted on two levels.

In

Thus the Chicago fur

First, there was the normal

exchange of goods for the Indians' furs carried on at Chicago and along the
Illinois River.

Secondly, there was a considerable exchange of goods for

money received by the Indians at the annuity p8'Yfilents.

The American Fur
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company then would send large shipnents of goods to exchange for the money
received by the Indians.

In Chica.go, the company was fortunate in having a

close friend, John Kinzie, serving as Indian sub-agent.

In 18:..:4, the rela-

tions of Kinzie and the .American Fur Ccrnpany were especially evident.

At

this time, John Crafts, the head of the Chicago outfit, was in Detroit and
the post was placed in the charge of John Hamlin. 35 With the Indian annuity
pB3Dlents due shortly .from v/ashington, Stuart cautioned Hamlin to prepare his
goods carefully.

Arly difficulties which might arise, Stuart told Hamlin,

can be discussed with John Kinzie despite his position as Indian sub-agent. 36
Thus Kinzie operated on both sides of the fence.

Charged with protecting the

Indians from the inflated prices of many fur traders, Kinzie also worked in
close cooperation with the American Fur Company.
At other times, the American Fur Company's influence was not quite so
evident forcing Stuart and Crooks to exert political pressure or to disregard
the laws relating to the Indian trade when they proved detrimental.

In 18.24,

the government passed a law designed to regulate the conduct of the Indian
trade.

This law required

Indian agents to designate, from
and suitable places for carrying
Indian tribes and to require all
thus designated, and at no other

time to time, certain convenient
on trade with the different
traders to trade at the place
place.37

The law enabled Indian agents to exercise stricter control over the
traders.

In this way British traders could be eliminated, traffic in whiskey

could be curtailed, and the Indian's welfare could be safeguarded.

The law

was originally supported by the American Fur Company, for it provided another
legal means for the company to eliminate competition.38

In the Green Ba.y

region and throughout the territory, licenses granted to an independent
trader required him to trade at a designated spot.

The American Fur Canpany
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would then erect a post nearby and reduce the price of its goods so drastically
that the private trader would be forced out of business.

Once the private

trader had been eliminated, the company again raised its prices to recoup
the losses suffered in breaking down the opposition. 39 The law was also quite
favorable to the Green B(\y traders since the posts designated by the Indian
agent were those ordinarily used by the traders.4°
Although the law did not adversely affect the American Fur Company's
interest in the Green Bay area, the Chicago outfit experienced considerable
difficulty.

The local Indian agent, Dr. Alexander Wolcott, refused to grant
trading locations desired by Robert Stuart and the American Fur Compa.ny.41
Thus Robert Stuart suddenly became an opponent of the 18.24 law where the
interest of the company required such action.

Stuart immediately' wrote to

Governor Cass stating his displeasure with the law.

Knowing that Cass favored

the develoµnent of private enterprise in the trade, 42 Stuart hoped that he
would apply the law leniently.

The law operated unfairly in the Chicago area.,

Stuart explained, because the canpany•s traders, being known throughout the
area, would be required to locate at a specific post.

Meanwhile, private

traders, unknown by the Indian agent, would be able to locate wherever they
desired.

Applying the levers of political pressure., Stuart requested Governor

Cass to temper the attitudes of Dr. '•Jolcott at Chicago toward the American
Fur Company:
I hope, Sir, that you will have the goodness to request Dr. Wolcott
to grant Mr. Crafts licenses for this reason, with the usual privileges that is, not to be confined to a designated spot, for others
have the liberty of running about in the vicinity of their posts
and it would be ruinous for him not to have the same advantage.43
Knowing that Governor Cass could not act .immediately and to avoid losing
the profits of the 1824 Chicago outfit., Stuart adopted another expedient to
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escape the regulations of the law.

He wrote to George Boyd, the Indian agent

at ;:.fackinac and friend of the American Fur Company, requesting him to grant
John Grafts licenses for one year. 44

In this way, Hobert Stuart hoped to

supercede the authority of Dr. Wolcott at Chicago who refused to grant such
licenses.

·'tihile Stuart worked behind the scenes pulling political strings,

he wamed John Crafts to obey the law only as far as the situation pennitted. 45
As the w;.nter trading season approached, Stuart became more adamant in
his objections to the law.

To his surprise George Boyd at Mackinac had re-

fused to grant the privileges requested.

Stuart knew that the law only for-

bade traders to conduct trade in furs and goods outside the designated post,
while sewing nothing about extending credit to the Indians.

Thus he advised

John Crafts to circumvent the law by following the Indians into the territory
not for trade but for the purposes of collecting debts and establishing
credit.46 Furthermore, Stuart suggested a means whereby the law could be
totally ignored:
• • • But in the event of his adhering to his first determination,
and that your trade suffers; you must, altho very repugnant to the
inclinations of the Company, or its agents, use the only means left
you in securing us fran serious loss, which is to confine your
unlicensed trade to the lands ceded to the United States • • • • 47
Since the Indian agent only possessed jurisdiction over the Indian
territory, Crafts could trade along the botmdary between ceded and tmceded
lands without being required to locate at any definite post. 48 By the Indian
Treaty of 1821 6 large segments of land in the Chicago area had been obtained
by the United States.

This land, then, would constitute the area in which

Stuart and Crafts could once again avoid the laws of the United States.
Despite his many objections to the law, Stuart received little aid fran
Governor Cass or the national government.

The law had little affect on Green

Bav. but it was trouble sane in Chicago and other trade regions.

In 1826.
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stus.rt was still quite active in attempting to secure the law's repeal.
;_,;riting to the Committee on Indian Affairs, Stuart cited two principal objections to the law.

Because the Indian trapping areas varied from year to year

due to the increasing scarcity of game, Stuart explained, the trading posts
had to follow such movementn.

Stuart feared that a post established one year

might be located too far away for effective trade the next.

Secondly, Stuart

claimed that it was extremely difficult to advance the Indians any credit
under such a system.

If the trader could not follow the Indians into their

hunting grounds; he could not determine the prospects of the trade, nor coU::.d
he be assured, af'ter advancing credit, that the Indians would deliver the
rurs.49 Since it was precisely these abuses which the government wished to
eliminate, the law remained on the books.

Many times the trader advanced the

Indians credit, and then he paid a low price for the furs, dragging the
Indians deeper into debt.
many such abuses.

With designated posts, the Indian agent prevented

In Chicago, though, the .American Fur Company ordinarily

succeeded in avoiding the law's impact.
Similar to many large corporations, the American Fur Company faced
innumerable personnel problems.

The traders continually protested over their

poor wages and limited trading territories.
differently.

The canpa.ny handled each case

Usually the trader was at the mercy of the company because there

were few alternatives on the frontier to employment with the American Fur
Canpany.

Jean Beaubien who consistently can.plained of the poor trading terri-

tory at Hil.waukee fell into disfavor with Crooks and Stuart and often received
a very small supply of goods. 50 Disgusted, Beaubien left his designated
trading area and returned to the neighborhood of Chicago.

Because of

Beaubien's refusal to abide by company regulations, Stuart and Crooks ignored
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his complaints of economic hardship.5l
Despite these several problems, the Chicago trade advanced under John
craft's leadership.

By 1825, he felt safe in abandoning his previous wage

agreement with the company for $1000 per year. 52 Y.nowing that the Chica.go
trade faced bright prospects: Crafts chose to work on a profit-sharing scheme.
crafts•s ideas on the fortunes of the Chicago trade were well-calculated.
In September, 1825, however, Crafts died and a delicate problem arose
concerning the new head of the Chicago outfit. 53

Beaubien•s belligerent

conduct while Crafts was head eliminated him from the post.

Gurdon Hubbard,

now head of the Illinois outfit, was available but not canpletely familiar
with the personnel in the Chicago area.

John Kinzie finally emerged as

Stuart's first choice for the position.

Kinzie possessed two attributes which

made him especially valuable to the company.

First, he was an experienced

fur trader, a life-long resident within the area, and on friendly terms with

the Indians.

Secondly, Kinzie was then Indian sub-agent for the Chicago area

under Dr. Alexander Wolcott.

This position not only gave Kinzie a strong

connection with the Indian population, but placed him close to Dr. ,blcott who
had been unfriendly to the company in enforcing the trade law of 1824.

John

Kinzie was thus a?pointed head of the Chicago outfit with Jean Beaubien as
his assistant. 54 Beaubien 1 s assignment as assistant rather than head of the
Chicago area was occasioned by Stuart's distrust of his ability:
It is probable that Hr. Beaubien might have conducted the whole
tolerably well, but as I have not full confidence in his capacity
~or ~~ e=;tensivo ~ concern r ~hought it best to associate
••r. Kinzie with him • • • • 5
Stuart made it perfectly clear that Kinzie's decisions would take
precedence over those of Beaubien.

Beaubien never really

acquies~ed

in this

arrangement and continually feuded with John Kinzie over the Chicago trade. 56
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The forgotten man in the plans of the American Fur Company was Gurdon
Hubbard.

Although the Chicago and Illinois outfits experienced several pors-

perous years between 1824 and 182'7, Hubbard was a good example of how the
canpa.IlY prospered while the traders floundered.

In 1825 1 Hubbard received

$400 per year, but he expected a raise when Crafts died. 57 With the assignment of Kinzie to the Chicago post, Hubbard was prepared to leave the Indian
trade and take the post of Indian sub-agent which paid $500 per year. 58
The Chicago area experienced several years of successful trad.e.5 9 In
1825 Stuart, pleased over the returns of the Chicago outfit, sent John Kinzie
an even larger supply of goods for the 1825-1826 season confident that Kinzie
could manage the whole affair. 60 Stuart's optimism was not justified.

In

August, 1827, Stuart had to report to John Astor that the Chicago outfit had
suffered a considerable loss.

This failure was blamed on the large number of

credits which Kinzie had not collected. 61 Another possible explanation was
that the Indian annuity payments which the Chicago outfit had so heavily
depended upon had been moved a considerable distance fran Chicago. 62 Moreover, the trade was affected by the natural depletion of game from the
territory.

As early as 1825, a military officer passing through Chicago had

commented that

11

•••

the quantity of game in this part of the colmtry is

diminishing very rapidly, and ••• it is barely sufficient for the support
of the Indians • • • • 1163

6

In 182'7, John Kinzie resigned from the .American Fur Canpany. 4 This was
also the last year that the company sent a large supply

or

goods to the

Chicago area. 65 When Kinzie resigned, Gurdon Hubbard also changed the character of his trade.

Hubbard, in 1825, was one of the :few traders to realize

the changing character of the frontier. 66 He noticed that soon the trade

-with

the white population would be of primary importance.

Knowing that

Chicago was still a sparsely populated area with a diminishing amount of game
and Indians, Hubbard in 182'7 moved to Danville, Illinois.
a brisk trade with the greater white population. 67

Here he conducted

In 1828, Hubbard sent a

special request to Jol.n Astor in New York to supply goods suitable for trade
with white settlers.

He could not obtain such goods at Hackinac since their
68
stock was still geared to the Indian trade.
In addition, Robert Stuart

and RmnsSiY Crooks objected to the abandonment of the fur trade for a retail
business.

69

Finally, in 1828, Hubbard became a partner in the company for the trade
of the Illinois Hiver district.

The American Fur Company reluctantly agreed

to furnish him with the necessary goods both for trade with the whites and
Indians.

Hubbard no longer wished to trade in the Chicago area.

Instead, he

bought out the canpany 1 s rights at Danville and along the Illinois River
where there was a greater concentration of population.

The company agreed

not to supply any other traders in that area i f Hubbard would assume their
outstanding debts amounting to $500. 70 With the resignation of John Kinzie
and the departure of Gurdon Hubbard, Jean Beaubien finally became the chief
Chicago trader.
individual basis.

The American Fur Company now merely supplied traders on an
For all intents and purposes, 1828 marked the end of the

fur trade society in Chicago.
From 1816 to 1828, the American Fur Company controlled the economic
destiny of the westem shore of Lake Michigan.

In Chicago, along the

Illinois Itiver,, and in Milwaukee, the canpany slowly brought the majority of
independent traders under its control.
beset on aJ.l sides by company personnel.

Those who refused to comply were
Depending upon the situation, the
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government and its regulator-y policies were utilized or ignored.
traders, economic and social life centered on the company.

For. the

In effect, the

American Fur Company was the principal agent of frontier control, but was it
an agent of frontier expansion?
While under the control of the American Fur Campany, Chicago changed its
character ver-y little.

In 1821, a government surveyor passing through the

settlement comnented that "the village of Chicago consists of about nine or
ten houses. 1171 In 1825, a i·iisconsin resident visited Chicago and saw only
fourteen houses and about seventy-five people. 72 As late as 1827, a visitor
canmented that the settlement had not changed since 1821. 73

To successfully

conduct the fur trade, the American Fur Company, of course, had to maintain
frontier conditions.

White settla:nent, extensive production of staples, and

the develoµnent of retail merchandising were changes which the American Fur
Campany opposed by necessity.
From 1816 to 1832, the company managed to control the character of
settlement, the econanic life of the region, and the traders.

In 1825, the

first tax assessment was levied on Chicago for the purpose of determining
voter eligibility.

The entire valuation amounted to $91 047.

The largest

segment of this valuation was registered in the name of John Crafts and
belonged to the American Fur Company.
$4,047 on their

Olm.

Thus the people of Chicago held only

Further, examining the figures one can connect several

names as associated with the American Fur Company as either clerks or boatmen.
Adding their value to the American Fur Company, one finds that only $975 of
the total tax assessment was in no wa:y, or none that can be traced, connected
with the American r'ur Company. 74
Beginning in 182$, though, the Chicago fur trade entered a period of
relative decline.

A few traders were still supplied on an individual basis

-;ith Jean Beaubien heading the general operations in Chicago.

Bernadtia and

David Laughton operated a small post on the Desplaines Hiver to trade with +~x_

potawatani, but since the Laughtons were only expected to collect three to
four hundred dollars worth of furs, their trade was quite small. 75 Pa.rt or
the reason for the decline in the fur trade was the gradual purchase of
Indian lands in Illinois and the eventual movement of the tribes west of the

Mississippi.

With the departure of the Indians, the most essential element

in the fur trade disappeared.

In 1833, after the Blackhawk War, the tribes

ceded their last remaining land east of the Mississippi fli.ver. 76 This event

marked the end of tho fur trade in the Northwest as it had operated for a
hundred ye are.
The Treaty of 1833 was the last major economic operation of the American
Fur Company in Chicago.

At the Treaty I the eovernment purchased land rran

the Indians and agreed to
due to Indian outrages.

p~

the fur traders and settlers for property lost

These claims went as far back as the War of 1812.

Many who came to Chicago in

1833 wished

to advance claims for property sup-

posedly stolen by the Indians, others were land speculators, while the
majority saw the opportunity to make a fast dollar before their Indian
brother departed for lands west of the }fississippi. 77 The American Fur
Canpany was no exception.

W. G. Brewster, agent at Detroit, wrote to David

Laughton requesting him to consult all local traders who wished to present
claims at the Treaty.

This was done in order that they might give Brewster

the power of attorney to handle their claim.s. 78 Robert Stuart was also at
the Treaty to push through the enormous claim of the American Fur Company.
lndiVidual traders, such as Jacques Vieau and Solomon Juneau, arrived to
Pl'eaent snall claims, but, even more importantly, they brought a large supply
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of goods to tra.de.·/'7

Interesting, too, was the fact that Governor Cass, Jean
Beaubien, and Gurdon Hubbard were witnesses to the Treaty. 80 The spokesmen

for the Indian tribes were Alexander Robinson and Billy (.;al.dwell, both of
whan had been closely connected with the fur trade and traders since the early
1s.20•s. 81 Governor Porter, the chief government commissioner, was a personal
friend of the Klllzie family.

The Kinzie family eventually drew large grants

Many of the goods distributed to the Indians by the govern82
ment were purchased from another Kinzie relation, Joseph Kercheval.
fron the Treaty.

Throughout the history of Indian relations and especially in the Old
Northwest, these treaties were the scenes or graft and corruption. 83 The
Treaty of 1833 was little different.

Meeting in Chicago, the Indians were

freely supplied with liquor despite the fact that the government had only
recently passed a law introducing strict regulations against any liquor in
the Indian trade. 84 At the Chicago Treaty under the eyes of Governor Porter,
Indian agent Thomas Owen of Chicago, numerous local officials, and foreign
visitors, the traders plied the Indians with whiskey to obtain their money.
The traders were unrestrained; much of the Indian payment arrived in fifty
cent pieces and strangely the traders sold beads, bread, and whiskey at the
rate of fifty cents a purchase. 85
But trade alone did not attract the American Fur Campany and traders.

By the Treaty of 1833, the Indian ceded their rema.ining lands east of the
Mississippi amounting to approximately five million acres.

In return, the

government agreed to take care of any debts levied against the tribes in
addition to providing lands west of the Hississippi.

The .American Fur

Company and the traders presented innumerable claims against the Indians.
According to the payment schedule of this treaty and four others, Gurdon
Hubbard received nearly

$6,ooo,

various members of the Kinzie family received
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$2.J,OOO, Jean Beaubien $3 1 000 1 and finally the American Fur (.;ompany garnered
86
nearly $17,00o.

Official Washington never forcefully reacted to the corruption surrounding
the treaty, but questions were raised about the large

stUnS

granted individual

traders and the American Fur COL~pany. 87 'Ihe most cursory consideration of
the Treaty indicated that the American Fur Company and the traders received
a large payment considerably out of proportion to the damages suffered.

Hardly a year before the Treaty, Indian agent Owen of Chicago had claimed
that losses in the trade due to Indian ravages had never amounted to any
88
Then just a year later the traders
significant amount in the Chicago area.
drew large sums from the Treaty.

Why did the government al.low such depreda-

tions and fraud to take place at Chicago and elsewhere in the 1830 1 s? Anxious
to obtain title to Indian lands and to speed the removal of the tribes, the
8
govermnent was little disposed to '~icker" excessively with the Indians. 9
Due to long years of business relations, the traders and the American Fur
Company held a certain degree of influence over the Indians.

If prohibited

from trade at the treaties or denied their claims, the traders could have
easily blocked the successful conclusion of a treaty because of their influence over the Indians.

Thus partially to expedite matters 1 the traders

and the company were given free rein at the treaty sessions. 90
The Treaty of 1833 brought forward another interesting aspect of the
trade.

None of the leading traders who drew

claim the money as their own.

p~ents

frcm the Treaty could

The Kinzie family was faced with the debts

that John Kinzie had compiled during his early years in the fur trade. 91
Gurdon Hubbard, who had traded for many years in the Chicago area, was in
debt to the American Fur Company for

$6,uoo.

Stuart even attempted to stop

,.
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Hubbard's claim from being pa.id on the grounds that the money rightfully
belonced to the cornpany. 92 Jean Beaubien, who received $3,UOO fran the Treaty
of 1833, was eventuaJ.l~r forced to pay $2,000 of this sum to the company. 93
Thus the 1irnerican Fur Company not only received a large claim but was also
able to collect the debts of !onner anployees.
in judging the fur trader's success.

The pczyments were significant

The company had exploited the Chicago

area for nearly twenty years, and many times derived large profits from it.
The traders, however, had never realized profits.

Partly through their own

careless financial habits and partly through the exploitative policies of
the American Fur Company, the

Chicru~o

traders, in 1833, had littlA investment

capital as Chicago was about to entAr a period of commercial growth.
Immediately after the Treaty of 1833, Chicago experienced a population
boom.

The lands ceded to the United States were now opened for settlement.

1830, the population did not exceed 100, but by 1835 Ghicago numbered
nearly 3500 people. 94 Almost as quickly the fur trader passed into obscurity.
In

Land sales were controlled by eastern speculators and town promoters.
fur trader knew little a.bout the town springing up about h:i.mo

The

John Kinzie, Jr.,

when he went to file pre-emption claims for the land his father ha.d settled,
failed to claim all the land that was rightfully his.

In his own words,

Kinzie was happy with just enough land to live on. 95 Gurdon Hubbard proved
to be one of the few traders who actually benefited f ran or contributed to
the town growth of Chicago.

In 1835, Hubbard invested in land speculation. 96

The new town now under the influence of speculators began new industries,
agitated for harbor improvement to increase lake commerce, and drove to complete the Illinois-!1ichigan Canal.
the rate of commercial growth.

All such o.oves were designed to increase

Chicago, indeed, had bridged the gap between

,,
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a fur trade village a.nd to'Wll.

The people who initiated such changes were not

even residents of the city two years before.

The capital employed was de-

rived fran land sales, eastern banks, and -=ovenunent internal :llnprovement
achenes.

Fur traders passed out of Chicago history; that is, they rarely

emereed as leaders of the camnunity.

'I'he actual course which the traders

followed was not clear because their names were not involved with the business
of thn new town.

Hany remained in Chicago while others moved westward where

their skills were still required.
The fur trade, though, did not automatically or suddenly cease in 1833.
For some time, the traders existed side by side with the citizens arriving
tran the East.

Jean Beaubien was supplied by the American Fur Company until

1835 when he purchased their remaining goods and buildings. 97

As late as

1839, many furs were still collected in Chicago for shipment to the East,
but it was a trade conducted on an individual basis by commission merchants
or owners of dry goods and clothing stores to supplement their incomes.98
The heydczy- of the .fur trade had passed, and the trade which remained paled
into insignificance alongside the new economic forces being generated in the
frontier town of Chicago.
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CHAPT.:I.R III
An :~ra or E:::ploita.tion:
The .American Fur Co.11pany in Green Bay, 1815-1$40

From 1816 to approximately 1833, much the same situation existed in
Green Bay as in Chicago; the American Fur Campany moved in to fonn a monopoly,
exercised complete control or the traders, and when business declined left
behind a number of traders indebted to the company.

In the history or the

Green Bay trade, the operations of the American Fur Campany were clear.

It

utilized the methods and practices of a major business enterprise exploiting
for the moment the traders and the country.

This, of course, was the design

of the company, to make money while favorable conditions prevailed.

But the

period of the American Fur Company• s control of Green Bay and other posts
along the more northerly shore of Lake Michigan had little or no relation to
the region's economic growth and an adverse affect on the economic and social
destiny of the traders.

The fur trade period at Green Bay y,>oints even more

clearly to the generalization that the fur trade contributed little to westward expansion and even less to a generation of frontier inhabitants.

During the period fran 1Sl6 to 1822, the traders at Green Bay were
seriously hurt in the trade by the competition of the factory system and
numerous government regulations such as the license law of 1816.

Utilizing

political influence to temper government policies on the Green Bay traders,
the American Fur Company slowly brought these traders under its influence.
Throughout 18201 the independent traders cmtinually complained about their
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I

dwindling profits because of government interference. 1 Gradually each.trader
turned toward the American Fur Company and purchased goods to trade for the
Indian's furs. 2 Each trader, however, was canpeting with his neighbors at
Green Bay and business did not noticeably improve.
and conducted in a haphazard fashion.

The trade wa4 disorganized

1'18.ny areas were visited by several.
The majority of trading

traders while other regions were left untouched.

occurred in the :i.moediate neighborhood of Green Bay, but on occasion a trader
would joumey up the Fox to the
visited

~Jiscons:in

River.

other traders periodically

~Iilwaukee. 3

The American Fur Company was also dissatisfied with the conduct of the
trade.

Their profits were apparently reduced because of the abundance of

traders and unorganized fashion in which they operated.

Rams~

Crooks and

Robert Stuart decided to alter their arrangements at Green Bay by reducing
the ntunber of people employed, defining areas of trade, and instituting a
sound organizational structure. 4 To reduce losses, Ramsa\Y' Crooks selected
the most canpetent Green Bay traders to form a partnership.

inclu:led five traders:
~acques Porlier.

losses.

The agreement

Louis, Pierre, and Augustin Grignon, John Lawe, and

.:!Ach agreed to share

1/5 the profits or suffer 1/5 the

Operating under the title of the Green

~

!Were to be obtained from the American fur Canpany.

Company, the trade goods
The

co~tract

forbade the

Green Bey Company fran buying goods or exchanging furs with any canpeting
enterprises.

The agreement was to last for three years.

One signatory of

the contract was to remain at Green B8i}r handling the administrative details
and the packaging and shipping of furs to Mackinac.

The remaining traders

Were to hire boatmen and clerks as needed and locate themselves in selected

~gions of the Indian country. 5

72
By establishing the Green Bay Company, the American Fur Carn.pany dropped
from its accounts many other traders previously supplied on an individual
basis•

These traders probably obtained goods fran competing firms, but Crooks

ard Stuart seemed to feel that a centrally organized Green Bay Company would
be able to subdue rival interests.

Ramsay Crooks, though, was careful to

employ the most skillful personnel and those who might otherwise provide
extensive competition.

\·men the contract for the Green Bay Company was

originally signed, Jacques Parlier, a leading resident of Green Bay, was
absent.

Rather than lose his services, Crooks signed his name to the contract.I

Later Crooks convinced Porlier of the propriety of joining the Green

Bay

company instead of remaining an independent trader. 7 Other traders :in the
are& were less fortunate, and Crooks bluntly refused to supply goods except
to the i"i ve partners of the Green Day Canpa.ny. 8
While Chicago was only a small settlement, Green
population and was an established community.

B~~

P.ad a greater

For years the fur trade has been

conducted in relative freedan fran outside regulation.

Until 1822 1 the

.American govenunent appeared to be the most imminent threat to the nonnal conduct of the trade.

The traders soon discovered that their nomal. methods of

conducting the trade were also seriously curtailed under the direction of
the American Fur Company.

It assigned each individual a specific location,

usually a.long the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers.

Areas which "the Green Bay traders

had formerly visited were now allotted to traders frcm different regions.

For example, the Green Bay traders had often journeyed down the \·;isconsin P..iver
all the way to the Mississippi River in search of favorable trade.

By 18221

h<>lfever, this territory was controlled by other traders of the American Fur

Cclnpany, notably Joseph Rolette operating from Prairie du Chien. 9 In 1822,

r------------------------------------TI-,
Augustin Grignon of the Green
Company continued the practice of trading
Bay

along the lower '.:isconsin River despite the American Fur Company's directions
that this area belonged to Joseph Rolette.

Robert Stuart at Mackinac con10
s:idered Grignon's conduct symptomatic of his general lack or principles.
In
the winter of 18221 Augustin Grignon and Joseph Rolette bitterly fought for
the Indian trade along the Wisconsin River.

At one point, Augustin Grignon's

trading post was burned by the Indians. l l Grignon immediately accused Rolette

of inciting the Indians and requested that his trading license be revoked by
the government.

12

Govemor Cass, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs,

recommended that the Indians be punished and that Rolette lose his license,

but government action was never taken. 13
The strangest aspect of the feud with Rolette was the attitude of the
American Fur Company.

Crooks and Stuart were disgusted not with Rolette•s

ccnduct, but with that of the Green

B~

traders.

Their outfits were never

profitable, and the company showed little patience with unsuccessful ventures.
Thus the .American Fur Company supported Rolette at every juncture because he

was of more value to the ccmpan,y.
goods ani

He was supplied with a finer assortment of

given a free rein in the territory.

Rather than crush all opposi-

tion, however, Crooks cautioned Rolette about his policy with regard to the
Green Bczy- traders:

I am perfectly aware that the capital placed in your hands by the
Campany gives you the power to injure all your competitors, i f
not to destroy their business altogether, and I am not ignorant
of the advantages which such a result would secure nor have I
the smallest doubt that such is your a.:im - Still however obvious
the benefit, mcxieration toward those who derive their supplies
from us, must be the eoveming principle • • • • 15
The Rolette feud was temporarily halted in October, 1823, when Joseph
Rolette and Augustin Grignon agreed to share trading territories on the orders

l
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Joseph Rolette.

In the early 1820's there was considerable fur trade com-

petition arow1Ci Green Bay.

Being one o! the few permanent settlements on

Lake i·1ichigan, Green Bay was naturally t.he first place business enterprises
in the fur trade stopped along the western shore of Lake Hichi3an.

Stuart

suspected that the Green Bay Company occasionally purchased goods fran
agents of American Finns in Detroit. 18
only ruin a large outfit, the

AL~erican

Fearing that the competition would

Fur Company consistently refused to

supply all the trade goods desired by the Green Bay Company. 19

In areas such

as Prairie du Chien and Chicago, where t.heir monopoly was ;,;ore secure, the
American Fur Company sent more substanti.al outfits.
The total economic effect, however, was to handicap the traders of the
Green Bay Canpany.

They could not canpete with the other trading outfits in

the Bay area or with Rolette simply because their supply and selection of
goods was inferior.

Year after year, tlle Green Bay Company lost heavily in

the Indian trade, and consequently the traders increasingly fell into debt
to the American Fur Comµmy. 20

Crooks and Stuart were convinced that the

Green Bay Company would never yield pro.:fits, yet they persisted in maintaining
an interest. at Green Bay.

'Why?

business considerations in mind.

These entrepreneurs had very practical
If the American Fur Company could maintain

a token opposition against other fur trading interests, perhaps the canpetition Would never gain a real foothold at Green Bay and naturally never be
able to threaten more profitable trading areas.

Writing to Joseph Rolette,

.!iobert Stuart expressed these tactics itl regard to the Green Bav traders:

r ___________________________________
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For they (Green Bay traders) have got goods fran Irwin at the bay,
(which he got from Detroit) • • • • besides I know that Lockwood
made them a liberal offer to supply all their wants; and let the
result be loss agaizl, they would have strengthened his opposition,
so as to make it of serious consequence to your operation for
their would be no restraint whatever; and it would be throwing
them completely into the arms of our opponents, which as I have
already stated, might be of no beneficial result to either of
21
them, but still must have turned out of serious detriment to us.
Had Robert :>tuart and Hamsa;y- Crooks given up their hopes of monopoly in
the Green Bay area by 1822?

This seems the most plausible explanation.

The

competition which Stuart and Crooks most feared was nore than just the passing
interest of other fur tra.d.ing companies.

They were, or seemed to be in 18221

permanent residents of the Day who could not easily be defeated.

Thus Stuart

and Crooks used the Green Dey Can.pany as a hindrance to the trade of competitors, never expecting a profitable return except in the broader perspective
of a free field for trade elsewhere along the lake shore.
In purely business t;, erms, the tactics of the American Fur Company were
certainly apropos.

The competition to the canpany centered in the area of

Green Bey known as Shantytown.

The area originally consisted of taverns and

small stores for the supply of the military personnel at Fort Howard.

22

In

182)1 Daniel Whitney arri. ved at Shantytown where he opened a sraall trading
store.

Soon he was joined there by two other merchants, William Dickinson

and Hobert Irwin, Jr.

ot the

Th.e presence of these stores gave the few residents

Bey opportunities to purchase goods at competitive prices.

13ut the

retail trade with the white settlers was not of sufficient volume, and these
merchants soon directed t 1ieir attention toward the Indian trade • .23

At first,

Robert Stuart could not believe that Whitney was actually participating in
the Indian trade. 24
at Green Bay.

He a.1so derided Robert Irwin's efforts to hire traders

',:riting to Jacques Porlier, Stuart observed that

r---------------------------------------------------,
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I believe the house of which Hr. Irwin is said to be a.gent will
create more noise than effect: the Lord knows the trade is
already bad e{!Qugh; but if more fools will come, why we must
wel cane them. 2'

The Amr:dca.n Fur Canpa.llY did welcane these new traders at the Day; at
least the canpa.cy did not, in the beginning, oppose their interests.

The

Green Bay Company, as intended, would provide enough competition to hold
the Shantytown merchants at bay.
'..hile the business tactics of the American Fur Canpacy assured that the
competition would not damage the general profitability of the Indian trade,
the Green 13a,y traders were £'acing economic ruin.

The Shantytown merchants

quickly established. business relations with the Indians.

Daniel Whitney and

his cohorts were able to se11 trade goods at lower prices than those allowed
by the American Fur Campany1

and naturally the Indians increasingly directed

their business toward Shantytown.

26

John Lawe instructed the partners o:f

the Green Bl\)' Company to conduct all their trade with the Indians as f'ar
awiq .fran Green Bay as possible in order to keep the Indians from trading at
Shantytown.

At one point, Lawe even considered spreading the rumor that

amaJ.1 pox was ravaging the Green Bczy citizens in order to keep the Indians in

the interior. Zl

Lawe had good reasons for contanplating such radical action.

The Indians often accepted their trade goods on credit f rarn the Green Bay
Canpany, and then at the end of the seasoo sold their furs to Irwin,
Dickinson, and ~Vhitney. 28

'This action, of course, left the Green Bay

Company no W83' to liquidate its debts to the American Fur Canpany.

The Green Ba,y traders slow:Ly realized the strategy behind the American

Fur Company's establishment. of the Green

Bay Company.

In 1822, Jacques

Porlier bitterly canplained that the American Fur Canpany was supplying other
P90ple with cheaper gocxis and locating them at trading territories which,

~--------~--~-:-------~-------TI--,
Robert Stuart, of course, denied all such

tor years, he had occupied.

.

accusations.

29 John Lawe, however, added to Porlier's testimony by summarizing

the many complaints of the Green Ba.r traders:
As I wrote you last year they made us fonn a Company at the Bay
but it is mere Burlesque for to throw us into misery & trouble
they pretend it is for our own good - it is true it would be if'
we had the privileges of others (that is to get our goods as low
as they could really give them & with a good profit) & at least
liberty to go where we please - but no it is quite the contrary they doo •t wish I believe to ruin us for fear an opposition might
form & come into the country .30
Lawe explained that the American Fur Company had sent traders into areas
where they had alwczys traded -

at Milwaukee, at the Portage of the Fox-

Wisconsin Rivers, and even on the Hock River.
Green

B~

31 In September, 18.23, the

Canpany again contracted for goods fran the American Fur Company 1

but John Lawe did not expect to make any profit.

In fact, Lawe seriously

doubted whether any of the Green Bay traders would ever recover from their
losses in the Indian trade.3

2

John Lawe had good reason to question the economic plight of the Green

B&y' Canpany because years of competition and the tactics of the American Fur
COlllpany had placed them in inextricable economic difficulties.

By November,

1822, Robert Stuart estimated the total indebtedness of the Green Bay Company
at $16,1.-00.

At this early date, Stuart proposed that the traders mortgage

their land and claims to land to the American Fur Company.

He also demanded

that these mortgages be of short duration, for he realized the bitterness
lilich the traders harbored against the company. 33

In April, 18.23, the American Fur Company merged w:i. th Stone, Bostwick, and

Ccmpany of Detroit necessitating a complete accounting of the Company's
business ledgers.

Stuart used this opportunity to disband the Green Bczy

· Company and settle its debts. 3 4 He decided new trading arrangements were

,,..__________________-:--:-----:----:----:---~-:-:--------:-~~--:-7-,8
,

necessary, but expressed confidence only in Augustin Grignon and John Lawe to
ever comuct a profitable trade.

35

After 1823, therefore, the American Fur

company again supplied goods to selected traders in the Green Bq region.
The trade steadily declined after 18.23.

The principal reason was the

greater competition especially that of Daniel Whitney and the other merchants
at Shantytown.

Rather than withdraw from the region, the American Fur Company

supplied :individual traders hoping a few would derive a fair trade.

In 18.25,

roirteen separate traders were employed with goods totaling $8,344.

In 1826,

t~nty-two

traders received $111 617 worth of goods.

36 Thus the profits which

could be garnered by any single indi victual were considerably reduced as the
territory was flooded with traders.
Robert Stuart attempted to reduce the losses of the American r'ur Company
bf urging the traders to follow more strict economic procedures.

Michael

Dousman was sent to Green Bay to work with John Lawe and the other Bay traders.
Furthermore, Stuart instructed the traders to issue no more credits to the
Indians tor a winter's outfit.

The large number of traders now in the terri-

tory, Stuart said, left little hope of ever obtaining the furs credited to the
Indians.

To prevent the merchandise stores of Shantytown from obtaining their

ture, he told Mr. Dousman to erect a store in the Shantytown area enabling him
to keep a careful watch on the opposition. Lawe was also instructed never to
ld'Vallce the white population any credit since they
gu&rantee pa.vment.

h~ too few occupations to

Although Stuart did not at this time outlaw trade with the

White settlers, he was against making such business a supplementary occupation
ot the traders.

Therefore, he required that trade with the white settlers be

Oanducted on a cash basis.3 8
The strategic economic moves made by Stuart for the benefit of Green Bay
Ind the canpany had little effect.

For the trading season of 1825 .. not one

r

79

Green

Bay trader realized a profit.

Stuart. blamed this failure on the

opposition provided by Daniel Whitney • 39 He knew that 'ifuitney was a serious
threat to the Green

B~

Whitney had employed.
two of

~~itney•s

traders, and advised them to hire the traders which

Stuart himself attempted to hire Paul and Amable GrignonJ

more enterprising agents.

40

These men refused to join the

American l''ur Canpany, and in the next season Whitney employed seven traders. 41
Therefore, Sb.art (to protect the American Fur Company) warned his traders not
to reduce their prices in order to compete with Whitney• s men.

Rather, Stuart

said, hold your goods and let hhitney' s men compete with each other.

42

In the 1826-1827 trading season, Stuart expected heavy losses at Green

aq, but he hoped that soon all the traders would be forced into other occupations. 43

Green Bay had its

Stuart's fears were not without justification.

worst season collecting .f\l.rs to the value of only $800.
bad for Daniel

\·~hitney,

and he offered to sell his interest in the trade to

the American Fur Company.}+:.+
Whitney's offer.

The season was equally

Always the master strategist, Stuart refused

Conditions were now favorable to the American Fur Company,

for Stuart merely wished to produce a stalemate in the Green Bay area.

Comment·

ing on Whitney's offer, Stuart clearly expressed his viaw:

Whitney must have suffered severely - and wishes me to buy him out,
but he may make the most of it for altho we cannot abandon that
trade, I would rather he should supply some of the people, than we;
for whether there is opposition or not, no money is to be made
there.45
After 1828, the American Fur Canpany sent fewer goods to Green
comucted the majority of business through John Lawe.
all.owed to divide the trade goods among his friends.

Bavr

and

If he wished, Lawe was
The American Fur Canpa.ny

bad accanplished their objective; the trade was unprofitable for all concerned.
H°" harsh were the business practices of the company?

The story is not complet~

1fithout realizing that the Green Bq traders, in many instances, contributed to

80

ri'their own difficulties.

The correspondance between Mackinac and Green Bay

indicated that the traders had little desire or ability to conduct an economical business operation.

They were a generation of froo.tier inhabitants who

were accustaned to relative freedan in the Indian trade, and they never quite
adjusted to the changing conditions of the frontier's economic life brought
by the government and the American Fur Company.

The traders often did not

bOther to go into the interior to obtain the Indian's furs.

46 At other times,

John Lawe gave his friends goods on credit knowing that their ability to pay
was questionable.

ot his friends.

Stuart constantly warned Lawe about the outstanding debts
If Lawe refused to act, Stuart made it clear that he would be

held responsible. 47
habits as

11

Stuart once characterized the Green Bay traders• business

there exists among the gentry of that district an unconquerable

aversion to economy, and their only care seems to be to get into their profession the means of pampering their indolence • • • • ,/+B

Finally, there was

considerable evidence that the American Fur Canpany, while trusting John Lawe,
worried over his excessive drinking which affected his conduct of the trade. 49
Despite these numerous problems 1 there seemed little doubt that the
American Fur Company exploited the comtry and the Green Bay traders.

The

principal reasons for the increasing indebtedness of the traders were the
bueiness tactics of the American Fur Company. 50

The company occupied many of

the choice trading sites fonnarly used by Green Bay personnel, and thEV often
re.fused to supply Green Ba.Y with an adequate stock of goods to oppose their
can.petition.

In effect, the American Fur Canpany' s control of Green Bay was

a b.isiness tactic designed to safeguard more valuable trading areas in the
interior by preventing the competition from gaining a base at Green J3ai1.

The

traders~ unaccustomed to business tactics and economy 1 naturally .faltered and

81
Like the country, they were exploited as the frontier monopoly
shaped the economic destiny of the western shore of Lake Hichigan.

But why

did the traders continue their affiliation with the American Fur Company?
traders had few alternatives.

The

Fur trading was their only skill and really the

onlY business enterprise at this

sta:"~e

of frontier development.

Only in later

years with the growth of towns would commercial enterprises offer the possibility of new opportunities.

Faced with the decline of tlY! fur trade and the

machinations of the American Fur Company 1 the traders confronted a dilemna.
F..a.rly in the 183J 1 s John Lawe best expressed the problems of the Green Bay
traders:
I will canmence in s~ing that the first year after the ~;ar was the
last year I saved myself for eveey year since I have been losing
money and not a little in that cursed Indian trade that l have always persisted & do still persist to continue which will soon put
me a beggar (but you may well say or ask the question why do you
still continue since you find it a loosing business) I will say I
do not know what to do else as ~ am not capable of doing or following any other kind of business. l
Fran 1828 to 18371 therefore, John Lawe and many other French inhabitants
continued their involvement with the American Fur Can.pany.

In the early 1830 1 sJ

John Lawe and the Grignons exploited the old trading areas along the Fox River.

Aa the years passed 1 the traders, following the Indians, moved further north

in the present-day state of Wisconsin. 52

The traders and the American Fur

Campany also remained at Green B8'f' for the occasional payment of Indian
annuities.

At various times since 1829, the government had purchased land

from the Imians and in re tum agreed to pay the Indians an annuity.

As in

Chicago 1 the American Fur Company supplied goods on these occasions to obtain
the lniian•s money.

tl'lde.

l.83o•e

John Lawe depended heavily on these P81!11ents for his

The importance of these annuity payments was apparent in the early
when the government subsidy arrived too late for the Indians to purchase
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goods and still reach t.he hunting areas for the winter. 53

For John Lawe,

this meant no winter's hunt; and for the American Fur Company, it meant a
reduction in the number of furs collected.
cal pressure on the

v:ar

Thus Ha.msay Crooks exerted politi-

Department to pay the Indians at least by early August.

Through Janes Doty, an influential territorial politician and friend of the
secretary of War, Lewis Cass, E.amsa.y Crooks pressured Washington for earlier
Indian pa.yments. 54

Immediate action was not forthcoming ar.d in both 1834 and

1835, John Lawe again lost money in the trade.

On

his 1834 outfit, Lawe

lost approx:imatel.y $2700. 55
Ramsay Crooks steadily cautioned John Lawe against giving credit to
either whites or Indians.

Even though the Indian annuity payments arrived

late, Crooks prohibited goods being released on credit.

He was also, as a

general policy, against the selling of any goods to white settlers.

Thus

Lawe could not conduct a retail trade with the white settlers who, by 1835,
more and more began to drift into the Green Bey area. 56

In November, lS.35,

Crooks admonished John Lawe for presenting the canpany a list of debts totPling
$1000 which were owed by white settlers.

Crooks observed that

You certainly lose more by bad debts, and you have always done so,
than you can possibly gain by the good one, and if you did not
sell a dollars worth at all to the whites, you would be better off
at the end of the year.57
Repeated failures by Lawe and his canpatriots plus the inroads of white
settlement finally convinced Ransay Crooks that the American Fur Company
should withdraw fran Green Bay. Crooks left the final accounting to his
agent, Samuel Abbot. 58 Infonned of the Canpany•s intention, Lawe inunediately
wrote several letters charging that the canpany had always flooded the territory with traders and charged outrageous prices for goods.

Crooks refused to

listen to Lawe's complaints and informed Samuel Abbot to disregard Lawe•s

charges when assessing the debts of the traderso

Crooks apprehended that Lawe

and the other Bq traders were raising a furor in order to justify their con-

templated repudiation of the debts. 59 Wishing, however, to maintain f'riend.ly
relations with the Green

residents, Crooks did write several letters
attempting to explain the company's business policies. 60 Arter 1837, nonnal
B~

operations of the American Fur Company were terminated at Green

B~.

John

Lawe was occasionally supplied with goods even as late as 1840, but this was
merely a gesture to maintain Lawe' s friendship.

Thus the fur trade era had

passed.
But one might legitimately question why the American Fur Company remained
involved in the Green Bq area a.s late as 1839-1840.

Writing to John Lawe,

Ramsay Crooks implied that the company was motivated only by friendship for
John Lawe:
We would prefer to close all our affairs in your quarter, & shall
be pleased to hear that you have made better arrangements for your
own interest than those that have recently existed between us, for
we have only continued you, under the impression that it was for
the advantage & convenience of an old & much est~emed friend, & not
for the sake of the profit the business gave us.bl
Crook's statement told only half the story.

As early as 18241 the trade

was unprofitable but the American Fur Company remained for tactical business
reasons.

In the 1830 1 s, the fur trade declined as the territory filled up

with white settlers, yet the company remained despite its policy against retail trade with the whites.

The company's actions were again occasioned

primarily by economic interests.

Beginning in the 1820's as the traders fell

into debt, they mortgaged lands to the company.

This deeding of land continued

throughout the 1830 1 s, and the company, of course, remained to assure the
payment o:f debts.

In 1833 1 Robert Stuart strongly advised Augustin Grignon

to sell any land which he might hold to the inccming white settlers. 62

Grignon naturally was expected to use the profits fran the sale to pay hie
debts to the company.
In 1834, the American Fur Canpany itself underwent a major transformation

with John Astor selling his interest to Ram.say Crooks and several other financiers.

To expedite the final accounting of company funds., all outfits were

to be closed out and their debts liquidated.
could only mean complete economic disaster.

For the Green Bay traders, this
John Lawe faced the future with

great anxiety:
• • • I am very much af ra.id indeed and God knows what is going to
becan.e of me and you all for I do not know which way to turn my
head at present. I owe so much that there is not a day passes
over my head but what I am thinking o&j!lY great troubles & what I
am go:lng to do about my debts • • • •
The debts owed by Lawe and his fellow traders were astronomical.

James

Duane Doty was employed as the company's attorney in 1834 to expedite the
transferrence of land into the American Fur Company's hands.
the trader's indebtedness can not be accurately computed.

The extent of

A reliable indica-

tion, however, was that all the land mortgaged in the l.B20's and early 1830's
was foreclosed to liquidate the debt of $35,00o. 64 After 1834 the traders
continued to deed land to the American Fur Canpany indicating that the debt
exceeded the

Stml

of $35,ooo. 65

As the American Fur Canpany acquired land titles in Green Bay, the region
along the western shore of Lake Michigan witnessed the arrival of thousands of
tanners and town dwellers.

Rather than withdraw fran Green Ba.r, the lands

deeded to John Astor and Ramsay Crooks were plotted into the town of Astor.
The value of land, of course, increased rapidly in the era of town speculation,
but the traders never shared in its developnent.

A contemporary resident

described the conditions which led to the plotting of Astor:
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••• The land was originally owned by John Lawe and the Grignon.
family. Together with other real estate, it was taken in payment
of balance due the old Green Dczy Company to the former Company;
the debt having accrued by loss in the Indian trade for in this
business it generally happened that the small traders who purchased
their goods at higher prices after years of toil and privation
spent in the trade, came out with nothing • • • leaving the great
monopoly, the lion's share of the profits. The consideration received by the former o~ers was trifling compared with the present
value of the property.
Since Ramsay Crooks intended to engage in town speculation a.round the
Bay,

it becomes obvious why the American Fur Company continued to supply John

Lawe and attempted to maintain friendly relations with the residents.

James

Doty, who served as attorney tor the company and agent for its town property,
argued strongly in 1834 that John Lawe be permittad to retain his property.
Otherwise, Joty explained, public opinion at Green Ba\Y' could jeopardize the
success of the town at Astore 67 John Astor agreed with Doty's views, and
Lawe was al.lowed certain parcels of land and supplied with goods for years in
order to improve the image of John Astor and the American F'ur Gompany. 68
At various times, however, the company collected small portions of the
remaining debts owed by the traders.

The most advantageous time for collecting

debts was, as in Chicago, at the various Indian treaties when the zovernm.ent
paid the claims of traders agamst

-~he

Indians.

In 1836, a Treaty with the

Henominee was concluded at Cedar Point, Wisconsin, and the claims were to be
paid in 1837. 69 ltamsay Crooks considered journeying to the BB\f or at least
sending an agent so that the Green Bay traders would be forced to pay their
debts before spending the 1noney on land or goods. 70

In late 1837, at

Washington the government concluded treaties with the V!isconsin Winnebago and
Sioux.

Crooks urged Lawe to go to Washington and press his claims, for part

of the money was owed to the company. 71 When the clair:is were eventually paid,
the i\m.erican Fur Company demanded nearly $6,uoo in back debts from .John Lawe. 72

86
As late as 1840, Lawe signed a contract acknowledging that he alone owed the
.
Fur company ~
,. . 22 500 • 73
American
1

During these final years of the trade :in Green Bay, two eras of frontier
society existed side by side, but there were few relations between them.
Without land or capital, the old fur trader did not invest to any significant
degree in the land speculation along the 1.ake shore.

r.:.Xcept for supplying

John Lawe for public relations purposes, the American Fur Canpany moved its
trade further westward..

Ramsa_y Crooks steadily refused to conduct a retail

trade with the whites, and thus the traders only business connection was of
little use in the econcmic life of the new town.
Much the same thing occurred in Milwaukee.

In

Milwaukee, the fur trade

never attained the same character as it did in Chicago and Green Bay.
Milwaukee typified the conduct of the trade at the more transitory locations
on the lake shore such as Racine, Kewaunee, and Manitowoc.

Settlement never

developed arotmd .these areas until the 1830 1 s, nor were they ever centers
for the collection of .furs.

The first employee or the American Fur Company

to reach Milwaukee :for regualr trade was Solanon Juneau.

He remained

Milwaukee's principal representative of the American Fur Company tmtil lS,361837.

Throughout his tenure, however, the compa..w supplied numerous other

traders at Milwaukee.

Jean Beaubien located there at different times as well

as James Kinzie and Jacques Vieau. 74 John Lawe tran Green Bq also sent a
representative to Milwaukee, but as usual found the American Fur Company
solidly entrenched at this location.75
The 1'1ilwaukee trade remained on this basis throughout the
early 18JO•s.

1820 1 s~

and

Atter John Astor sold out to Ramsay Crooks, consideration was

given to closing the Milwaukee outfit.

The principal reasons were again

declining game, the influx of white settlers, and the gradual movement of the
Indians to lands west of the Mississippi. 76 By 1837, the Milwaukee outfit was
definitely closed out, but Juneau received an occasional supply of goods until
1840.77 In all these areas, the fur trade did not automatically end.

In

Milwaukee and Green B~, retail merchants periodically bought and sold furs.78
The fur trade was again conducted by individuals with only small capital investments.

As in Chicago, the fur trade wa.s no longer of any economic sig-

nificance at Green

~

and Milwaukee.

Solanon Juneau, who had always been Milwaukee's principal trader, hardly
noticed the changes taking place in frontier society.

As in Chicago and Green

Bay, Hilwaukee in the 1830's rapidly grew from a fur trading post :into a
frontier town.

Juneau did not realize the value of his land until Morgan L.

Martin, an enterprising frontier lawyer, instructed him on the :intricacies
of town develoIJ11ent and speculation. 79 Juneau remained part of the history ot
town growth in Milwaukee, but this was not due to his foresight or capital,
but to the proddings of eastern capita.lists and western entrepreneurs.
For nearly twenty years, therefore, the fur trade was the economic base
of the frontier on the western shore of Lake Michigan, yet was this trade a
significant step in westward. expansion and the later growth of towns?

There

seems little question that the fur trade had no significant effect on regional
growth.

Obviously, the fur traders and the American Fur Company had a vested

interest in sustaining frontier conditions; the advance of white settlement
could only represent the decline of the frontier monopoly.

Thus the American

Fur Canpany, operating from sites which would later become towns, controlled
the countey for nearly twenty years.

This :initial period of town history can

be most adequately described as an era of exploitation.

When white settlement

88

finally reached this region, the canpany moved further west rather than change
its basic economic framework for trade

w~.th

the whites.

i·,bat did the American Fur Company .leave behind?

In its wake

generation of frontier inhabitants indebted to the cooipany.

were a

In the middle

1S30's, land speculation was the chief economic interest of town residents,
but the traders possessed little capital and almost no land to enter into the
mainstream of town developnent.

Perhaps a recent historian of the fur trade

adequately summarized its significance:
• • • The above evidence lends support to the contention that the
fur trade as such did not play a very important role in our
dynamic westward expansion. It is true that some trappers eventually became guides for government and emigrant expeditions, but
their contributions were minor • • • • The number of persons
:involved (in the trade) was insignificant and the value of the
trade even locally, not very impressive. This is not to say that
the American fur trade had no importance as a vehicle of westward
expansion, but ~at its importance must be sought in areas other
than economics.
The fur trade and indirectly the .American Fur Company did make contribu-

tions to the later histOI"J of towns, but these were really minor.
trader did sustain canmunities at both Chicago and Green Bay.

The fur

Hore importantlyJ

the fur traders located new posts in the interior and along the lake shore,
and, to a certain extent, solidified the geographic site of later towns.

the

t~ansportatian

In

of goods to the interior along the major communication

arteries, especially the Illinois River to Lake Y.dchigan connection and the
Fox-Wisconsin waterway, the traders indicated the possibilities for the largeSl
scale shiµnent of goods.
Finally 1 the traders and their descendants were
trained in the basic methods of retail merchandising.

This training enabled
82
a few to enter the business canmunity of the new towna.
But all these minor

influences only serve to underscore what has becan.e increasingly apparent; the
developnent of towns required capital and technical skill, neither of which

89
~

the fur trade left to town sites on the western shore of Lake l:ichigan.
In 1833, the site of future towns at Green

Bay, Milwaukee, and Chicago

were in the same stage of economic and political developnent as when the story
opened :Ui 1816. Neither the traders, nor the American Fur Canpa:ny, nor the
military had any significant effect on their developnent before lSJJ.

It was

an era or 11 stage 11 of frontier history which sustained frontier traders and
filled the coffers of the American Fur Compa:ny. 83 The town sites remained the
same, and to speak of a westward movement before 1833 is really :Uiaccurate.
But in that ver-y year conditions were changing; new forces were astir :Ui
American life which would hasten the developnent of towns in less than a
decade.

This would be the true era of economic expansion, of the westward

movement, of town growth.

As in the period before, the major winds of change

began in the east in government councils, in the financial districts of New
York, and in the actions of enterprising capitalists.
we must now turn.

To these developnents,

FOO'lliOTliS
CHAPTER III
1 Louis Grignon to John Law, January 10 1820, in rrThe Fur Trade In
1

Wisconsin, II WHC, .xx, p. 146. Hereafter references to this collection or
manuscripts will be cited as WHC, xx. Other traders also complained or a poor
hunt. See especially the letters exchanged between Louis Grignon, Jacques
Porlier, and Jolm Lawe in the winter of 1820 in WHC 1 xx, PP• 150-159.
211American Fur Company Invoices, 1821-1822,

11

WHC, XI, p. 375.

3Louis Grignon to Charles Grignon, July 23 1 18221 !frill., XX, pp. 268-269.
Grignon describes here the general areas in which they traded, most being
located on the Fox River. Also see 11Porlier• s Narrative, 11 !lliQ, J..'V, P• 439.
4copy of an agreement between A. Grignon, Pierre Grignon, Louis Grignon,
and John Lawe 1 ~' XX, pp. 206-2JS.
5 Ibid., PP• 208-2.10.

6

Ibid., P• 210.

7Ramsay Crooks to Jacques Porkier, August 24, 182.l,

!:lli.£1

XV, pp. 211-212.

8Ramsay Crooks to Lewis Rouse, September 4, 182.l, and September 30 1821,
1
American Fur Company Papers, Vol. II, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
Hereafter, this collection of papers will be cited as AFC Papers, WHS. Crooks
bluntzy told Rouse that he no longer could obtain goods from the American Fur
ComparJT.

9Ramsay Crooks to Joseph Rolette, September 4, 1821, AFC Papers, II,
Willi.

10Ran.say Crooks to Robert Stuart, January 4, 1822, ~.

246.

l.lwuis Grignon to Augustin Grignon, February 191 18221 WHC, XX, PP• 243-

12Jacques Porlier to Lewis Cass I June 8, 1822, h'HC,
Porlier wrote to Governor Cass on behalf or A. Grignon.

90

xx,

PP• 258- 260.

..

91
l.3Govemor Lewis Cass to John Calhol.Ul, Secretary of \far, July 9, .1822,
WHC, XX, P• 265. Later in July, Grignon was informed that no action could be
tiken against Rolette because there was no definite proof. See James G.
Soulard to A. Grignon, July 29, 18221 ~' XX, P• 274. Joseph Rolette was
often involved in such incidents and was generally considered the most ruthless
trader in the territory. See David Lavender, The Fist In the Wilderness
(Garden Gity, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1964), pp. 321-325.

~say Crooks to flobert Stuart, April 81 1822, AFC Papers, II, WHS.
15Ramsq Crooks t.o Joseph Rolette, September 5 1823, AFC Papers, III,
1
WHS.
16Copy of an agreement between Joseph Rolette and the Green Bczy traders,
October 16, 1823 1 WHC, XX, p. 315; and Robert Stuart to Joseph Rolette,
September 101 1823, AFC Papers, III, WHS.
l7John Lawe to Janes Portier, February 3 1 1824, ill!£ XX, P• 3.33.
18Robert Stuart to Joseph Rolette, August 19 1822 AFC Papers, Il, v.iHS;
1
1
Stuart to 'Rolette, September 10 1 182.3, AFC Papers, III, WHS.
l9Rans8\Y Crooks to Pierre Grignon, October ;., 1821, AFC Papers, II, WHS;
I. Mason to Joseph Rolette, August 22 1 18221 J\1',C Papers, II, WHS.
20Robert Stuart to Jacques Porlier, October 25, 1821 ibid.
1

~bert Stuart to Joseph Rolette, August 291 1822, ~·
22ttenry s. Baird, 11Recollections of the Early History of Northem
Hisconsin, 11 !lliQ, IV, p. 202.

23 rnronnation on the original merchants at Shantytown is fol.Uld in an
excellent article by Alice Smith, "Daniel Whitney, Pioneer Wisconsin Businessman, 11 Wisconsin Magazine of Histoq, XXI (March, 1938) 1 pp. 262-292. Also see
Elizabeth laird, "Reminiscences of Life In Territorial. Wisconsin, 11 WHC, XV,
PPo 220-221; and Moses Strong, History of the Territory of Wisconsiii(°Madison:
Democrat Printing Campany, 1885), po 81.
24Robert Stuart to John Lawe, October 10, 1821, AFC Papers, II, i,.ms.
25Robert Stuart to Jacques Portier, October Zl, 1822 !ill£., XX, P• 290.
1

26John Lawe to Robert Stuart, January 4, 182.3, John Lawe Papers, Letter
Folder IV, Chicago Historical Society. Hereafter, this collection will be
cited as La-we Papers, Letter Folder No., CHS.
ZlJohn Lawe to Jacques Porlier, Novmiber 14, 1823, WHC, XX, p. 322.
28
John Lawe to Jam.es Porlier, February 3, 1824, ~., PP• 331-332.
29Robert Stuart to Jacques Porlier, May 16, 1822 ~., P• 255.
1

92
30John Lawe to Jacob Franks, Au.gust 26,

182~, !lli.Q,

XX, PP• 'Z77-'Z78.

-·

31 Ibid

32John Lawe to Jacob Franks, September 5, 1823, !'.!!Q XX, p. JOO.
1
3.3Robert Stuart to Ramsay Crooks, November 10 1822 AFC Papers, II, WHS.
1
1
34nobert Stuart to Lewis Rouse, l'iay 10 1823, AFC Papers, II, WHS;
1
Robert Stuart to Jacques Porlier, June 101 18:~3, AFC Papers, II, MIS; and
Lavender, The Fist In the Wilderness, pp. 345-346.
35Robert Stuart to Ram.say Crooks, November, 1823, AFC Papers, II, WHS.
3 6u.s., Congress, Senate, Resolutions Concerning the Decline of the Fur
Trade, Sen. Doc., 90, 22nd Cong., lat sess., 1832. In this document, the
American Fur Company presented a detailed list of all their outfits for the
past fifteen years, the goods sent, the number of people employed, and the
profits derived •

.37Robert Stuart to John Lawe and Micha.el Dousman, August 13, 1825, illi£1
XX, P• 378. Michael Dousman was earlier a very successful competitor of the
American Fur Campany.

Now as an employee of the canpany, he was sent to Green
See Lavender, The Fist
In the Wilderness, PP• 345-346.

Bey to :improve the fortunes of the Green Bay outfit.

38Ibid •
.39Robert Stuart to Ramsay Crooks, July 26 1 1826, AFC Papers, III,
40Robert Stuart to John Lawe, October 4 1 1826,

vms.

~·

41Robert Stuart to Jacques Porlier, November 10, 18261

~.

42Ibid.
WHS.

4.3Robert Stuart to Ramsay Crooks, November 2.3 1826, AFC Papers., III,
1

44Robert Stuart to Ramsay Crooks, August 18, 1827, ~. Robert Irwin,
Jr., who was al.so a merchant at Shantytown involved in the Indian trade earlier
followed the same course as Whitney and attempted to sell out to the American
Fur Canpa.ny. Stuart also re:f'used Irwin's offer. See Robert Stuart to Robert
Irwin., June 9 1 1825; AFG Papers, III, WHS.
4 5Robert Stuart to Ramsay Crooks, August 18, 1827, AFC Papers, III, WHS.
46

Robert Stuart to Ransay Crooks, November, 1823,

~.

93
Robert Stuart to John La.we, September 10 1 1B26, ~· John Lawe
continued this practice of releasjng goods on credit to his friends even in the
l830's. At one point, Crooks relieved Lawe of the pressure of his friends by
erooks himself telling the people that he did not trust their credit. See
Ramsay Crooks to John Lawe, November 3, 1835, La.we Papers, XII, CHS.
48RamS83' Crooks to Robert Stuart, January 4, 18221 AFC Papers, II, WHS.
49Robert Stuart to John Lawe, NovE1I1ber 7, 1824, AFC Papers, III, 1-.'HS.
50A different interpretation on the American Fur Company's policy toward
Green Bl\Y' is found in Lavender, The Fist In the Wildemess, P• 346. Lavender
claims that the principal reason for the failure of the Green Bay traders was
their own lack of business skill. However, Lavender fails to consider that
the American Fur Company blocked their efforts at every juncture.
51John Lawe to Hrs. Hamilton, September 12, 1824, .!fil£, XX, P• 351.
52r_ist of trading licenses granted at Green Bay, 1831-1832, in 1'George
Boyd Papers, 11 !fil9.1 XItl p. 295. Also see the letters of H.ams83' Crooks to
the Green Bl\Y' traderi"were moving north. (Green Bay and Prairie du Chien
Papers, IV, Wisconsin Historical Society.)
53Ramsay Crooks to John Lawe, February 16, 1835, AFC Papers, Burton
Collection. This collection of American Fur Company Papers centers on the
1830's. The papers are on microfilm at Cudahy Library, Loyola University.
Originals are located at the Detroit Public Library, Burton Collection.
54nam.say Crooks to John Lawe, March 7, 1835, ~., and Ram.say Crooks
to Janes Doty, March 71 1835, ibid.
55Ramsay Crooks to John Lawe, November 3, 1835, Lawe Papers, XII, CHS.
56Rams83' Crooks to John Lawe, March 7 1835, Lawe Papers, XII, CHS.
1
Ramsq Crooks steadily refused to allow his traders to sell goods to the
white settlers. Crooks' position is discussed in an article by J. Ward
Ruckman, 11Ramsq Crooks and the Fur Trade of the Northwest, 11 ~Iinnesota Histor;.y,
VII (March, 1926), P• 27.
57Rams83' Crooks to John Lawe, November 3, 1835, Lawe Papers, XII, GHS.
58Ramsay Crooks to John Lawe, August 17, 1836, Green Bay and Prairie du
Chien Papers, V, Wisconsin State Historical Society; Ramsay Crooks to William
Brewster, December 21, 1836, AFC Papers, Burton Collectipn; and Ramsay Crooks
to Samuel Abbot, May 27, 1837, AFC Papers, Burton Collection.
59Rams83' Crooks to Samuel Abbot, June 27, 1837, AFC Papers, Burton
Collection.
6•,
~See especiaJ.ly Ramsay Crooks to John Lawe, July 14, 1837, AFC Papers,
Burton Collection. Crooks pointed out that the canpany never made any profit
at Green B83' and continued their interest there merely to aid the tr~ers.

94
1Ramsq Crooks to John Lawe, April 4, J.$39, Lawe Papers, XIX, CHS.
6

~bert Stuart to Augustus Grignon, November

21 1833, Lawe Papers, X, CHS

63John Lawe to Rachel Lawe, September 4 1834, Green Bay and Prairie du
1
Chien Papers, IV, vms. For infonnation on the final accounting of the Green
Bay trade see Alice Smith, Jam.es Duane Do
Frontier Promoter (Hadisan:
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1954 , pp. 158-159.

64sm1th, James Duane Doty, P• 159.
6

5There are numerous legal deeds in the John Lawe Papers, Letter Folders

10 to 20, CHS, in 'Which Lawe continually deeded land to the American Fur

Company to liquidate debts compiled in the fur trade.
6
s. Baird, 11 Recollections of the fa.rly History of Northam
Wisconsin," !lli.Q, IV, P• 215.

6iten:ey

67Sm.ith, James Duane Doty, P• 171.

~enneth w. Porter, John Jacob Astor: Business Man (Cambrd.ige: Harvard
University Press, 1931), II, p. 1.231.
69charles J. Kappler (ed.) ,Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties (Washington:
1
Government Printing Office, 1904) • II, pp. 463-466.
70Ramsq Crooks to Samuel Abbot, 1~ Z7 1 lS.37, AFC Papers, Burton
Collection.
71Ramsay Crooks to John Lawe, October 71 18.37, ~·
72n.am.s8\1 Crooks to John Lawe, April 4, 1839, Lawe Papers, XIX, CHS.
73contract between John Lawe and Samuel Abbot, representative of the
.American Fur Campany, August 2S, 1840, Lawe Papers, XY~II, CHS.
7

~or a description ot the early Milwaukee trade see '~arrative ot Peter

11
II WHC, xv, PP• 458-459;
Narrative or Andrew J. Vieau, II WHC, XI,
P• 224; and Bayrd. Still, Milwaukee, the History or A City (Madison: The
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1948), PP• 5-S.
75Jean B. Jacobs to John Lawe, November 12 and December 21 1834, WHC,
1
xx, pp • .360-.361, 368.

J. Vieau,

76Ramsay Crooks to Solomon Juneau, March 31, 1835, AFC Papers, Burton
Collection; Ramsay Crooks to William Brewster, December 21, 1836, AFC Papers,
Burtcn Collection.
77'Rams8\1 Crooks to Samuel Abbot, October .3, 18.37, 1214•

78Green Ba.y Intelligencer, 18.3.3, passim; Milwaukee Sentinel, 18.37, passim.

95
f'1still, Milwaukee, P• 16; 1Narrative of Horgan L. Martin, 11 WHC, XI,

P• 4o6.
SOJanes L. Clayton, 11 The Growth and Economic Significance of the .American
Fur Trade, 1790-1$90 1 If in Aspects of the Fur Trade ed. by Russell 1.T. Fridley
(St. Paul: Minnesota Historical. Society, 1967), p. 72. Clayton's judgment of
the effect of the fur trade on selected regions is quite acc1irate, but this
does not touch the question of the profitability of the trade to the American
Fur Company and the country as a whole. Predictab~, Clayton contends that
the fur trade had no important national economic significance, and that actu~
it declined in volmne and profitability under the American Fur Company.
(Cl~ton, 1Gr.owth and Econcmic Significance,'' p. 70). Numerous authors,
however, presented a different view. In one of the earliest monographs on the
rur trade, Frederick Jackson Turner felt that the American Fur Company gained
large profits at the expense of the traders. Frederick J. Tumer, "The
Character and Influence of the Indian Trade in Wisconsin," The i~rl.y Writings
of Frederick Jackson Tumer, ed. by Everett J<liwards (Madison: The University
of Wisconsin Press, 1938), p. 163 • .John Astor's biographer, Kenneth Porter,
also believed the trade was very protitable in the Old Northwest. (Porter,
John Astor, II, P• S2,3). Finally, Paul Phillips who wrote the supposedly
definitive study of the .American fur trade admitted that the records were not
canplete enough to speak accurately, but based on the available records, he
felt that the American Fur Company made clear profits of over a million dollars
from 1822 to 1834. (Paul Phillips, 'lhe Fur Trade (Noman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1961), II, p. 361 •
81.niese generaJ.izations about the trade were especially prominent in the
works of Frederick Jackson Turner. See especially Tumer, 1'The Character and
Influence of the Indian Trade In Wisconsin, 11 PP• 167-169.;
820n1y a very few traders ever entered the retail trade on any significant
scale in the towns. Many did become small merchants, but they were never the
moving forces behind later town growth unless outside capital motivated their
energies. David Lavender, The Fist In the Wildemess, P• XIII, cla.irn.s that
the trading posts 11 • • • were training arenas for young men who developed
into leading batlkers and merchants, mayors, governors, congr-essmen. 11 In the
region under consideration, however, La.vender's generalization does not stand
up. Two traders, Gurdon Hubbard and Solan.on Juneau, attained some praninence
in later communities, but both depended on eastem capital and the directions
of skilled town promoters.
83or course, the idea ot a 11stage 11 of frontier history was first sounded
by Frederick Jackson Turner, 11 The Significance of the Frontier In American
History, 11 The Turner Thesis ed. by George R. T~lor (Boston: D.C. Heath and
Co., 1956), PP• 6-7. Rl\V Allen Billington has defended the doctrine in his
general textbook, Westward Expansion (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1960),
pp. 3-6, and in his brilliant recapitulation and analysis of recent work on
frontier history, .8!!lerica's Frontier Heritage (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1966), PP• 39-41.

I:

CHAPTER IV
The Founding or a Town:
Chicago and Its Financiers, 1833-1837
The decade of the 1830's was a transitional period of the towns on the
western shore or Lake Michigan.

While the fur trade, conducted under the

auspices of the American Fur Company- and then later by individual merchants,
slowly declined as a significant econanic factor, new forces were operating on
the destiny or locations such as Chicago, Milwaukee, and Green Bay.

The

changes were rapid and occurring along with the demise of the fur trade society
so that often town pranoters operated next to the old fur traders.

Thus to a

certain extent there was not a clear division or the frontier's various stages,
for fur trader society did not autana.tically cease with the arrival or tmm
promoters.

Perhaps Ray Allen Billington's brilliant summary or frontier

history made the point more explicit:
No orderly
and 11 urban
rather was
broad zone

procession or 11 trappers 1 frontier", 11 farmers 1 frontier, 11
frontier, 11 moved westward across America; the scene
of kaleidescopic patterns constantly changing within a
that was itself slowly advancing with each passing year. 1

On the other hand, the 18J0 1 s marked a significant stage in rrontier
development.

The growth or towns just did not occur during the

heyd.~

the fur trade for its very nature and aims hindered such developments.

of
With

the decline of the .fur trade at the beginning of the 1830'e, the real process
of western expansion and town growth proceeded with unparalleled rapidity.

All

along the western shore of Lake Michigan, speculators and capitalists utilized
the old fur trading posts established where rivers ran into Lake Michigan to

promote townsites.

One Chicago resident described the mania of townsite

speculation in the 183u 1 s:
utterly reckless had the community grown that they chased
every bubble which floated in the speculative atinosphere. The
more absurd the project, the more remote the object, the more
madly they were pursued. The prairies of Illinois, the forests
of \'dsconsin and the sandhills of £fi.ichigan presented a cha.in
almost unbroken of supposititious villages and cities. The whole
land seemed staked out and peopled on paper • • • • Often was a
fictitious streamlet seen to wind its romantic course through the
heart of an ideal city, thus creating water lots and water privileges. But where a real strear:i, however diminiutive, did find
its way to the shore of the lake, no matter what was tho character
of the surrounding country, sane shrewd operator would ride night
and day until the place was secured at the Govemment price. Then
the miserable waste of sand and fens, which lay unconscious of its
glor.v on the shore of the lake, was suddenly elevated into a
nighty city, with a projected harbor and lighthouse, railroads and
canals, and in a short tine the circumja.cent lands were sold in
lots • • • • Not the puniest brook on the shore of Lake Hichir;an
was suffered to remain without a city at its mouth, and whoever
will travel around that lake shall find many a mighty mart staked
out in spots suitable only for the habitations of wild beasts.2
So

In the 1830's, there was never any significant agricultural hinterland
to support the frontier towns or contribute to their comoercial growth, but
the towns steadily increased in population and in the number of canmercial
businesses placing the towns in the forefront of westward expansion.

The

importance of towns in rostering westward expansion is a uost significant new
interpretation of western history.

Frederick Jackson Turner devoted little

attention to the role of the town or village in his writings on frontier
history.

In the jli.se of the New V.'est, nevertheless, 'furner wrote what became

a truism of western historians:
The rise of an agricultural surplus was transforming the west and
preparing a new influence in the nation. It was this surplus and
the demand for markets that developed the cities just mentioned.
As they grew the price of land in their neighborhood increased;
roads radiated into the surrounding country; and farmers, whose
crops had been almost worthless from the lack of transportation
facilit~es, now found it possible to market their surplus at a small
profit.
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But the frontier did not operate as Turner had described:
in the wake or agricultural expansion.

-

Urban Frontier;

In 1959, lli.chard

c.

towns following

Hade wrote 1h!,

The Ilise or Western Cities, 1790-1830 in which his opening

line marked a significant departure in writings on frontier history:

towns were the spearheads of the frontier.

11

The

Planted far in advance of the line

of settlement, they held the West for the approaching population.'!+ In 1966,
Ray

Allen Billington in America's Frontier Heritage acknowledged his debt to

Wade's theme of the urban frontier. 5 Moreover the most recent generaJ. history
of American urban growth called for the discarding of the belief than an
expanding agricultural settlement brought towns and commercial growth in their
path.

Rather, the authors claimed that
• • • American expansion was largely a function of urban expansion,
and that the civilization which pushed the edge of wilderness always toward the Pacific drew igost of its impulses and took most
of its direction fran cities.
One of the leading American econanic historians, Thomas

c.

Cochran, gave

added weight to Wade's original concept at the 1967 meeting of the Organization
of American Historians when he observed that businessmen in the guise of
speculators and town investors were often the first settlers to locate on the
frontier.

11

Seen another way, 11 Cochran explained, "early towns show that much

of the movement to occupy virr).n farming land was the filling up of the empty
areas around pioneer business centers. 117
The "process 11 of westward expansion or the movement of the urban frontier
has been a key word among recent historians.

The elements of town growth such

as land speculation, internaJ. improvements, and retail merchandising have been
treated as part of a process, yet even more basically these factors were the
result of individual decisions and the business skills of capitaJ.ists and
8
entrepreneurs.
The men who were involved in townsite promotion at Chicago
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and other points along the shore of Lake Hichi;_;an were not nameless runc•tiona.ries in the process of town growth but its most important ingredients.

For

this reason,, their methods of operation,, backgrounds,, and contributions to
town growth will form the story's focus.
Land speculators were probably the most important agents of town growth.
In Chicago, these men were present as early as 1833, at least two years before
any

significant migration of canmercial. or farming elements.

The role of the

land speculator and land speculation in western development has been a neglect
and confused issue in American history.

Frederick Jackson Turner did not even

mention the land speculator in his f nmous essay on 11The Significance of the
Frontier in illnerican History. 119 :c:arly writers who did discuss land speculation usually found that the land speculators dela\Y'ed frontier expansion because
they prevented the cheap and quick disposal of the public domain.

In 1924,

Benjamin Hibbard's A History of the Public Land Policies concluded that land
speculation was detrimental. to the proper functioning of a democratic land
system.

Hibbard claimed that when the speculator held land off the market

waiting on a rise in price,, he delayed the settlement of the country by the
small fanner and inhibited the building of roads,, schools, and public buildincs.10 Writing in 1932, A. M. Sakolski in The Great American Land Bubble
made the first canplete study of land speculation.

Sakolski 1 s conclusions

were basically the same as those of Hibbard; the land speculator was a negative,, rather than a positive force in westward expansion. 11
More judicious treatments of the land speculator began in the 1930 1 s
with the works of Paul Wallace Gates.

Gates pointed out the many different

varieties of speculators from the small farmer to the large eastern corporation.12 Studying the speculative period in Illinois fran 1830 to 1837, Gates
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at first a.greed with the interpretations of most earlier historians blaming
the speculators for Illinois's crushing state debt of ig37 and the slow pace
of Illinois' develoµnent in the early 1840 1 s. 13 Continuing his studies, Gates
tempered his views in the 194G 1 s.

Although he still claimed that land specu-

lation was the principal cause of farm tenancy, he admitted that many times
the affluent speculator was the only source of capital for local intenial
improvements.

In addition, Gates granted that the speculator's capital often

played an essential role in encouraging nationalizing projects such as roads,
canals, and waterways. 14 ~ihile rocognizi.ng their importance, Gates nevertheless remained a consistent critic of the speculators:
For better or for worse, the speculator whether absentee or resident,
squatter or banker, local politician or easteni senator, was present
on every frontier. He affected ever-J phase of western developz.1ent
and left in all places his indelible mark. His motives and his
deeds one may deplore but so characteristically American was he, so
dynamic a part did he play in shaping land and cultural patterns
that it is difficult to imagine an American frontier without hlm. 15
Generally the writings on land speculation have assumed that anything
placed in the way or the farmer's ability to obtain land quickly and cheaply
was a corruption of American ideals.

16 Most authors, however, have failed to

distinguish between speculation in prairie lands and in town lots. 17 In the
towns, the speculator was not depriving the settlers of fa.nn. lands, nor was
he investing in land which could be put to better use.

In fact,, speculation

is a.lrn.ost an inaccurate word for the business investments of eastern and
westeni capitalists in western towns.

They invested in town lots hoping for

a quick price increase,, but at the same time they contributed to the town's
development by creating the image of a prosperous town all over the cotmtry,
by financing the building of stores, bridges, and the paving of streets, and
by loaning money to small retail and commercial businesses.

Naturally, many

rr-----------____,
~
~eculators sold their lots again and again in order to gain profits, but

these profits were often reinvested in additional lots and improvements.

The

iarge eastern investors often took not only a business interest but also a
personal pride in their involvement with a struggling western city.

In this

study of town growth, the focus will be on the individuals who initiated the
town's developn.ent, and among these the land speculators loaned largest in
the fortunes of towns along the western shore of Lake Michigan.
Chicago was long recognized as a possible townsite because of its
critical location.

As early as 1808, Albert Gallatin mentioned the importance
18
of a possible connection between Lake Hichigan and the Illinois Fiiver.
In
lSl7, Major Stephen Long investigated the feasibility of a canal at this
point. 1 9 Little action was taken but lmowledgeable observers never failed to
canment on Chicago's strategic location.

In 18211 Henry R. Schoolcraft

praised the fertile fa:nn lands and commercial possibilities of the area between
Chicago and Milwaukee. 20 In 1825, William H. Keating disagreed with most of
Chicago's earlier visitors.

He believed that the soil was not nearly as

fertile as previously claimed and that lake shipping off'ered few inducements

to merchants.

Yet even as a critic, Keating was forced to admit that Chicago

was located on a direct line of ca:nmunication between the Great Lakes and the
Mississippi River. 21
Despite these reports, Chicago remained an isolated fur trade village
throughout the 1820's, but certain factors indicated that the frontier was
slowly moving westward.

Of prime importance was the extinction of Indian

title to land, its survey, and then sale through govemment auctions.

Land

cessions in Illinois began as early as 1804 and continued into the late 1830ts.22
As the land was purchased, government surveys prepared the way for its eventual
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The town of Chicago itself was actually plotted in 1829.

sale to farmers.

In

1826-1327, Congress had granted the state of Illinois alternate sections of
iand along a proposed route for the Illinois and Michigan Canal.

This grant

included the limits of Chicago, and, in 1829, the canal conunissioners laid
out the original town.
the survey.23
the town lots.

The land was then sold in lots to

p~

for the cost

ot

Fur traders and white merchants were the principal purchasers of
The price pa.id for these lots was extremely moderate. 24 De-

spite ti·:e fact that Chicago was plotted, the Illinois and Michigan Canal pro-

posed, and some Indian lands ceded, Chicago waited several years before
attracting the attention of migrants a.rd capitalists pushing westward with the
favorable economic conditions in the East. 25

ft,or the Chicago area, the

Blackhawk War, which ended the last vestiges of Indian control, and the Indian
Treaty of 1833, which opened large tracts of farm land, were the principal
events which directed white settlement toward the Chicago area.

The Blackhawk

War and the Treaty of 1833 advertised to all concerned the opportunities
awaiting the first settlers.
The first people on the scene were not farmers or merchants btt. the
eastern investors.

The speculator arrived nearly two years before the migra-

tion of town artisans and merchants and even longer be.fore farmers arrived in

any significant number, and for several years the speculators were the principa
architects of Chicago's developnent.

There were many different varieties of

lanct speculators, for sooner or later eveey individual bought farm land or
town lots hoping for a quick price rise.

There were fur traders and squatters

with little capital or interest in the land who sold their claims when population pressure brought a negligible price increase.

Among the small speculators

were also eastern capitalists and western residents who might own one or two
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rots in a town hoping for a small profit.

For the history of the American

frontier, the most important speculators were the major eastern capitalists
who invested from $5,000 to $1CXJ,000 as individuals or as a corporation in
townsites and fann lan:i.

26

Major eastern speculators ordinarily employed

agents throughout the country to supervise the buying and selling of land, the

paying of taxes, and the beginning of improvements.

In the towns, the conduct

of speculation was the same for the large and small investor, for both wished

to increase the town's value through improvements.

What type of men were these

speculators, how did they operate, and how did they underwrite the develoIJ!.1ent
of Chicago?
During the lg30 1 s 1 Arthur and Frederick Bronson were two of the most
active speculators at Chicago.

The brothers were members of a praninent New

York banking family led by their father, Isaac.

Isaac Bronson had amassed a

considerable fortune by judjcious land speculation and money lending to small
businesses.

By the 1830' s, he was recognized as an authority on banking pro-

cedures being especially noted for his opposition to wildcat banking. 27
Arthur Bronscn associated with Charles Butler a wealthy businessman and politico of New York.

As a young man, Butler worked in the offices of Martin

Van Buren an:i slowly became identified with the controlling faction of New York
state politics, the

11

Albany Regency. 11

28 Arthur Bronson and Charles Butler

first cooperated in trying to establish a banking institution at Cincinnati,
Ohio.

Fearing the opposition of Ohio citizens to eastern capitalists, Bronson

and Butler -worked through one of Cincinnati's leading citizens to gain a major
2
interest in the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company. 9
The econan.ic interests of Arthur Bronson and Charles Butler extended
further west than Ohio.

In January, 183.3, they discussed. plans for a general

tour of the West to consider land speculation and business investments.

Their
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interest in Chicago had been stimulated by the reports fr(El Illinois during
the Blackhawk War and the knowledge that soon many tracts of land would be
ready for sale.

30

&<J late January, 1833, the plans for a western tour were

canpleted and the two men set out to accumulate as much information on the
area as possible before deriarture in the spring.

Arthur Bronson first turned

to his friend, General ,dnfield Scott, who had led the military forces against
the Indians in the Blackhawk War.

Scott had just recently returned to New

York City from the Illinois country, and he assured Arthur Bronson that it was
a suitable area for :hiveatment.

Scott was especially impressed by the possi-

1
bilities of Chicago to eventually become a major commercial center.3
Bronson and Butler next contacted numerous merchants of New York City
one of vtiom had, on occasion, supplied goods for the early Chicago Indian
trade.

Fortunately for the future growth of Chicago, Robert A. Kinzie, a son

of John Kinzie the Chicago fur trader, happened to be in New York and in contact with this merchant.

Kinzie was :immediately contacted, and he strengthened

Bronson's opinion that Chica.go was the place to center his investments.

At

the Sal:le ti.me, Kinzie offered to sell Bronson and Butler his title to several
tracts of land in Chicago. 32

A tentative agreement was drawn up givine Butler

and Bronson the option to purchase this land after a suitable inspection once
they arrived in Chicago. 33

By August, 1833, Butler and Bronson had reached their main western
destination--Chicago.

Standing amidst what could only have been the crudest

imitation of a town, Charles Butler expressed his vision of Chica.go's future:
If I were a young man and unmarried I would settle down at Chicago:
it presents one of the finest fields in America for industry and
enterprise, and though at present a journey to this point is attended with great privations, fatigue, exposure, and difficulty,
in a few years we shall think no more of going to Chicago than we
now think of going to Buffalo. There will be lines of steamships,
sta es and railroads the entire distance f ran Alb
to the Fort

105
at st. Louis on the Mississippi, Chica.go being an important and
canmanding point on this great thoroughfare.34
At Chicago, the two men wasted little time in securing an interest in the
t.o ..m.

After hiring a surveyor to examine the land offered to them by Robert

A. Kinzie, Butler and Bronson rejected his offer.

Kinzie owned only a partial

share in a tract of land, am Butler and Bronson felt that successful townsite
speculation required complete ownership of any specific investrnent. 35

However,

they next discovered that an army officer formerly stationed at Fort Dearborn,
Captain ,;avid Hunter, owned considerable land in the central sections of the

town.

Correspondence was opened with Captain Hunter, and in November, 18341

Arthur Bronson alone purchased Hunter's land for

~20,000.3 6

The purchase was

quite large including a tract of eighty acres adjoining the town, nineteen

town blocks, and portions of

many

other blocks. 37 Bronson later sold this

property to Charles Butler for $100 1 000 1 five times the original purchase
.
38
price.
Despite this sale, Bronson remained the rost active investor.

He bought

additional land. fran :many residents of Chicago and maintained business conn~ctions

with countless Chicago citizens.

purchases of town lots from Thanas J.

v.

In AUaC7Ust, 1S33, he made large
Owen, the Chicago Indian agent, John

H. Kinzie, James Kinzie, and Richard J. Hamiltm.3 9 Bronson's land speculation activities were extremely diverse ranging the whole western

~country. 40

Because of this diversity, he could not alone handle the buying, selling, and
improvement of this property.

In Chica.go, he had business connections with at

least ten Chicago residents, several of whom acted as his authorized agent in
the buying and selling of property.

In late

Han.Uton bought lands for Bronson totaling

1~33 1

for example, Richard J.

~;;3,426. 41
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Bronson not only employed agents for his town speculation projects,

but he also shared many purchases with frontier residents.
supported a number of western speculators.

In this

way, he

Initially sharing purchases with

Arthur Bronson, these western entrepreneurs soon had garnered sufficient
profits to undertake their own speculations or invest their money in more
stable commercial pursuits.
and agent was John Temple.

In Chicago 1 for example 1 Bronson 1 s chie .f partner
Tfl'llple was a physician who, upon reaching Chicago

in the 1S30 1 s, gave up his chosen profession to engage in land speculation and

then later in commerce.

42

In late October,

1833, Temple and Bronson agreed

to

share in the purchase of Chicago tCMn lots and their subsequent improvement.
For his services in superintending the property, Temple was not required to
provide as much capital as Bronson.

Tanple supervised occasional sales of

the town lots, and then reinvested the money in additional lots and their
:improvement. 43

Often the purchasers of lots from Temple and Bronson were

required to build houses or stores upon the property. 44
John Temple remained a consistent advocate of Chicago's commercial
future, and he continually wrote to Arthur Bronson about the ever increasing
need .for eastern capital to support city improvements.

In June, 1S34, Temple

commented that "Chicago has so grown that you would not know it

& all on this

side the river, three streets built up with about two houses for a lot,
rurming parallel with the main branch of the Chicago P.iver. 11

Temple was

pleased with the arrival of merchants and artisans, but he still recognized
that Chica.go's major requirements were the skill and capital of eastern
businessmen. 45
In 1S35, Bronson and Temple tenninated their partnership in a dispute
over the management of the property. 46

Bronson then transferred his business

r
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-;,.ffairs to another Chica.go resident, Walter Newberry. 4·r Yet the association
had been beneficial for both men and for Chicago.

Through his association with

Bronson, Temple had access to large capital resources to purchase lots and
make improvements.

Later Temple was able to invest in land and COI.'ll!lercial

businesses on his own being typical of the spawning of western entrepreneurs
from eastern sources.48
Arthur Bronson also had occasional dealings with John H. Kinzie, the son
of the Chicago fur trader, who had purchased several lots in 1830 at the
canal sale.

Bronson owned the town lots contiguous to the l\inzie interests

and it was of benefit to both men to see the property advertised and improved.
In 1834, Bronson had the town map of Chicago printed and then he

person~

distributed it to interested ea.stern investors while John Kinzie circulat<..>d
the ~ap to various western businessmen. 49 Typical of most eastern capitalists,
Bronson was at first hesitant to spend great sums in improvine his Chicago
property; but due to the constant pr<Xiding of men like John Kinzie, B:Mnson
slowly acquiesced in large scale improvements.

In

1834, Kinzie alone built

a warehouse, and three other buildings in order to provide places of business
for retail merchants. 50 He adtlsed Bronson that he should also build on hia
property explaining that buildings would bring fran twenty-five per-cent to
fifty per-cent profits through renting, not to mention the effect on the
general appearance of their section of the town.

Larc_::er financial projects

required the cooperation of many property holders, and Bronson was asked to
contribute to the building of a hotel or public house.51
Tho intricacies of land speculation also required the skills of a lawyer,
and Bronson early employed James Grant to handle sane of his legal affairs in
Chicago including ascertaining clear title to land, paying taxes, loaning
llloney to town residents. and trying court cases

aris~

fran non-pa.vment of

r
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loans or debts.

In 1835, Grant loaned money in behalf of Arthur Bronson to

several Chicago merchants in addition to a $5,UOO loan to Hiram Pearsons who
probably emplo3red the capital for street improvements on his lots next to
52
Bronson's property.

In these early years, Bronson performed

many

services for the young town.

He employed various people to handle his affairs, shared purchases with town
residents, advanced capital for lot improvement, and loaned money to prospective town merchants.

Yet Bronson was an investor and always his principal.

consideration was profit.

From his Chicago holdings, it is very difficult to

detennine the extent of his success, but perhaps two examples are indicative
of the skill with which he invested.

His original purchase from Captain Hunter

for c~20 1 000 was sold a year later for $100,ooo. 53
several town lots for

~27.25;

New York associate for

In 1833 1 Bronson purchased

three years later he sold these lands to a

$15,ooo. 54 Bronson, however, alw8\}Ts reinvested in

Chicago property so that land sales ultimately benefited the town by bringing
more financiers into involvement with Chicago's economic growth.
The Bronsons were only the first of
their money in Chicago real estate.
employee of the American Fur

Company 1

many

eastern capitalists to invest

In 1828 1 Gurdon Hubba.rd, the former

realized that the fur trade was declining

and moved to Danville, Illinois, to open a retail trade with the white settlers
there.

He returned to Chicago when its fortunes as a center of white settle-

ment seemed to increase in 1833.

Hubbard knew that land speculation, commer-

cial pursuits, and retail businesses would soon be of great importance in the
town.

Similar to other fur traders of his generation, however, Hubbard owed

debts to the American Fur Company which hindered. his ability to invest in
Chicago's growth. 55

If only he could find a source of capital, Hubba.rd could

~

~
surmount this difficulty.

But where was Hubbard to obtain capital for any

type of econonic investment?

Fortunately, Gurdon Hubbard was originaJJ..y from

the East having l..Uldertaken the occupation of fur trader as an adventurous
young man of eighteen.

His family in Middletown, Connecticut, apparently

possessed sane capital, for Hubbard began writing relatives and old friends
about the profits involved in land speculation at Chicago.

:;•:ventually, he

attracted the interest of two brothers, :&!ward A. and Samuel Russell of
Hiddletown. 56 The Russells were representatives of a major shipping company
which was primarily involved in the China trade.

Moreover, the Russell

family and the relatives of Gurdon Hubbard were partners in a small manufacturing firm in Hiddletown. 57
By late 183.3, .: :dward A. Russell, who handled the fa.'D.ily 1 s western land
investments,, had authorized Hubbard to purchase a large number of Chica.go town
lots.58 The arrangement was actvantageous for both ,1arties. As land agent for
Edward Russell, Hubbard finally had an occupation which enabled him to enter
the mainstream of Chicago's econanic life.

Hore importantly, eastern capi ta1

was again employed in underwriting Chicago's growth.
Edward Russell was very cautious in the conduct of his townsite speculation.

Having utilized his friendship with a government surveyor who had

surveyed the land aromd the town, Hubbard sent the field notes to J<.:dward
Russell for his own perusai.5 9 Russell, however, instructed Hubbard that the
lllajority of his capital should be 1nvested in the town of Chicago itself.
~ubba.rd

was al.so directed to purchase lots only in these sections of the town

!Where it seemed likely that business would center.
~ussell

Additional purchases,

said, should be made where major roads or communication arteries en60 Edward Russell was not a novice at townsite
rter and leave the town.

llO
speculation having invested in both New York City and Buffalo.

His .experience

in townsite speculation, he tried to :impart to Gurdon Hubbard:

I may be mistaken, but one thing is certain, that the place where
business will actually center will be the place where lots will
becane most valuable, and the further you radiate from the centre
(.!!£), the less valuable will lots be. In New York, lots a mile
from the centre (sic) of business, never came into canparative
value, for twenty years. • • • I merely mention these suggestions
to guard you a~ainst being carried away with the spirit of speculation • • • • 1
With this advice in mind, Hubbard invested the capital of I:i.:dward Russell
primarily in the old town of Chicago, which was originally plotted by the
canal commissioners in 1829, and close to the streets bordering the branches
of the Chicago River. 62 Lots contiguous to the branches of the Chicago Iliver
were caJ.led "water lots 11 and were the most desired by all capitalists for
here was the center of commerce and trade.

In January, 18341 when Chicago

was still little more than a fur trading post, Gurdon Hubbard judged the significance of water lots in Chicago:
As Chicago will be a market for the whole N Western part of our
state • • • it will be a point where large quantities of beef and
pork will be packed for the Atlantic market & these water lots
are well adapted for that business there being a sufficiency of
water to admit vessels of any burden for several miles up this
branch at all seasons of the year. I am of the opinion they will
be used exclusively for that purpQse & will command cash at any
time, at a considerable advance.bJ
Fran the beginning of his interest in Chicago, Edward Russell was
convinced of the propriety of improving his lots.

He claimed that stores and
buildings often were of more value in future years than the lot itselt. 64
Thus Gurdon Hubbard cmtinually advised Edward Russell on the most needed type
of buildings for a specific area of the to'WJ'l. 65 The capital of Edward A.
Russell was also drawn into other areas of the town's develoµnent.

In 1835,

Gurdon Hubbard subscribed money for the Russells toward the building of a

lll

bridge and the paving of streets.

66

Edward Russell, of course, was alWB\Y'S

primarily interested in increasing the value of his town lots for an eventual
sale.

The capital which he invested in Chicago, nevertheless, contributed to

improvements not otherwise possible.

His

storc.~s

and warehouses were often

rented to merchants lacking sufficient capital to build their own stores.
Moreover, the improvements undertaken by Edward Russell through Gurdon Hubbard
had thP. secondary effect of providing jobs for carpenters and mechanics in
a town not yet able to employ its residents with a nonnal economic livelihood.
The large eastern speculator never invested in only one area or a town
or even one town along the lake shore.

Hubbard bought lands for the Russells
throughout the state of Illinois and along the lake shore. 67 By 1835,

Hubbard himself was able to share in these investments.

In 1835, he sold

portions of his Chicago property in New York for $801 000, which originally had
cost only $5 1 000. 68 He now al.so had capital resources which he then reinvested in Chicago businesses and in other tams on the lake shore.

In 1835,

Hubbard attended a public land sale at Green B8'}7 where he invested in lands
at Hilwaukee and Green Bay, but he al.WB\Y'S maintained that Chicago would be
the preeminent town on the western shore of Lake Hichigan. 69 Later he became
one of the original. proprietors of Racine, Wisconsin, calculating that it too
would one day be an important commercial center.70
Starting his career as merely the westem agent of Edward A. Russell,
Hubbard's fortunes blossomed as the years passed.

He opened his own land

agency to handle the investments of eastern businessmen.

Hubbard employed

his brother Christopher, who still resided in the gs.st, to interest easterners
in lots at Chicago or adjacent fann lands. 71 By July, 1835, Hubbard's land
agency was a startling success, and Christopher Hubbard was instructed to

r
r • ~cept

ll2
no more small investors.

Hubbard was by now in the enviable position

of requiring that his clients must be organized c001panies of eastern capitalist..l!
with assets of at least $200,000. 72 Thus Hubbard's career was typical of many
western residents who were at first dependent on eastern capital and then

slow1Y achieved the status of entrepreneurs themselves.
Hubbard still devoted substantial time toward handling the property of
:Edward A. Russell despite his other activities.

Bdwa.rd Russell or his brother

Samuel occasionally visited Chicago to check on their property and the progress
of Chicago. 73 With the peak in land prices in 1835 and 1836, Edward Russell
desired to Gell many of his lots hoping for large profits.

Gurdon Hubbard,

however, tried to stall such action claiming that additional improvements
could only bring higher prices in the future.74 Writing to Russell in 1835,
Hubbard tried to impress him with Chica.go's qrowing
camnercial potential by
tj
pointing out that retail businesses had equalled the volume of business for
last year in one month this year.

Delay the sale of your property, Hubbard

advised, for " • • • last week we had

14 schooners in Port ••• & are antici-

pating a very heavy fall business. 1175 According to Hubbard, the camn.ercial
basis of Chicago was stable preventing any appreciable decline in land values.
Edward Russell remained intent on selling his property.

He was familiar

with financial conditions in the East and feared a business recession because
of the general insecurity of banking establishments. 76 On instructions from
Russell, Hubbard began his search for a suitable buyer for the property.

His

first consideration was, of course, to sell to a group of capitalists who
lfOuld continue to ir1prove the property and contribute to Chicago• s growth.
Hubbard even suggested that Russell try to sell his property to Arthur Bronson
and Charles Butler :in New York. 77 Bronson and Butler were not interested 1 and

11.3
Hubbard next contacted Hobert Sedgwick, a capitalist who already had .considerable property at Chicago.

Sedgwick offered $200 1 000 for the property with

Hubbard assuming a share. 78 The Sedgwick negotiations collapsed, and Hubbard
now tried to form an association of Chicago businessmen to purchase the
Russell's property. Major James B. Campbell was to supply the majority of
capital with Hubbard also having a large share. 79 While Hubbard searched
frantically for a buyer, Edward Russell was becoming more skeptical about the
New York money market and the country• s precarious financial condition.
April, 18.36, he decided that the Campbell deal was too great a risk.

In

gven

though Russell admitted that a sale to a group or company would benefit
Chicago and assure the continued improvement of the property, he knew that the
payment of

~.200,000

would be spread over several years.

Fearing a financial

depression, Russell decided to sell his lots in a number of small sales where
r
00
the purchase1s would be required to pay within a year.
Hubbard, therefore,
advertised Russell's property in the Chicago newspapers, and then sold it
81
piecemeal. at a public auction.
The deeds of sale required 40 per-cent cash
down and the balance in twelve months carried at 10 per-cent interest.

After

the sale, Edward Russell still remained involved at Chicago with a few lots
82
in the business sections of the city.
In their involvement in Chica.go, the Russells were responsible for many

of the town's improvements, but they were also instrumental in drawing more
capital into the Chica.go area fran the 38.st and from 1'ilgland.

Interested

friends of Ed.ward Russell continually contacted Gurdon Hubbard for advice
on real estate investments.

In June, 1836, r..dward and Samuel Russell a.greed

to a scheme in which they would again purchase Chicago lots and adjacent farm
lands for sale to foreign capitalists.

Their land purchases were to be shared
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~with

Gurdon Hubbard and his brother.

The Russells, of course, supplied the

buJk of the capital while Gurdon Hubbard was responsible for selecting the
land.

Christopher Hubbard was conmdssioned as the trio's land a.gent to sell
84
the property in fulgland. 83 The plan never matured until the lc'l40' s,
but
its fonnulation was a clear example of the efforts of eastern capitalist in

western town develOIJllent.
Charles Butler of New York also initiated his own land speculation
schemes.

Butler had accompanied Arthur Bronson to Chicago in 1833, but he

had not purchased any land at that time.

In 1835, however, Butler purchased

the Hunter property fran Bronson for $100,000. 85 Next Butler organized the
American Land Company in association with New York and Boston capitalists.
Charles Butler was elected president of the company which was capitalized at
$1,000,000.

The company's investments were spread throughout the west in86
cluding both farm land and townsites.
Butler then selected his brother-

in-law, William Ogden of New York, to handle the company's investments in
Chicago and surrounding areas. 87 Ogden came to Chicago with considerable
business and political experience.

In 1834, he represented Delaware County

in the New York State legislature attaching himself to the ''Albany Regency,"
the democratic faction of New York politics.

He was a constant advocate of

intemal improvements calling for state aid to build the New York and Erie
Railroact. 88
Commissioned as agent of the American Land Company, William Ogden arrived
in Chicago :in May, 1835.

His .first task was to survey the American Land

Canpany•s property, then arrange it into town blocks and lots for sale at
future dates.

To increase the property's value, Ogden paved streets and

erected buildings.

In 1836, Ogden and Butler poured $15,000 into the property's

r:--------~r---------------------------------------------11-5-,
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~provement.

0

"

b.'ven though he prepared the property for sale, Ogden wa.s

skeptical, reeling that people "WOuld never invest in a wilderness such as
Chicago.

To Ogden's surprise, he sold one-third of the property in 1835 for

$lOO,OOO, the price paid for the entire property a. year ea.rlier. 90 Thus Ogden
so0n realized Chicago's commercial possibilities, and he decided to make the
frontier town his permanent home. 91 Ogden later became one of Chicago's
leading citizens and oost enterprising businessmen.
Deciding to establish permanent residence in Chicago in 1836, Ogden's
first means of an economic livelihood was a.s general agent of the American
Land Company.

At the same time, he handled various real estate transactions

for Arthur Bronson.

Gradually he increased his contacts with eastern speculators drawing more capital into Chicago. 92 Ogden also invested his own
excess capital in townsites and farm land throughout the territory.

In

addition, his operations enabled smaller speculators or town residents to garner profits.

He was occasiona.l.ly contacted by government surveyors, military

personnel, and town merchants who knew of valuable town lots and rann land but
lacked the necessary funds to purchase.

In this case, Ogden supplied part of

the capital and entered the deed in his own name.

~;hen

the property was sold

on the speculative market, he shared the profits with the small western investor. 93
In ld37 and 1838, Ogden expanded his activities.

land agency were sent throughout the eastern states.

Letters advertising his
Ogden offered to buy

tracts of land, pa;r the annual taxes, and make ir:i.provanents for a commission
usually amounting to 5 per-cent on the eventual sale price. 94 Like most other
large speculators, Ogden was not only caicerned with imtlediate profits, but
also contributed to the commercial well-being of Chicago.

From the beginning,
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be claimed

that Chicago lots must be continually improved through the building

o! houses and stores and the paving of streets.

In 1836, Ogden expressed his

ideas on town pranotion:
Large contigious interests in any town of merit can be by
capitalists improved and brought forward into market under very
much improved and favorable circumstances and the value much
enhanced. To give time to persons that will buy & build is ot
great consequence as it enables you to get better prices and in
the improvement made you are better secured while the property
in the vicinity much benefited.95
When Ogden sold the lots of eastern investors, he often required the
purchaser to build a store on that lot.96 At other times, Ogden sold lots to
merchants giving them nearly three years to pay and thus enabling new businesses to gain a sound financial basis.

Ogden also built stores himself in

order to provide business locations for new merchants.

At one point, Ogden

offered the Michigan Lumber Company three lots in the central business sections at a giveaway price merely to attract lumber and shipping interests to
Chicago.97 Ogden and his partners were in no sense philanthropists, but
they did realize that property values depended on Chicago's economic growth.
The interests of speculators and the financial needs of Chicago fortunately
coincided.
Land speculation was not alone the prerogative of major companies dealing
in town lots and prairie lands.

During the 1830 1 s, speculators of every

variety were conspicious along the .lake shore and in the interior.

All their

activities served to bring capital into the area and hasten the arrival or
more pennanent and steady town artisans and tanners.

While the Bronson.a,, the

Russells, and the American Land Company represented the largest interests in

.

Chicago, various other agencies speculated in Chicago and its h1lnterland.
Fran as far away as Aberdeen, Scotland, George Smith arrived in the village of
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~Chicago in 1834.

Financed by a group of Scottish investors, Smith innnediately

purchased Chicago town lots and adjacent fa.nn lands.

Returning to Scotland

in 1836, George Smith told the Scottish financiers of the camnercial possibili-

ties along the westem shore of Lake Michigan.

Following

~.lmith's

recommenda-

tions, a joint-stock canpany was fonned in Aberdeen, Scotland, known as the

In

Illinois Investment Company for additional land speculation in America.

the la.te 1S30 1 s, George Smith returned to Chica.go as agent of this finn. 98
There were various other speculators at Chicago.
Company invested in lands at Chicago.

The Rockwell Land

Its board of directors included many of

the area's most prominent speculators:

Dixwell Lathrop, John B. F. Russell,

and Janes Campbe11. 99 The story of Chicago land speculation, however, would
not be canplete without mentioning the smaller speculators, whether fran the
East or the West, who purchased perhaps one lot or ten, improved the lots,
and then sold out.

Perusing the records and correspondence of William Ogden

and Gurdon Hubbard, one encounters the names of countless eastern residents

who, to various extents, financed the early growth of Chicago.

One such was

John Wright from Sheffield, Massachusetts, who purchased lots in Chicago in
partnership with an uncle in Brooklyn, New York.loo Justin Butterfield of
Watertown, New York, hired a westem agent to invest in the townsites along
the proposed Illinois-Michigan Canai. 101 l;'hile their investments were smaller
than those of the major Chicago speculators, they, nevertheless,

pl~ed

an

important role in Chicago's develoµnent.
The principal econanic activity of Chicago's population for several
years was land speculation.

A

single town lot often changed hands several

times as each owner added an improvement and then sold when the price assured
a profit.

The actual methods of buying and selling were a mixture of private

r;:t.rarisactions between individuals, public auctions, and government land sa:J.es

·

~

J:n Chicago, the most active periods of land speculation took place between
~

and the close of lake navigation in October.

In the summer, Chicago was

a bustling village as speculators travelled up and down the western shore of

t.ske Michigan searching for profitable investments in townsites. In the
1iiJlter, the business of land speculation switched to New York.

Large specu-

like Arthur Bronson, Charles Butler, and Edward Russell constantly
~raded Chicago property with other tina.nciers. 102 Edward Russell found it
].B.tors

necessacy to remain in constant communication with Gurdon Hubbard, hie western
agent, so that their sales would not be duplicated. 103 The constant exchange
o! land seemed to indicate to aJ.1 concerned that Chicago was financially

prosperous.
selves.

At various times, Chicago speculators traded land among them-

In 1835, Hubbard traded lots with 1·Iilliam Ogden of the American Land

Company. 104 In 1836, Hubbard estimated that $150,000 in property was exchanged between the major Chicago speculators.

These transactions, Hubbard

claimed, were not that profitable for the speculators; yet they produced
excitement in the town and precipitated a flurry of land sales among other
speculators and a corresponding price rise.l05
\bile the transactions among the speculators spurred the constant

improvement of Chicago, the most important events both for the town and the
investors were the government and state land sales at Chicago.

Until June,

1835, most of the lots bought and sold in Chicago wre those plotted by the
Canal

commissioners in 1829.

The majority of farming land was not surveyed

end ready for sale until 1834 when the government established a land office
at Chicago and announced its first public sale for June, 1835.106 The public
8ale offered fann land in the interior to squatters and settlers.

In addition 1

~--------------------------------------ll-,9
iand immediately adjacent to the original plot of Chicago was also readied for
saJ.e.

The second most important public sale wa.s in Jl.ll'le, 1836, when the state

of Illinois sold additional lots along the route of the proposed Illinois and
107
Michigan Canal.
The time of a public land sale was the most active for any town on the

lake shore. Speculators, merchants, and fanners were all jammed into the
frontier town as the sale began.

As the time for the government sale ap-

proached at Chicago in 1835, Chicago entrepreneurs expected a rush for town
108
lots and farm lands.
Before the public sale in 1835 and 1836, F.dward
Russell infonned Gurdon Hubbard that a large number of capitalists were
leaving the Ea.st for Chicago. 109
in Chicago at this time.

Many

individuals attested to the excitement

The editor of the Ghicago American commented that

the large number of capitalists streaming into the to\oll indicated that all
believed Chicago was to be the commercial center of the West.no An English
visitor to Chicago in 1836 witnessed the following scene at the time of the
public sale:
I never saw a busier place than Chicago was at the time of our
arrival. The streets were crowded with land speculators hurrying
from one sale to another. A Negro, dressed up in scarlet, bearing
a scarlet fiag and riding a white horse with housings of scarlet,
anno\ll'lced the time of sale. At every street corner where he
stopped, the crowd flocked around him; and it seemed as i f some
prevalent mania infected the whole people. The rate for speculation might be so regarded. As the gentlemen of our party walked
the streets, storekeepers hailed them frcm their doors, with offers
of fanns, and all manner of land lots,~~vising them to speculate
before the price of land rose higher • .L.L.L
Many,

however, thought that the speculators had gone wild at Chicago,

One observer commented that "I think they are all crazy.

I do not know i f I

shall be able to find a foot of land but what sane one makes claim to • • • • Jl.2
In August,

1835, the Oneida

l·-!11i.g, a praninent New York newspaper, printed the

r
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impressions of one financier who considered the Chicago land sale pure folly.
According to this view, Chicago real estate was purely a

11

speculative 11 invest-

ment for Chicago did not have a commercial or agricultural basis. 113 Because
of the degree of land speculation and the number of people who were involved,
the above was clearly the minority opinion.
papers could only hurt Chicago.

Yet bad publicity in eastern

Thus the editor of the Chicago American an-

swered such charges in an effort to prove Chicago's commercial potential.
Citing the growth of population, the increase of business establishments, the
number of vessels entering the Chicago harbor, the Chicago American claimed
that:
• • • Chicago exhibits all the bustle and animation of a prosperous
and rapidly growing town. And what is the cause of all this?
Surely not the extravagant delusions of our citizens. It is ~ii;
cause Chicago possesses rare and striking natural advantages.
In following articles, the Chicago American described Chicago's great advantages; the proposed Illinois and Michigan Canal, fertile fann land, and an
accessible port to handle the shipnent of goods.

With this evidence, the

editor of the Chicago American concluded that •• • • • Chicago can present
arguments enough to satisfy the skeptical, that property here has not merely
an imaginary value • • • • ).15
Neither Chicago's ea.stem critics nor the newspapers of Chicago told the
whole story.

It is certainly true that when the speculators first arrived

in the town in 1833, there was really very little to justify large scale invest

ments except Chicago's geographical location and the dreams of capitalists.
But that is exactly the point:

the speculators built the town of Chicago.

Through the efforts of men such as Arthur Bronson, Edward Russell, and Charles
Butler in the East and their western agents, Gurdon Hubbard and William Ogden,
and a host of smaller investors, the basis of Chicago's economic growth was

121

laid.

The constant exchange of property brought more and more financiers into

the Chicago camnunity. Working through their westem agents, large speeulabrs
built stores, warehouses, and made capital available to small merchants.

While

the speculators continually sold their town lots when the price increased,
profits were often reinvested in the town.

In addition, men who had begun

their careers as western land agents soon shared in the speculative profits,
and then later turned toward other economic pursuits relating to the town's
camnercial life.

But all the aspirations and capital investments of entrepre-

neurs depended on the arrival of artisans and merchants who could give sustenance to the groundwork prepared by the speculators.

MAP EXPLANATION
The town of Chicago was sold by lots and blocks.

A block was usually

320 by 360 feet with each lot measuring 80 by 180 feet.

Lot sizis varied, of
course, with the course of streets and the contours of the lake.

Not all land in Chicago, however, was sold in lots and blocks. Chic.ago
was first plotted in 1829 by the canal commissioners and these lots and blocks
were lm~n as the Original Town. On the map, this area is indicated by a
heavy black border. As the years passed, "additions" were made to Chicago,
that is, new areas were brought within the city limits. Speculators, such as
Arthur Bronson an::i Edward Russell often purchased land adjacent to the plotted
town calculating that business would slowly push the borders of the town outward.
Business in the town originally centered along the Chicago River especia.JJ.;j
where it first enters the city from Lake Michigan. 11Vlater lots" or those
bordering directly on the Chicago River were the most valuable for ships could
navigate a good distance down the Chicago River. Forwarding and commission
houses, dry goods stores, and g~neral business establishments were located as
close to the River as possible.
One must also remember that surveyors only plotted the various blocks a.rd
lots. Later the specula. tors a.rrl owners of town property were forced to actually lay out the lots arrl cut streets and avenues through the wilderness.
Arthur Bronson's property - Actually Bronson owned a great deal more
property than indicated here, but this consisted of his major purchases.3
- The property of Edward A. Russell was located throughout the town on both
sides of the Chicago River. The areas indicated rere thus show only portions
of Russell 1 s holdings. It is very hard to establish which lots were owned by
specific individuals because of the constant exchange of lots.4

FOOTNOTES
MAP EXPLANATION
1 Homer Hoyt, One Hundred Years of Land Values In Chic
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1933 , pp. 28, 428. For a can.plate discussion of
the manner in which cities and towns of the United States were planned and
expanded see John W. Reps, The Makin of Urban America: A Histo
of Cit
EJ.aming In the United States Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 5).
2.rhere are various early descriptions of Chicago indicating the location
of the principal business establishments. One of the best was written by a
visitor to Chicago in the 1830 's. See Daniel Gold, "The City of Chicago In
1837, 11 Daniel Gold Papers, Chic ago Historical. Society. Additional information
can be found in A.T. Andreas, A History o! Chicago (Chicago: A.T. Andreas
Publisher), I, PP• 128, 131-133, 136-137.

3The loo ation of Bronson's original purchase was compiled from the
description of the purchase in a Legal Deed between Arthur Bronson and David
Hunter, Novanber 1, 1834, Arthur Bronson Papers, Letter Folder I, Chicago
Historical Society.
lt.rhe location of Edward Russell 1 s property was taken from two letters:
Gurdon Hubbard to James Campbell, February 22, 1836, Hubbard Papers, Letter
Folder II, Chicago Historical. Society, and Edward Russell to Gurdon Hubbard,
April 14, 1836, Russell Papers, Letter Folder I, Chicago Historical Society.
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the American Past (:Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1966),
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46John Temple to Arthur Bronson, April 8, 1835, and
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-CHAPTF:.R V
The Growth of a City: The Partnership of Capitalists
and Town Residents in Commerce, Retail Businesses
and Internal Improvements 1 1833 to 1842
While the contention stands that Chicago's initial growth was stimulated
by the participation of eastern and western entrepreneurs in land speculation,

Chicago's continued expansion necessarily turned upon the developnent of commercial and retail businesses.

All the speculator's efforts in erecting an

image of Chicago's prosperity were of little value without the mechanics,
merchants, and professional people moving from eastern towns to relocate in
the frontier village of Chicago.

The real flood of town migration began in

late 1834 and increased dramatically in 1835 and 1836 only to taper off in
1S37 as a shroud of economic depression spread over the i!Ast Coast limiting
the resources of those desiring to move West. 1 In the period £ran 1834 to
1S36, however, Chica.go solidified its economic position by increasing the
number of retail trade establishments, establishing communication and trade
with the interior portions of the state, and encouraging the growth of Lake
Michigan shipping.

When Chicago entered the depression period in late 1837,

there were commercial leaders and eastern capita.lists with an interest in
sustaining and even advancing Chica.go's canmercial developnent during the
depression years.

By 18421 when normal financial conditions returned, Chica.go

emerged as the pre-eminent city on Lake Michigan's western shore.
'fhe merchant, the artisan, and less directly the farmer were the backbone
of any city, and Chica.go's develoµnent depended upon their acceptance of its
132
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potential as described by capitalists and speculators.

But how did such

people learn of Chicago's existence and the opportunities available? Many
eastern urban dwellers learned of Chica.go through letters and personal contacts.

Often a relative or friend undertook a journey to the v/est searching

for a town with commercial opportunities.

Typically a young man travelling
2
in the \.'iest wrote home describing the advantages of each town he visited.
There is no

wa:y

of gauging either the volume or effectiveness of such letters

or later personal. contacts in stimulating western migration, but in the case
of Chica.go evidence does exist that such contacts were important •.3

In same

cases letters from the west received wider circulation than just the correspondents.

In 1834, a young man from Hartford, Connecticut, toured the western

towns in hopes of finding a suitable location for a retail business.
travelled, his letters were displayed in the local post office.

As he

Eventually,

he selected Chicago as his new home, a choice which certainly affected later
emigrants from that area.4
Interest in Chicago as a site for economic investment and commercial
businesses was also stimulated by the innumerable travelogues and reports of
foreign visitors to America.

Chicago attracted a considerable number of such

callers in the 18.30 1 s with the conclusion of the Blackhawk har and the resulting Indian Treaty of 18.33.

Curiosity, of course, was the magnet which

attracted many early travelers, but their accounts, published in 1835 and
1836, often included judgments about Chicago's future.

In 1835, Charles Fanno

Hoffman's A Winter In the West cited Chicago's strategic location for canm.erce
and predicted its rapid rise as the new trade center of the '.Jest. 5 A
Scottish traveler canmented that 11Almost every person I met regarded Chicago
as the germ of an inunense city, and speculators have already bought up, at
high prices, all the building ground in the neighborhooct.rr6
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But such foreign and native travel accotlllts probably appealed to .and

were read only by the more educated urban dweller in the East. What of the
small shopkeeper, the artisan, and finally the ranner preparing to move West?
For these people, guidebooks describing the western country were popular
sources of 1ni'onnation.

One of the more famous was written by John Mason Peck

in 1834. While investigating the Illinois cotllltry, Peck visited Chicago and
:immediately sunnised that it

11

•

•

•

will eventually become the greatest place

for business and canmerce in all the northwest. 7 Later when Peck published
his Gazeteer of Illinois, Chica.go was mentioned as the most important town
on the shores of Lake Michigan.

g

Such rave reviews tllldoubtedly attracted a

good number of town migrants.
Newspapers were also effective conveyors of info:nnation about the West.
They were cheap and accessible to most prospective emigrants.

Eastern news-

papers regularly canmented on the most favorable townsites in the West. 9
The degree of publicity received by any western town in an eastern newspaper
really depended upon the establishment of newspapers in western cities.
Until Chicago could boast of its own weekly publication, eastern newspapers
could only print the occasional reports of travelers and personal correspondents.

Without a newspaper, there was no agency in a westeni city for collect-

ing facts about population, commerce, and the surrounding farm land and then

distributing these facts to the general public.

It was not tlllusual for the

Chicago post office to receive letters from the East inquiring about living
conditions, wages, and commercial opporttlllities.10 Without a dedicated postal
clerk or an interested western entrepreneur, such letters remained unanswered.
A principal reason for Chicago's early popularity was that as early as
November, 1S33, the Chicago Danocrat was founded.

Two years later, Chicago

,,.----------------------------------------------------------,
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-;ossessed two newspapers when the Chicago American began publication.

C{llll'JlUilications and correspondence were then opened with newspapers throughout
the country.
~ocrat

.&iitors throughout the East perused the columns of the Chicago

and Chicago American extracting items of interest for their own

readers and the prospective emigrant.
COJTh~ercial

In 1836, for example, the Philadelphia

Herald sent a questionnaire to all westeni newspapers asking for

a description of the town, its location, the number of merchants, the volume
of commerce, and the number of buildings.

11

The American answered these

questions through its editorials knowing that the reply would be printed in
newspapers throughout the country. 12 Compiling the reports of travelers and
the information gleaned fran a western newspaper, eastern editors then advised
their readers on the merits of various western towns.
good deal of favorable cam::ientary.

Chicago received a

In 1836, for example, the Niagara Democrat

described Chicago in the following manner:
In the list of towns that have sprung up with incredible

rapidity, Chicago deserves a conspicious place - probably the
first rank. It is now a little more than three years old;
numbers 5000 inhabitants; is a scene of bustle, industry and
enterprise, which a few years since would have been deemed the
work of fifteen or twenty years to produce. Its commanding location has drawn, and is continually drawing towards it, the
capital of this and the eastern states • • • labor is high and
COO!lllands cash; merchants and mechanics are thriving; lawyers and
doctors if they do not flourish in their professions, make it up
by speculation. All is brisk and promising.l.3
Easteni newspapers performed a vital service in advertising Chicago's
opportunities, but the two Chicago newspapers were of even greater significance.
In the first years of their existence, the Chicago American and Chica.go

Democrat were little more than advertising brochures; important national news
usually found coverage only on the back pages.

The aim, of course, was to

provide information for eastern editors and for emigrants passing through
Chic~o in

search or a western haven.

At the same time. the Chica.go newsnaners

~-------------------------------------------------13-,6
had a surprisingly wide circulation in the East not only among other newspaper
offices but among individuals. 14 Thus the colunns of the Chicago publications
were oriented toward attracting carpenters, masons, and merchants.

In 1835,

the Chicago American cautioned the prospective migrant that:
Our distant readers must not judge the business of this place by
the meager appearance of our advertising colunns, for we can
assure thsn that they do not present a fair criterion. Many merchants are extensively engaged in a wholesale and retail business;
our harbor is enlivened by the arrival of fi~e, ten, fifteen, and
sometimes more vessels, in the course of a week • • • plainly show
that Chicago is fast rising to an eminence which will be equalled
by few, and surpassed by none, of the towns now springing up in
this • • • western wilderness.15

For the prospective agricultural pioneer upon whose future Chicago would
depend for commerce and good supplies, the American initiated a column entitled
"Hints to Ihlgrants 11 in which favorable farm lands -were described, methods ot
obtaining the land fran the government were explained, and the most needed
and suitable products for market were discussed.

16 That Chicago required mer-

chants, artisans, and farmers was clearly evident in newspapers both East and
West.
Having learned of Chicago, the eastern town dweller still faced innumerab
obstacles before migration to the West became a reality.

First and foremost,

the tide of westward migration was regulated by the prevailing .financial
situation in the East.

Most historians today agree that Frederick Jackson

Turner's concept of the West as a safety-valve tor eastern discontent operating
during periods of financial depression was incorrect.1 7 The real westward
movement began during the favorable econcmic period which prevailed in the
1S30 1 s.

However, it still remained true that many who came West were seeking

a freer field of economic opport'Wlity.

Eastern newspapers continually urged

Young merchants to go West where they might more easily enter into the business

,........---
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18

Since most historians directed their attention to the movement

o! farmers, the writings on Wflstward migration have rarely considered the

causes and character of town migration. 19 Artisans and merchants who moved

rrom

eastern towns to the West were of many varieties.

Some possessed suf-

ficient capital to establish their own stores and sell goods.

Others had

little capital, and depended upon loans fran speculators to rent a store and
purchase goods. Mechanics, carpenters, and clerks were also in evidence. 20
Their journey was perhaps the least expensive.

If passage from the East was

obtained, an emigrant could readily find work in the town of Chicago in 1835
and 18,36.

The Chicago Democrat and American constantly advertised for workers

on public improvement projects such as the harbor, streets, and the Illinois
and Michigan Canal. 21

It also seems likely that many tanners worked in

Chicago for a few years until sufficient capital was accumulated to start a
fann.

The speculators who had arrived earlier prepared the way for these

emigrants by creating the occupations which sustained the town migrant.
Town migration was particularly unique in that many people moved directly

tran town to town.

The records and correspondence which remain from this

early period of Chica.go history indicate that ordinarily totm migration was a

long jump, that is the emigrant, whether he was a merchant, lawyer, or artisan,
left his residence in New York or New England and travelled across the country

to Chicago.

Certainly many stopped enroute at Buffalo and Detroit, but these

towns by 1835 already possessed nl.Bl1.erous mercantile P.Stablishments; the freer
field for a young merchant or professional person was Chicago. 22
The path to Chicago from New .England and New York was difficult and
tedious.

By the end of the Blackhawk War, however, various improvements in

transportation and communication had assured that Chica.go would receive its

~
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share of the new migration.

The Erie Canal, opened since 1825, brought the

eJlligrant as far as Buffalo to await passage on the Great Lakes.

Before 1833,

passage fran Buffalo to Detroit was regular, but few steamboats had ever ven-

tured to navigate the waters of Lake Michigan.

The Blackhawk La.r again,

a].biet indirectly, provided an impetus to the settlement of Chicago.

In need

of troops quickly to combat Blackhawk 1 s uprising, the government decided to
charter steamboats to transport the troops to Chicago rather than using the
overland route.

These steamboats were the first to reach Chicago proving that

navigation o.r Lake Michigan was both feasible and practical. 23 From then on,
Chicago gained an early lead as the chief' port on Lake Michigan's western
shore.

Thus Chicago received the majority of €migrants, and for a long while

those wishing to settle in towns or country further north on the lake shore

were often forced to travel by land from Ghicago.24
Many

travelers avoided the all water route to Chicago from Butta.lo

tearing the dangers of lake travel.

The most favorable alternative route was

to disembark from a steam.er at Detroit and then travel overland by the
Chicago Road. 25 Others preferred to take the Chicago Road only as far as
St. Joseph, Michigan, then board a steamboat or schooner to Chicago; a regular
fleet of steamboats journeyed between these points in the

la~er

1S30's. 26

But again the story of westward town migration appears only as a process,
but it was, in reality, an adventure undertaken by individuals.

Perhaps by

observing the experience o! just a few, generalizations on town migration will
appear in a somewhat better perspective.

Richard Ela of Lebanon, New Hampshir

for example, saw no hope for a mercantile career in Lebanon and decided that
11

•

•

•

the West is our object; there is no other hope left for us • • • • n'Zl

Setting out from Lebanon in 1834, Ela stopped for a short period in Buffalo to

earn his

~-------------------------------------------------D-,9
~entua.lly,

nunois.

28

he reached the West and by-passed Chicago to settle at Plain.field,
Many

yotmg men moved from urban areas in the East to seek their

.rortuna in western towns.

This was not a haphazard journey, but those with

a little capital picked their future home with great care by looking over each
frontier metropolis noting its particular advantages.

Elisha Pease tran

Hartford, Connecticut, indicated the care with which town migrants came ':·Jest:
I left home with the intention of spending fran 3 to 4 months in
travelling and learning what the chances were !or a yotmg man in
this part of the cotmtry. I will say to you frankly that a man
cannot live as pleasantly here as at the East, but that with a
small capital and proper management he cannot fail of laying the
foundations for an independence if' not a forttme in a few years.
I am as tmdecided about any business as when I started. I have
concluded to go as far as St. Louis then I shall stop and review
what I have seen, calculate the chances and make a bold push.29
For Pease, Chicago was already too settled with merchants, and thus he
moved further along the lake shore. 30 The same was true of David Roberts or
Fredonia, New York, who looked over various towns including Chicago.

Arriving

in Chicago in 1833, Roberts thought it already too crowded and moved to Joliet,

lllinois. 31 Others, though, f'ound the crowded conditions and excitement indications of Chicago's great future.
the spring of 1836.

Lemuel Freer departed from New York in

Buttressed by a small amount of money, he stopped at all

the lake port towns evaluating the commercial possibilities of each.

Cleveland:

Detroit, and Mackinac were, according to Freer, already too well-supplied with
retail stores while Green Bay and Milwaukee were too involved in lot speculation to indicate the soundness of their economic position.

But Chicago was

different in Freer•s jud8'Jllent:
I do not believe she has her equal in the tmion. There is more
buoyancy and enterprise than I ever before saw • • • • Chicago
has acquired a f'onn of progression that nothing can stop for
twenty years • • • • There are forty merchants here, ten of whom
sell goods to the amotmt of sixty thousand, twenty forty thousand
and ten to the amotmt of from fifteen to twenty thousand • • • ..32

,.......--______________________________________________________
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On the steamboat to Chicago, Freer had the good fortlllle to meet .another

merchant frcm New York who was also spying out a suitable town to locate his
general retail business with goods valued at $10 1 000.

Arriving in Chicago,

the two men formed a partnership with Freer employing his capital to buy a
lot and rent a store.

Once established, they soon found their original stock

of goods inadequate and sent to New York for an additional $30,000 worth or
supplies.

Because of his connections with New York merchants, Freer's partner

was able to obtain these goods on credit thus enabling the two merchants to
maintain a lucrative trade.33
Similarly Charles Walker from New York sent a relative to Chicago in
1834 with a stock of boots, shoes, and leather speculating that such trade
might prosper.

Later his brother-in-law, who was floundering in a small

village in New York, was sent West to serve as a partner in Charles Walker and
Ccmpany.34

Perhaps an even more interesting case was the career of Benjamin Barker.
Barker was frcm Buffalo, New York, and came i·:est in 1832.

His brother,

Jacob, was a leading Buffalo forwarding and commission merchant.3 5 With a
small amount or reserve capital, Benjamin Barker visited various westem towns,
but finally decided that Chicago was to be the major center of the West.3 6
After his joumey, Barker had little capital left, and for all intents and
purposes Barker and his !smily were marooned in Chicago two years before the
heaviest migration.3 7 Life was extremely difficult as attested to by his
letters, yet Benjamin Barker was able to find assorted jobs in cutting wood
and clerking for other merchants.
store, but

al~s

His dream was to set up a small grocery

he lacked the capital.

From his arrival in Chicago, he

constantly wrote his brother asking him to finance a business in Chicago.JS

r:;.

October, 1833, Benjamin Barker tried to convince his brother of the

propriety of such an investment:
If we lllSiY judge fran the start Chicago has taken this stunmer we

may fairly anticipate it will shortly become one of the largest

towns in the Western world ••• now is the time to make money
here • • • • I have no doubt a rail road or canal between this
& the Illinois will be commence within one or two years taking
al 1 these things into consideration. I don't see that there
can be much risk in commencing business here on a small skale
(sic)39
Jacob Barker soon gave in to his brother• s requests and agreed to finance
a grocery business at Chicago. 40 In some cases, therefore, eastern businessmen also directly financed the establishment of retail trades.
r1any

immigrants who cane to Chicago were not as fortunate as Benjamin

Barker or Lemuel Freer, for they had neither capital nor eastern connections

to sustain them in the first difficult years.

Fran 1B34 to 1836, neverthe-

less, Chicago supplied many jobs for the laborer providing a means whereby
countless urban JJ.igrants accumulated capital and entered the class of small
merchants.

F.dward Talcott came to Chicago virtually penniless, but he knew

that, for a time, he could work as a land surveyor.4J. Many other merchants
and artisans streamed into Chicago from 1B34 to 1836 knowing that wages were
high and jobs plentiful because of the various building projects initiated by
the speculators such as Gurdon Hubbard and v!illiam Ogden. 42 A prospective
merchant did not have to build his o'Wl'l store immediately because he could rent
noor space in a structure erected by the speculators.

The marginal retail

merchant and general laborer owed much in his first years to the economic

tround~rk prepared by the early Chicago capitalists. 43
Accepting the thesis that the capitalists and speculators ~ed the
transition of eastern town dwellers into the frontier to'Wl'ls, one must yet
deal with the common generalization that the speculators and capitalists

...

l°iindered the path of the agricultural frontier.

As the years passed, the

growth of Chicago increasingly depended upon the production of its hinterland and without the develoµnent of an agricultural market, Chicago's
develoµnent would have been seriously curtailed.

In the view of most histori-

ans, the speculator corrupted the basic ideals of America's land system by
monopolizing large sections of fertile farming land and holding it out of
production until a suitable price was gained.

When actual land sales did

occur, such as at Chicago in 1835 and 1836 1 the speculat'Or supposedly manipulated the sale and government officials so that the settlers were deprived
of the choice fanning sites.

Finally when the settler lacked the capital

to purchase a fa.rm, the speculator used the opportunity to loan money at
usurious rates of interest.44 There is certainly truth to all the various
charges hurled against the land speculator, but there is another side to the
story which indicates that in many cases, especially in Chicago, the land
speculators advanced the general progress of westward expansion both in the
town and in the country.
Speculation is endemic to any system of capitalism and private ownership.4!
When public land sales were held, the nineteenth century American was foolish
to believe that he could escape the appearance of speculation.

In defense of

the land speculator, it should be realized that he indirectly aided the
agricultural pioneer.

Many

settlers who came 'vvest had little capital.

They

located for a time in a frontier town like Chicago where, through various
jobs, they accumulated sufficient funds to return to farming. 46 Moreover,
the speculator was hardly in a canrnanding position in relation to the settlers.
Farming pioneers often disobeyed laws or established extralegal organizations
to ward off the speculator's competition. 47 At the Chicago land sale in 1S35,
the squatters formed a committee to protect the claims of each member.

The

14.3

r.:;;,cuJ_ators were prohibited from ever raising the cost of public lands over
the minimum. government price.

Several speculators tried to bid on fanning

].and previously claimed by a settler, but they were forcibly ejected .fran the
sale.

Protesting to the legal and military authorities at Chicago, the

speculators found that the community, in general, wished to see its farmers
receive their just claims. 4B

In fact, the Chicago American editorialized that

at the 1835 gove:mment sale, the settlers received fair treatment a.nd the
town 1 s

speculators and capitalists had not cheated anyone, but only purchased

land not previously claimed or entered by anyone else.49
Neither did the speculators alwa;ys hold land off the market waiting for
a price rise nor did they monopolize large tracts of farm land.
would seem to indicate quite the reverse.

Pure logic

A speculator wished a quick return

on his property, and to hold land off the market in large sections could only
deter settlement and force settlers to other areas.50 Again Chicago speculators provided a convenient ex.ample.

Arthur and Frederick Bronson bought con-

siderable farm land in Illinois a.nd Wisconsin yet always stipulated that to
garner profits and foster the growth of the whole area, town and country, the
property must be disposed of as quickly as possible.
avoided monopolizing large sections of land.

Ordinarily the Bronsons

They realized that i f a whole

section was purchased the settlers would just avoid that area..

Thus the

Bronaons instructed their western agent to purchase small tracts in separate
locations so as not to deter the normal pattern of settlement. 51 The Bronsons
knew that once settlement was established around their locations, their ta.nn
land would command a. high price.

In no case did the Bronsons consider holding

land off the market longer than two years. 52
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settlers and other frontier residents were often equall;{ guilty.

Officials

of the local land offices, the register and receiver, were notorious for
engaging in land speculation.

Because of their position, they could effective

lY select the choicest land. 53 Yet surprisingly perhaps to critics of the
J.and speculator, Uilliam Ogden, one of Chicago's major town speculators, was

the chief spokesman in Chicago against the abuses of the land system.

Ogden

.round tha.t many unscrupulous settlers advanced claims f'or land which already
bad been improved by a wealthy farmer or capitalist.

Furthemore, Ogden

claimed that the whole structure of the local land offices encouraged corruption and fraud.

Officials of the land office, Ogden explained, were political.

appointees lacking special qualifications for dealing with the legal problems
surrounding land sal.es. 54 Ogden certainly was accurate in his criticism for
officials of various land offices decided most ca.see involving the confusion
of land titles.

Ogden also resented the susceptibility of local land office

officials to bribes fr<Jn wealthy speculators and fa.naers.

'Ihus he reca:amended

to the Coounissioner of the General Land Office that all cases involving land
titles should be decided in

~ashington

by knowledgeable lawyers away from

the partisan frontier atmosphere. 55
But this is not to sa:y that the town and farm speculators did not take
advantage of their position as Chica.go's chief source of capital.

Profits

were their first consideration and to this all else was frequently subordinated.

Both Edward A. Russell and William Ogden invested their capital and that

ot other easterners in loaning money to settlers who lacked the resources to
purchase their claims.

In 1B35, Russell sent $41 000 to Hubbard specifically

for loans to sett4ers. 56 In the late 1SJ0 1 s, Ogden loaned $15 1 000 in the
same manner.57 The rates of interest were often usurious

...
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1 zt, but then one must balance this fact against the realization tha.t the
speculator provided the settler the only possible means of purchasing a farm
or the squatter of securing his claim.

Without the capital of Edward Russell,

William Ogden, and countless others like them, the agricultural hinterland of
Chicago might have developed at a slower pace eventua.11y affecting the growth
of Chicago itself.

most clearly.

Perhaps William Ogden expressed the view of the speculators

His view is similar to that of capitalists throughout .American

history, but criticism of their position must always consider the system
under which they operated and the advantages which they provided.

Writing to

an eastern investor, Ogden described his attitude toward charging high rates
of interest:

Neither does this large scale advance upon money give offense to
the purchaser, he seeks you knowing your rates and desires you to
buy his claim for him which he not having the money to buy would
otherwise lose, together with his house, barn, fence and frequently
improvements equal to fifty or more acres under cultivation of the
plough.58
To make sweeping generalizations about the role of the land speculators
on the agricultural. frontier would be to distort the picture.

Certainly the

speculators were as guilty of abuses as they were responsible for certain
advances.

The conflict occurs in historical. writing because to each fa.I'l:ler or

each town resident the case was different.
villain while to another he was a hero.
the 1830' s.
press.

To one, the speculator was a

This same ambiguity existed even in

Harsh judgments about the speculators often appeared in the

A notable example was in 1836 when the AJ..bW Evening Journal attacked

the American Land Company as a monopoly for purchasing govenmient lands.

The

editors claimed that the canpany's charter was drawn up by Charles Butler's
brother, Benjamin Butler, then Attorney General of the United States.

Accord-

ing to the Albany ;Wenipg Journal, various high goverrn:tent officials were
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r;;:..I'<)lllinent stockholders in the American '.'""d Canpaey thereby indicating its

'

-ttempt to defraud the general public. 5 ) The Chica.go American printed the
charges against the American Land Coupany, but it was equally significant that
they presented a rebuttal from Charles Butler, President of the Company.
Butler ably defended the actions of the company.

Admitting that the majority

of the charges were true, Butler pointed out, however, that long before
settlers journeyed to Illinois's interior, the American Land Company had aJ.60
ready invested .lll the future growth of the country.
As in all western
cities, Chicago was at times critical of its capitalists and the American Land

Company, but generally the speculators were welcomed to the city because of
61
their contributions to its economic life.
The involvement of capitalists and speculators extended far beyond
merely town and prairie speculation, loans to settlers, and the construction
of houses and stores.

As Chicago grew commercially its most continued need

was for internal improvements and chief among these was the building of the
Illinois and !tl.chigan Canal.

Here too the speculators worked in conjunction

with a rising class of western merchants to extend Chicago's communication
arteries.
Chicago's major attraction to eastern investors and to fanners had
alw~s

been its location on a possible thoroughfare between the Great Lakes

and the ilississippi River.

As early as 1808, Albert Gallatin suggested that

a canal between the Illinois F~ver and Lake Michigan could be a major communication artery. 62 Hhen Illinois was admitted as a state in 1818, there was
every expectation that a canal project was in the offing.

During the 1820 1 s,

several charter companies were fonned to begin work but all soon collapsed.

Finally in 1827, the national government granted Illinois alternate sections

,,,--
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of land a.long a proposed canal route to aid in financing construction of the
canal, but the project was still in the planning stages in lBJJ. 63 When
Charles Butler and Arthur Bronson arrived in Chicago in 1S33, they realized
its potential but also sa.w the nounderjng attempts at a canal project.

Butle

was amazed that the state legislature did not recognize the dependence of the
entire state upon such a project. 64 The Chicago Democrat also berated the
state for failure to act, 65 but all efforts Aeemed to have little effect until
Butler and Bronson arrived on the scene.
While in Chicago, Butler and Bronson were approached by concerned
western citizens, such a.s John Temple and John Kinzie, and asked to expend
their capital and efforts in obtaining a charter fran the Illinois state
legislature for a new private canal company.

66 Butler and Bronson returned

to New York assuring the Chica.go citizens that they would consider the project.
In New York, the seemingly shelved the idea, but John Temple in Chicago

flooded their New York of'.f'ices with requests for a private canal company.

In

early 1834, Temple contacted numerous state politicians and received their
assurances of support for a private canal company.

This information he sent
to New York, but still Butler and Bronson delayed action. 67 In Hay, 1$34,
Temple appealed to their business sense and desire for profits:
Now my dear friend allow me to scold you a little, for you deserve
it, and no doubt anticipate already the subject - The charter the charter - .None have yet come to hand • • • • Away with your
fickleness my Friend - send me the Charter for a. Canal - He have
now within our grasp one of the most splendid prizes ever presented
before & if we do not seize it, ours will be the folly and the loss
- indecision is the ruin of all great undertakings - I have been down
into the State three times since the year commenced and have ma.de it
my business to prepare the public mind for a canal & for having it
constructed immediately & indeed there seems no opposition now & the
time is ripe for the work. Do send the Charter & recollect our main
dependence is u~n you. To get that Charter fran the Legislature,
we will insure.

,,,...._______________________________________________________u._,s

-

Later in June, Temple assured Bronson that a private canal ccmpany would

bring greater profits than any of his land speculation projects. 69 Butler
and Bronson finally drew up a charter for a canal company stipulating that

the state must convey its land grant to the campany. 70 In the intervening
years, however, various elements in the state realized the immediate need for

a canal which they now felt should not

be

controlled by eastern capital.

Editorializing in November, 1834, the Chicago Democrat called upon the people
of Chicago and Illinois to construct their own canals and avoid the hegemony
of eastern financiers.

71 Conscious or this hostility, Bronson dropped

interest in a private canal company.

his

Bronson never really wished to build

the canal himself, unless it was absolutely necessary.

Therefore he decided

that since sentiment in the state now seemed to assure the quick

constructio~

ot a state-operated canal, he warned his western agent not to meddle in the
project any longer for

11

•

•

•

i f the state will undertake either on her own

account, our desire being rather to have same camnunication opened than to
do it ourselves. 1172

In 1835, Chicago indeed pushed for the immediate construction or a canal.
Newspaper editorials increased as Chicago realized that products shipped via
an Illinois and Michigan Canal over the Great Lakes to New York would reach

market quicker than any southern route to New Orleans. 73

The standard exhorta-

tion in 1835 was 11 Give us this canal, and Chicago will soon be to the West
what New York is to the East. 1174
But the state had always been hindered by lack of proper financing until
1835 when the state itself contracted for loans to begin construction.75
However, it was again eastern financiers who opened their coffers to .finance
the Illinois and Michigan Canal.

Arthur Bronson, for examplf.: 1 was one or the

r::::

'
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iargest holders of canal bonds.

1.49
When the canal bill was passed in ,January1

1.B.36, Gurdon Hubbard, William P. Thomton, and William B. Archer were appointed

canal commissioners. It was significant that two of these men, Gurdon Hubbard
and William B. Archer, had extensive connections with eastem capitalists
serving as their agents in land investments.

While Hubbard invested for the

Russells of Connecticut, Archer shared land purchases with Micajah T. Williams

of Cincinnati. 77 Thus leadership of the canal project itself fell to specuiators and capitalists.
Net only did eastern money finance the canal, but land speculators such
as Bronson, Hubbard, Williams and Russell bought heavily in the sale of canal

lands at Chicago in July, 18.361 to finance the canal's construction.

'l'he

IDinois and Michigan Canal never became a reality of Chicago 1 s commercial
system until late in the 1$4.0's, yet it had definite effects on the city
before that time.

Among the towns on the westem shore of Lake Michigan,

Chicago was the first to consider and actually begin construction of a canal.
For capitalists and speculators investigating investment opportunities in
Lake Ifichigan town.sites, Chicago thus seemed to offer the best security. 78
Moreover, the beginning of construction in 18.36 provided many jobs for
laborers and artisans. 79 In its earliest stages, therefore, eastern capitalists contributed to the financing and construction of the Ulinois and Mi.chig
Canal.
Commercial. growth depended upon improving and inaugurating a canrn.un.ications network.

!<'or Chicago and all towns on the western shore of Lake

Michigan, harbor improvement assumed primary importance.

As early as 18291

when the Illinois state legislature was petitioning Congress for aid in
constructing the Illinois and Michigan Canal, a request for harbor improvement
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ttaB also made.

In the early 1S30 1 s, there were no adequate harbors on

Lake Ilichigan.

At Chicago, ships were forced to dock outside the mouth of

the Chicago River and transport goods and passengers to the shore by small
boa.ts.

The principal obstructions to entering the Chicago Iil.ver were sandbars

which had to be continually dredged away fran the river's entrance.

Chicago,

hoWever, was the first town on Lake Michigan to receive steady appropriations
for harbor improvement.

The first $25,000 was granted in 1833 and construction

of a harbor and the dredging of sandbars began.

The early improvement of its

harbor gavo Chicago a considerable lead over the other towns on Lake Hichigan
81
and a virtual monopoly for a few years over lake traffic.
For many years
after, the Chiago newspapers continually editorialized on the need for harbor
82
inprovement.
By 1837, ships entered the Chicago River and unloaded goods
and passengers at wharves in the principal business sections of the city. 83
As with the Illinois and Hichigan Canal, harbor construction at Chicago
served a dual purpose; it not only incroased the town's comnercial potential,
but also provided jobs for emigrants seeking a livelihood in the ~lest.

As

early as 1834, the p_hicago J\merican pleaded for laborers on the harbor project. a4 In 1835, construction was actually slowed when the government engineer
was lo::.;ing workers because of the high.er wages offered by speculators in
building stores and houses in the town. 8 5
As Chicago increased in population, its needs for connections with the
interior grew correspondingly.

In 1836, a transportation company was formed

between merchants of Chicago, Ottawa on the IDinoia !liver and even some
towns further south.

Its purpose was to transport goods fran the East into

the interior of Illinois and bring foodstuffs back to Chicago. 86 Yet the
interior of Illinois was not filling up rapidly enough to supply f a.nn products

r:::..
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tor Chicago, which by 1835 had approximately 3500 people.

Chicagoans therefore

depended for f oodstu!f s upon areas to the $outhwest centering on the Wabash
Valley which al.ready was a market oriented agricultural region.

Chicago adver-

tised its need for farm products and requested the f'anners of' the Wabash area
to bring their surpluses to Chicago where the highest prices could be ob-

tained. 87 In 1834, a railroad from Chicago to Vincennes was proposed to tap
the resources of the Wabash Valley.

One contemporary Chicago resident ex-

plained the importance of this railroad to Chicago:
The subject of a rail-way fran Chicago to Vincennes, is one of
deep, I had almost said of vital interest to our citizens. It
is true many fanns are opening in the neighborhood of Chicago,
and the country is rapidly filling up, with a population • • • •
But the increase of population in the country is such that it is
not able to sup;ily itself with produce; much less is it able to
feed the rapidly increasing population of Chica.go. This must
continue to be the case for five years to come • • • • Thus the
conclusion forces itself upon us, that we must forever remain
depencrnnt on the ~.abash country for san.ething to eat • • • • 88
But who could build such a railroad to the interior'!
names appear in fostering Chicago's developnent.

11.e;ain the same

In 1835 1 a company was

formed and a federal land grant was obtained for a railroad from Chicago to
Vincennes; and among its principal directors and stockholders were Arthur
Bronson, John Kinzie, Gurdon s. Hubbard, and George Dole.

Hubbard and Bronson

were to sell shares of stock a.t both New York and Philadelphia a.s well as at
Chicago. s9 Even though the project proved abortive, its inaut,'Uration was
symptomatic of the sources of leadership and capital for Chicago• s improvements; it was a combination of eastern capitalists and a generation of western
merchants whose careers had begun in land speculation.
A similar example was evident in 1836 when the Chicago Hydraulic Company
was charter'°d to bring fresh water into the town.

Among its principal stock-

holders were J&les l..!ampbell, Hobert Kinzie, Gurdon Hubbard., John H. Kinzie,

~d
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Richard I. Hamilton, all of whan had previously been involved in .land

speculation and presumably were reinvesting their capital gains in Chicago's
growth 0 90 This became increasingly clear as additional commercial establishments were founded in 1835 and 1836.

John Kinzie operated a forwarding and

commission business as did Gurdon Hubbard.

Each owned shares in various

steamboats and established connections with the major shipping lines operating
on the Erie Canal. 91 In this way1 the orderly and e.f'ficient transshipnent ot
goods .from New York to Chicago was assured.
leadership in other areas ot town life.

Hubbard and Kinzie also provided

Both were involved in town politics

serving as councilmen and both were directors of the Chicago branch of the
92
state Bank.
William Ogden was also involved in the commercial. and political.
history of Chicago.

In 1836, he was the. principal organizer of Chicago's

own steamboat canpany to build and charter boats for the Chicago trade.

He

interested many Chicago merchants, but eventually he turned a.gain for the
support of various eastern capitalists. 93

In addition, his project was

supported by two representatives of the Illinois Investment Company from
Scotland. 94
As Chica.go expanded commercially, therefore, community leadership was
controlled by a class of merchants, land speculators, and general entrepreneurs
In most of the major commercial undertakings, certain men pleyed a dominant

role in Chicago and appear again and again on the rolls of new companies and
in the city government.

Host of these names we have already encountered in

the history of Chicago:

William Ogden, Gurdon Hubbard, John H. Kinzie, and

John Tanple.

In March, 1837, Chicago was finally given a city government to

replace its old town status, and in the .following May a mayoral election was
held.

The two candidates were William B. Ogden and John H. Kinzie.95

At

first, the Chicago American showed definite hostility to Ogden because he so
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clearly represented eastern capital, feeling that a native son might better
serve the interests of Chicago. 96 This, however, was a minority opinion for
Ogden was elected Chicago's first mayor indicating the leadership of the
city's canmercial. class. 97

In 18391' Chicago's third nayor was Benjamin

p..aymond, a deal.er in dry goods and one of the city's wealthiest mcrchants. 98

AB the city expanded, all facets of its life turned for leadership to the
business canmunit~. 99
But how successful were these early capitalists and speculators in
fostering Chicago's economic growth? Statistics unfortunately are rare for
early Chicago history, but there were a. few reliable indices of economic
developnent.

Chicago's population increased dramatically from 1833 to 1837
when it tapered off due to the depressio:n. 100 The number of vessels arriving
101
at Chicago increased fran 4 in 1833 to 456 in 1836.
Because Chicago had
a frontier economy, most foodstuffs and manufactured. products were imported..
As the years passed, however, Chicago slowly increased its e:xports to the
East.

While imports would exceed exports until the middle 1840's, it was
102
evident that Chicago had come a long way by 1837.
It one wished to

gauge the retail and commercial growth of Chicago, he need only peruse the
first issues of the Chicago Democrat in 1833 and 1834 when barely a half page
was taken up with the advertisements of retail and commercial. establishments.

In 1835 and 1S36, both the Chicago Democrat and Chicago American devoted three
to four pages to business advertisements. l03
By 1S37, therefore, Chicago seemed assured of a continuing economic
develoµnent..

Retail merchants, lawyers, and general artisans streamed ii:to

the city with the opening of new canmercial endeavors and the unlimited employment on various internal improvement projects.

CapitalistR snch as
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william Ogden, Gurdon Hubbard, and John Kinzie continued their real estate
speculations but increasingly contributed their business skill and excess
capital to encouraging improvement projects and opening subsidiary canmercial
businesses such as forwarding and commission houses.

Their earlier connection

with eastern capitalists provided them with an extraordinary opportunity to
draw eastern funds into areas other than land and townsite speculation.

By

18.36-1837, Chicago had its own native city leaders like Ogden, Hubbard, and
Kinzie, but their connections with Arthur Bronson and Charles Butler indicated
Chicago's develoµnent was still a partnership of Ea.st and West.
Unfortunately Chicago developed under boom conditions during the
nationwide speculative period of the 1830's.
did not continue indefinitely.

The rate of economic expansion

By late 1836, there were signs in the East

that the speculative period was slowly drawing to a close.

International,

national, and local conditions brought on the Panic of 1837 which lasted until
approximately 1843.104 In the West, the Specie Circular passed in July, 1836 1
was the first hint of the curtailment of easy credit which had fostered large
land sales and city and state improvement projects.

The Specie Circular

required local land officials to accept only gold and silver in payment for
public land with an exdeption tor actual settlers buying not more than 320
acres.105
But the Specie Circular did not cause the depression, for conditions
had long existed within the national and international economic frameworks
for financial. contractions.

As conditions worsened in the East, their effect

soon reached the western states.

In Chicago, the tightening of credit seemed

In May, lS.37 1 the Chicago American mentioned that tight money
106 The newspaper called
in New York ha.d olowed the volume of Chicago's trade.
for positive govenunent action to ameliorate the financial squeeze. 107 Yet

unpreventable.

155
the depression in Chicago business circles was not alone the result qf easteni
financial conditions.

Settled in advance of the agricultural frontier, Chicago

had to wait for the developnent of a surplus-producing hinterland before it
possessed a balanced economy.

The Chicago iimerican realized the defects ot

Chicago's economic develoµnent as early as May, 1837:
In the building up of the West, and developing the sources of its
prosperity, so alluring have been the temptations to the mere
capitalist and speculator to invest his money, and so splendid,
and in tact almost incredible has been his success, that the
regular channels or business and means of subsistence have been
neglected, and almost every avenue to weal.th, except the •royal
road' of magic speculatio!!t. has been spumed as unworthy of grave
and honorable attention.lVti'

The editor quite correctly recognized the benefits of townsite speculatio
which brought Chicago from a frontier village to a city in the interval. or
four yea.rs. 109 The fact remained, nevertheless, that Chicago needed the
agricultural surpluses of the interior to balance its commerce with the
East and supply the hane market.
The depression worked great hardships on the canmerce of Chicago, but
the city's econany did not stagnate during the depression.

Population re-

mained fairly steady and trade continued to increase, althotif1 at a reduced
rate. no In the years from. 18.3.3 to 18.36, there had grown up a number or
interested eastern investors and a class of westem merchants vitally concerned with the fortunes of Chicago. While many western entrepreneurs suffered financial losses during the depression, they remained in the city to
wait out the financial storm.

At the same time, some large eastem investors,

notably Arthur Bronson, continued to pour money into the city throughout the
depression.
skill

o:t

As in earlier years, Chicago depended on the dedication and

its businessmen and the capital of eastem financiers.

The depression did not surprise Chicago's capitalists.

Arthur Bronson,

~
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Charles Butler, and Edward H.ussell were cognizant of the deteriorating
financial conditions in the East and warned their western agents of the
approaching storm.

As early as June 30, 1836, Arthur Bronson felt that

Ea.stern financial conditions would eventually precipitate a decline of
property values in the West.

Consequently, Bronson instructed his numerous
western agents to curtail real estate purchases.111 Charles Butler of the
American Land Company a.ttanpted to hurry the collection of debts owed to
the American Land Com.pany. 112 In 18.36, l!;dward H.ussell., who had invested in
Chicago through the agency of Gurdon Hubbard, also limited further investments and sold a considerable portion of his property before the financial
depression hit the country.113 Despite warnings fran ea.stern financiers, the
Chicago business community and especially the real estate promoters were hard
hit by the depression.

In 18.38., a Chicago resident canmented that there is

no telling who are good • • • •

11

The Kinzie's a.re good I should suppose •• • •

But it is dangerous to trust anybody now •• ;i.L+ In 1841, William Ogden found
only gloom among Chicago's land speculators:
As regards Chicago, everything has changed mightily since you le.f't,
property has depreciated monstrously, it often happens that property
which sold for hundreds or even thousands is not now worth even $10.
Those too who were richest when you left are of the poorest now.
Jamison, Pearson, G. s. Hubbard, James Kinzie., Kimball and Porter,
Clybourne, and a host of others for instance & very_few of the old
stock of 30 are otherwise than deeply embarrassed.ll5
Perusing the records and correspondence of William B. Ogden, however, it
was obvious that land speculators and merchants continued business during the
depression.

Ogden, for example maintained his status as agnet of the American

Land Canpany in selling property and occasionally supervising real estate
improvements.

At the same time, he handled the town lot investments of
Various other easteni and westeni capitalists. 116 By 1837, Ogden centered his
real estate interests and those of his customers on the north side of the
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Chicago River, and consequently he did everything in his power to draw capital
for improvements to that area.

Ogden intended that the north side of the

Chicago River should become the principal business district of the city.

For

a number of years, he canpeted with capitalists and merchants in other sections
of the city spurring the general improvement of Chicago. 117 In 1839, Ogden
agreed to build stores and houses for a minimal commission i f his eastem
investors supplied the capital. 118 At other t:imes, he employed eastern capital
in the building of warehouses and fiour mills to accoomodate the increasing

agricultural produce shiped to Chicago.119
During the depression, William Ogden played an unparalleled role in
Chicago's developnent.

While other land speculators who resided in the West

suffered financial failures, Ogden was able to weather the depression and increase his own financial standing. Besides land speculation, Ogden was involved in many other business ventures.

While he lost money in certain areas'f

Ogden 1 s innumerable econanic investments enabled h:im to lead Chicago's business
community during the depression.

In 1839, Ogden indicated the diversity of

his economic interests which aided his financial position fran 1837 to 1842:
Besides my land, lot, & city matters in Chicago, building renting,
:improving, & c. I still carry on my Brewery, am concerned with
Henry Smith in a large canal contract of near $200,000 in amt. &
have taken into my care since my return more than 50,000 acres of
land belonging to others, the titles of which in many cases have
to be examined, taxes to be paid, examinations to be made & c & c.121
Ogden's land agency was a viable concem even as late as 1839.

Various

eastern capitalists sent money to Ogden which was then loaned to settlers for
land purchases.122 During the depression years, moreover, many capitalists
were able to continue their land speculations through Ogden's agency.

Be-

ginning in 1837, the Chicago newspapers carried notices of city lots and falm
lands, which were delinquent in ta.xes. 123 If these tax.es rooiained tmpaid, the

1
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-;tate and city governments sold the property for the meager price of ~he back
taxes.

The original investor usually had from two to three years to redeem
his land by paying the back taxes. 124 Because of the seriousness of the
depression, thougti, speculators, like Arthur Bronson and \'/illiam Ogden, figured
that such lands would never be redeemed and thus purchased land at tax sales.iz
Because of Ogden's excellent financial standing and his access to eastem
capital, he was the principal

~ent

of many city improvements.

In late

1839,

he organized a campaign to build a bridge across the Chicago River giving
greater access to the property of his mvestors on the north side of the
Chica.go River. 126 Knowing that Chicago lacked the capital to finance the
bridge, Ogden wrote to Arthur Bronson in New York hoping to interest him in
the project:
The facilities for crossing our River, however, must be great]Jr
increased or business property on the north side will yet suffer
great depression. We are now making another effort for a Bridge,
but we shall find great difficulty in funds to build it even i f
we get the vote of the Council to do so, neither the city nor
individuals have much money here.l'Z/
Bronson agreed to aid in the financing of the bridge.

12$

Moreover, Ogden

succeeded in obtaining backing f ran several of his clients holding property on
the north side of the Chicago Hiver. 1 29 Ogden himself contributed $10001 and
he also interested other Chic.a.go merchants in the bridge. DO
One of Ogden's more important tasks during the depression waa in
negotiating loans for Chicago's merchants and professional people.

Beginning

:in 183S, he received a fiood of loan applications from Chicago merchants. 131

Ogden himself did not possess the necessary reserve capital to loan money, but

Arthur Bronson in New York was quite willing
rate of interest.

to loan money at an appropriate

Bronson oroinarily required land as security, and it was

'.iilliam Ogden ts duty to judge the financial responsibility of the loan applicant
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and the quality of the land offered as security.

In 1838, for example, John

Caton, a Chicago lawyer, applied to Ogden for a $1000 loan to improve his
property.

Ogden sent the request to Arthur Bronson with the following judg-

ment of Caton:
Chiefly, Mr. Caton is doing a very good law business and is I
think responsible, of good habits and character but like the profession generally not always exact in meeting engagements. Still
I believe he would meet this & interest probably punctually.132
Bronson loaned money to a great number of Chicago merchants.

In the late

1830's Archibald Clybourne borrowed considerable capital to pay the debts
arising from his meat-packing business.133

In 18401 Walter Newberry used

capital obtained fran Bronson to erect buildings on the north side of the
Chicago River.134 Larger amounts of capital were disbursed by Bronson to
many

of his former land speculation partners.

In 1838, John Kinzie, who had

started his career as a land speculator, operated one of Chicago's leading
forwarding and commission houses.

The decline of property values, however,

found K:inzie in considerable financial difficulty, and he twice turned to
Arthur Bronson for loans totaling nearly $101 000 based on the security of his
property.

Interest on the loans was 12 per cent yearly. 135 By 1841, Kinzie

was dissatisfied with what he termed Bronson's high-handed business tactics
and usurious rates of interest. 136 The fact remained, however, that Kinzie
would probably have suffered financial collapse without Bronson's help when
it was most needed.
Gurdon Hubbard faced difficulties similar to those of John Kinzie.
Hubbard also operated a forwarding and commission house as well as a general.
land agency.

In 1837 and 1838, he ignored the deepening financial crisis and

bought more land and started improvements by borrowing capital. through
Arthur Bronson.

By late 1838, Hubbard was indebted to Bronson for $10,000,
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but

he insisted that Chicago and its business community (Hubbard, of course,
included himself) were solvent and good for all outstanding debts. 137 The

bright financial picture painted by Hubbard did not exactly correspond with
the jud@llents of his contemporaries.

In 1839, a Chicago investor warned one

of ht.a eastern connections that Hubbard was in New York, but

11

I should think

it very doubtful whether he will be able to weather the stonn.

Do not in-

volve yourself further with him • • • • ,,13S Ogden al.so felt that Hubbard was
facing ruin, and by 1840 Hubbard himself doubted whether he could escape the
financial morass of the depression.140
In 1839, Hubbard was desperate because Arthur Bronson demanded payment

for his loans.

To satisfy his debts, Hubbard was forced to sell part of his
warehouse in Chicago. 141 Bronson was then informed by his agent, William
Ogden, that further collections from Hubbard would cripple all his commercial
activities.

Neither Bronson nor Ogden wished to force financial ruin on

Hubbard because his warehouses and forwarding and commission business were
essential. commercial establishments on the north side of the Chicago River.14 2
While Hubbard and Kinzie and ma.ny others like them experienced difficult times
during the depression, both emerged during the decade of the 1S40's to become
premier businessmen of the city; part of this growth certainly was due to the
capital and good offices of Arthur Bronson.
The connections with eastern capital were increasingly more important
during the lengthening yea.rs of the depression.

As financial contractions

first spread over the East coast in 1837, eastern wholesalers who supplied
goods to western merchants began investigating the credit position of their
western custaners.

The system was crude and disorganized.

Many

agents of

New York business fizms visited the city of Chicago and inquired at bars,
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hotels, and among the general populace about the stability of various
merchants.

Because of this system, many Chicago merchants found their credit
in the East l:imited.143 As banks closed both East and West, Chicago merchants

depended even more heavily on the capital and services of men like Arthur
Bronson.

But Bronson was not alone in this effort.

0 rigina1Jy

George Smith who had

come fran Scotland as a representative of the Illinois Investment

Company, an organization designed for land speculation, stayed to invest in
aJ..1 segments of the town's economy.

As banks closed in the West, Smith

realized that the frontier which most needed a means of exchange to conduct
business was handicapped.

In 1839, therefore, Smith established his own

banking house, George Smith and Canpany, issuing bills of exchange which
served as a circulating medium for the debt-ridden camnunity of Chicago.144
Two of his fonner partners, Patrick Strachan and William Scott, then went to
New York where they established a brokerage firm which aided the exchange ot
money between Chicago and the Ea.st.14 5 Smith provided any number of additional
services.

He was a regualr investor in Chicago improvements especia.J.ly in

steamboats plying the Great Lakes.

Furthermore, farmers and merchants who

needed assistance in marketing their surpluses received advances from George
Smith and Canpa.ny. 146 As in previous cases, George Smith represented foreign
capital which helped to bolster Chicago's econanic picture.

Alice Smith in

her study of George Smith viewed his contributions to Chicago during the
depression in the following light:
In the struggle of the panic-ridden city to establish a finn
rooting, George Smith and his money plqed no insignificant
part. Capital and credit such as he had to offer were needed
as never before to get agriculture, transportation, and industry
in motion.147
With the leadership of western entrepreneurs and the capital of eastern
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to
1g36, William Ogden had organized a steamboat line
Michigan City, Indiana.

run between Chicago and

The project was finally underw83' in 1838 because of

the investments of numerous eastern and western businessmen.148 In 1840,
ogden obtained a government mail contract to help finance the line.14 9
Despite this, several of the stockholders of the Chicago and Michiean City
steamboat Campany went bankrupt leaving Ogden responsible for the debts ot
the firm.

Ogden then sold a part interest of the canpany to Buffalo merchants
who were able to maintain the line.150 The canraercial picture looked even
brighter in 1839 when Chicago and Buffalo merchants established the first
regular line of steamboats on Lake Michigan.151 Despite the depression, there
fore, Chicago was slowly recognized as the chief port on Lake Michigan.
Chicago was far ahead of its rivals along the western shore of Lake Hichigan
and even was accused of holding a monopoly over the lake shipping by ports on
the eastern shore.152
Chicago merchants and capitalists also showed groat interest in railroad
projects.

In 18.36, the Galena and Chicago Union Railw83' Company was chartered,

but as of 1839 the project had still not advanced beyond the plarming
stages. 1 53 Chicago newspapers therefore launched a campaign to revive the
company.
Milwaukee.

The principle impetus was a fear of their rival city to the north,
Chicagoans feared that the proposed Mila.ukee and Rock Hiver Canal

would draw the agricultural surpluses of :northern Illinois southern Wisconsin

to Hilwaukee instead of Chicago.

In 1841, the Chica;so Daily American prodded

Chicago merchants with the following observation:
Thus it will be seen, our Milwaukee brethren are moving ahead for
the Rock River Trade, which now canes to Chicago. \·till not our
citizens open their eyes to the importance o! constructing a Rail
Hoad immediately - or will they wait till the growing trade of that
vast and fertile region is directed to ',.1isconsin Territory?l54
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Arthur Bronson and various Chicago property holders supported the railro
project, but the lack

or

capital caused by the depression prevented real
progress until the late 1840's.155 Yet even during the depression, Chicago
continued to talk of and attempt various internal inprovements to ;ldvance
Chicago's commercial position.
Of all the internal improvement projects, the Illinois and Michigan Canal
was the most important.

Construction on the canal continued throughout the

depression until the state of Illi"lois failed in lSU.

But during the most

difficult years of the depression, the Dlinois and Michigan Canal was a a,mbol
of hope for Chicago merchants and kept the .future of Chicago before the eyes

of eastern capitalists.

In 1839, the state had obtained loans from ea.stern

capitalists to continue work on the canal.156 Cana1 construction provided
jobs for la.borers and the general artisan.

were given

contra~ta

clining trade.

Furthermore, nerchants :.n Chicago

for canal materials which sustained their genera.J.ly de-

William B. Oi;den was one of the largest canal contractors and

was of the opinion i f 1839 that
It our state loans a.re effected, the rapid progress and hea~J
disbursements upon the canal for 2 or .3 years to come will sustain us and we shall increase with a l~~e growing and thrifty
business until the canal is canpleted.

Contracts for the canal were often satisfied with canal scrip, a
circulating medium which aided the normal commerciaJ. transactions of Chicago.
In M83', 193 9, the Da.i],y Chica.go American indicated the importance of canal

money to the city:
This amount can be circulated to good advantage around the cityin the pa_yment of debts and necessary purchases; and the greater
portion of it will, no doubt, be expended among us. Our business
men should take it, if' for no other reason, than the important one
of susta.irdng the canal-. and consequently preserving and extending
the trade of. the city.1,s
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Along with other citizens of Chicago, 1dlliam Ogden attributed Chicago's
\'18athering of the depression to the canal.159 Begiru1ing in 1839, however, the
state showed increasing signs of indebtedness and an inability to continue
canal construction.

l'ihile the Chicago newspapers urged the state to cutback

all internal improvement projects, the Illinois and 1-lichigan Canal was defend

as the most vital need of the entire sta.te. 160 l'iben it seemed evident that
the state legislature was about to halt canal construction, William Ogden and
other Chicagoans lobbied in Springfield, but to no avail. 161 In March, 1S4l,
work on the Illinois and Michigan Canal was finally terminated.

During the

most difficult years of the depression, however, the building of the canal
had bolstered Chicago's economy.

Bessie L. Pierce in her study of Chicago

thought that
Canal construction of the period 1837-1S41 was the saving factor
in an otherwise hopeless situation supplying Chicago with a means
of life, until the appearance of an agricultural su:rnlus offered
the first secure foundation for urban developnent.lo2
For a short time s.f'ter work on the canal was stopped, Chicago was thrown
into a panic.

How were the merchants to survive? rlhere would laborers and

artisans find employment? But the picture was not that bleak, for other
sectors of Chicago's economy indicated that the depression was drawing to a
close by late 1841.

In tact, as early as

1839 Chicago appeared to recover

momentarily as large supplies of goods arrived from the East and new retail
stores were established.163 Probably the most significant indication of
Chicago's future was the statement of the Chica.go Daily American in June, 1839,
proclaiming that 1fide (Chicago) are now becaning a producing and exporting
country. ul-64 This, of course, was the key to Chicago's growth.

Ra.ilroads,

steamboats, the Illinois and Michigan Canal were all projects kept alive by
eastern capital a.nd westem businessmen with the hope of converting Chicago
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into the chief export center of the West.

In 18.'.39,, Chicagoans were premature

in believing that the depression was at an end,, but there was no mistaking

that all preceding developnents marked Chicago as a major export center.

In

the midst of the depression, the Secretary of War,, after perusing the reports
of the Topographical Bureau who were at work on harbor construction along the
western shore of Lake Michigan,, seemed to confirm what Chicago's merchants and
capitalists had long been struggling for:
The canmercial interests of all the states that border upon the
lakes is intimately connected with Chicago aa a place of transshipnent and deposits (sic): and the agricultural prospects of
Illinois,, Indiana,, Iowa,, and Missouri, are to become greatly
dependent upon facilities for business upon a large scale at
some point on the southwest part of the shore of Lake Michigan. 165
In late 1$41,, despite the halt or canal work,, Chicago seemed to be
emerging from the depression.
city's needs.

The newspapers were now more cognizant of the

Land speculation was frowned upon as were fanners and merchants

who came West hoping to make a f'orttme in a day.

No longer were the news-

papers filled with exaggerated statements of Chicago's econanic position.

The

Chicago DajJY American,, for example,, cautioned fa.nners and city merchants that
1
The greatest fortunes have been the moat gradually acquired. 11166 There were
advertisements,, it is true, still praising Chicago's excellent business
opporttmities and the possibilities for fanning in the interior,, butthere
was also a new conservatism,, a. sense of proportion about the needs of Chicago
and what could be accomplished.

or

even greater importance to Chicago's development was the arrival of
significant amotmts of wheat,, pork,, and other f'ann. products in 18U.167 After
several years,, Chicago now possessed an agricultural hinterland to supply the
city and to provide exports to balance its commerce.

In 1841, population

again began to increase a.."ld Chicago was indeed on the road to recovery.

By
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1S4l, Chicago was no longer a frontier town.

Perhaps the editor of the

-

Chicaeo Daily 1\merican expressod the economic transfonnation which Chicago
had undergone:
It was scarcely but yesterday that we imported nearly eveey
necessary of life into the northern part of this State. Not
only did we obtain our dey goods and groceries fran the east,
but also our flour, our beef and our pork • • • • Grain and
beef and pork were articles that received little attention at
the hands of gentlemen speculators.
Now however, this tide is about to change. Our own products
and our own vessels are daily leaving port for the east. We
are no longer a species of colony miserably dependent upon the
mother countey • • • .169
The end of the depression, therefore, really marked the end of Chicago's

.f'o:m.ative period of economic growth.

Fran 1833 to 18421 Chicago had moved

from a frontier town to a city with a developed and sustained econany.

At

first the dream of capitalists and entrepreneurs both East and West, merchants
and artisans slowly drifted to Chicago and supported such dreams.

The real.

test occurred during the depression, but eastern capital and western leadership stayed with the city.

After 1841, Chicago possessed sane semblance of

a balanced economy and each year saw trade increase, farm surpluses rise,
and new camnunication arteries radiate fran Chicago to the interior of
Illinois.

But Chicago was not the only city to develop on Lake Michigan's

western shore.

To the North, Milwaukee, Green Bay, and a host of smaller

cities all imagined themselves a.s the chief port on Lake Hichigan.
development was

remarkab~

Their

similar to that of Chicago helping to clarify the

general. course of western town growth and partially explain the significance
of each city.
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rABI.E 1 -- Land Sal.es at Chicago.

In 1835, there were 3,626,536 acres subject
to entry 2.t the Chicago Land Office. Land Sold to Individuals from

1835 to 1843.a
1835 • • •
1836 • • •
1837 • • •
1838 • • •
1839 • • •

1840
1841
1842
1843

370,043 acres
202,364 II
15,6'!1 H
87,881 rt
160,635 II

• • • 137,382 acres
• • • 138,583
• • • 194,556
• • • 229,460

ll

11
<I

aJessie B. Thomas, nstatistics Concerning tie City or Chica.go, II in
Chica_go River and Harbor Conventicn: 0rl£in. Proceedirurn and Statistics, ed.
by Robert Fergus (Chicago: Fergus Printing Company, 1822.), p. 186.

Population GrCJ<1th of Chicago.

T1\Blli 2 -

1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836

a

1837
1838
1839
1B40
1841
1842
1843
1844

• • • 30
• • • 40-50
• • • 60
• • • 150
• • • 350

• • • 1,800
• • • 3,265
• • • 3,820

~,ierce, History of Chicago, I, p. 44.

•
•
•
•

• • 4,170
• • 4,000
• • 4,200
• • 4,470
• • • 5,752
• • • 6,248
• • • 7,580
• • • s,ooo

Pierce compiled these statistlcs

from all available sources including census reports, travel accounts, and
newspapers.

TABLE 3 -- Ship Arrivals at the Port of Chica.go. a

1833 ••• 4
1834 ••• 176
1835 • • • 250

1836 ••• 456

,,,.--
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aAt various times the ChicagJ rewspapers tabulated the number of vessels
arriving at Chicag:> o These statistics were ccmpiled from the following
issues: Chica.go American, December 15, 1835; and the Chicago American,
December 10, 1836.

TABLE 4 -

Imports and l!;xports at the Port of Ghicago. a

Import

1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841

•••
•••
•••
•••
•••
•••

$325,203.90
$373,677.12
$579,174.61.

$630,980.26
$562,106.a:>
$564,347.88
1842 • • • $664,347.88
1843 ••• $971,849.75
1844 .••• $1,686,416.oo

$1,000.64
$11,,065.00
~16,04h.75

$33,843.00
$228,635. 74
$384,862.2.4
$659,305.20
$682,2.10.85
$785,504.23

aJessie B. Thanas, 1tStatistics Conceming the City of Chicago, 11 p. 184.
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CHAPTER VI
'lhe Establishment ot A Town, 1833-18.41

Milwaukee:

Next to Chicago, Milwaukee was the most important townsite on Lake
Michigan's westem shore.

In the 18;l) 1 s, Milwaukee was a smaller fur trade

post than Chicago, but it al.so was controlled by the American Fur Company
under the supervision of Solomon Juneau.

By 1835, Milwaukee became one ot

the most popular to'Wllsites on Lake Michigan.
similar to that at Chicago.
f/dlwaukee•s residents.

The pattem of develoµnent was

Land speculation was the first occupation of

During the first years of Milwaukee's development,

eastern financiers and their western agents provided the capital and leadership
in advancing building construction, internal improvements and camnercial.
growth.

By 1842, Milwaukee was no longer a frontier to'Wll, for the intervening

years had witnessed the development or commercia.J. and retail businesses and a
surplus-producing agricultura.J. interior.1
Attention was first directed towards Milwaukee in 1831 when Major Samuel

c.

Stambaugh was appointed commissioner to obtain the cession of Indian lands

in southeastern Wisconsin.

In 18311 the Menominee Indians ceded the land which

opened the to'Wl'lsite of Milwaukee to purchase by speculators.

Exploring the

country purchased from the Indians, Stambaugh raved about the agricultura.J.
possibilities of land from Green Bay to Milwaukee. 2 Despite Stambaugh's
Report, the area of present-day Illinois and Wisconsin was little 1mown until
after the Blackhawk War in 1832-1833.3 Then news about the fertile farming
land and possible to'Wllsites was spread over the East coast.
181

Slowly emigrants
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headed West, but for obvious geographical reasons Milwaukee was slowe.r to
attract attention than Chicago.

The major routes to the liest were overland

and ran south aJ.ong Lake Eichigan•s southern shore.
Chicago Hoad first extended only to Chicago.

Turning northward,, the

l·filwaukee' s more northerly lo-

cation on the lake shore deprived it of this initial emigration.

Until the

middle 1830 1 s,, a decent road did not exist between Chicago and .l:iilwaukee. 4
Moreover,, steamboats plying Lake Michigan rarely stopped at Milwaukee in the
early 1830 1 s,, but instead joumeyed to Chicago where al.l passengers disembarked
In 1835, Solomon Juneau was forced to offer the captain of a vessel a town lot

to dock his boat at Milwaukee. 5
There were several conditions which led to the popularization of the
Milwaukee townsite all of which were interrelated.

The developnent of roads

was dependent upon population pressure and the desire of emigrants to move
north.

'V'Jestem emigrants also moved to locations where fa.rm land and town

lots were available.

Throughout the 1830' s, Indian lands in V-iisconsin were

purchased by the government, surveyed, and then readied for public sale.
h~ile

the town of Chicago was plotted in 1829 and town lots offered at a gener-

al. sale in 1833, the site of Milwaukee was not legally registered until 1835. 6
Thus the beginning of town lot speculation, i..tiich attracted more and more
eastern capital, began at a later date in Hil:waukee.

At the same time, agri-

cultural land surrounding Milwaukee was not opened for public sale until 1839
forcing early settlers to squat on the public domain hoping that their claims
would be validated at the public sale in 1839.

Thus the progress of the town-

site at Milwaukee and its agricultural interior was noticeably behind similar
developnents in Chicago.
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Milwaukee was separated into three sections, each represented by different
finB.l'lCial interests.

Geographically, Milwaukee was divided into an east side

and a west side by the Milwaukee lliver.

To the south, the Milwaukee River

was joined by the Menan.inee River dividing the townsite into a third section. 7

Throughout its early history, Milwaukee was a.ffected by constant feuding among
the different sections.
But who were Milwaukee's town pranoters and land speculators who settled
each of these sections? Morgan L. Mart.in of Green Bay was the first to envision a town on the Milwaukee River.

In 1833, Martin had undertaken a tour

of the territory of Wisconsin searching for fann and townsite speculations.
Visiting Milwaukee, Martin immediately decided that its location marked it
as a future lakeport.

8

At this time, Solomon Juneau resided at Milwaukee in

order to conduct the declining business of the American Fur Canpany.

Martin

explained to him the possibilities of the Milwaukee townsite, but Juneau was
apparently incapable of visualizing the country three or four years in the
future.

According to Morgan L. Mart.in,

His (Juneau) first hint of the prospective value of his location
at Milwaukee came from me,, and he was so incredulous that it was
sometimes difficult to prevent his sacri9icing his interest to
the sharks who soon gathered around him.
Martin, however,, needed Juneau acquiescence to further the pranotion of
the east side of the I-:ilwaukee Hiver.

Having resided at this location for a

number of years, Juneau was eligible to claim pre-emption rights to the land.
Hartin there.fore purchased a hal..f of Juneau's claim for $500 agreeing to do
all that was necessary to secure the pre-emption rlghts and promote the townsite.

Martin also purchased other claims of early .fur traders thus monopollz:inti
the land on the east side of the Milwaukee River. 10 To hurry the survey of
the land, Martin wrote to the Surveyor General of the Michigan Territory. 11
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-BY 1835, he bad secured all the necessary legal titles.

During this period,

Solomon Juneau remained uninterested in the whole venture preferring instead
to carry on the American Fur Company's !altering trade.

Juneau never even

entered into a written agreement with Morgan L• .Hartin feeling that Martin's
project, was visionary. 12 In 1835, Juneau expressed his half-hearted interest
in town.site speculation to Morgan L. Martin:

I told him that what you would do for our common interest would be
agreeable to me. Hith the reservation of 4 lots for me and 2 lots
for my brother you can do what pleases you • • • • I have referred it entirely to you to do a.a you please but I hope you will
ask a. good price.l.3
In later years, Solomon Juneau took a more active interest in Milwaukee's

future handling the majority of business associated with the buying and
selling of land while l1a.rtin attended to other financial interests at Green
Bay. Juneau thus became one of Milwaukee's maj.or business and political
leaders.

Yet this role he assumed only because of the skillful prodding and

business acumen of Horgan L. Martin.14
Being a westein businessman residing at a frontier outpost such as Green
Bay, Morgan L. Martin had little access to large capital resources.

Townsite

promotion, however, was an expensive proposition, requiring the buying of
land, the construction of buildings, and the paving of streets.

Where did

Martin obtain the capital needed for such large expenditures? He was fortunate in contacting ten ea.stein capitalists and one other western entrepreneur
who supplied the majority of capital for buying land and making improvements.
Martin and his eastern partners formed a company known as Morgan L. Martin
and Company

:i

•

•

•

for that especial purpose that is to say or making improve-

ments at the mouth of the River Milwaukee • • • • ,,15 With an initial capital
outlay of $20.000, Morgan L. Martin was appointed the company's general agent
for

buying~

selling, and mald.M improvements on the land.

Under the terms of
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-the contract, Martin was also commissioned to purchase additional. lands along
the lake shore provided they were possible townsite locations or possessed
lUlllber or mineral. deposits.

In no case was Martin authorized to purchase fann

lands since its speculative value was considerably less than townsite investments. 16 By

1~ 1

1835, Morgan L. Martin and Solomon Juneau possessed the

capital resources to inaugurate improvements on the east side of the Milwaukee
River.
While Martin was arranging the financial. backing for the East Side,
another visionary westezn citizen happened upon the r1ilwaukee site.

In 1834,

Byron Kilbourn had received an appointment as a government surveyor of the
public lands bringing him to the Wisconsin co'lllltry.

Kilbourn was originally

from Connecticut, but then moved to Ohio with his family.

He began his career

as an engineer on the Ohio canal system in the 1820 1 s, experience which proved
a great asset in his later years at Milwaukee.

In 1834, Kilbouzn selected

Milwaukee's west side tor townsite speculation because it would give him
access to the region's agricultural. interior. l"''
Like Morgan L. Martin, Byron Kilbourn did not possess the capital
resources to engage in townsite speculation.

In the person of Micajah T.

Williams, though, Byron Kilboum al.so had the backing of an eastem capitalist.
Williams was from Cincinnati, Ohio, where his career exemplified that of a
westem entrepreneur.

He was well-acquainted with the needs of frontier towns

having served as commissioner to study the feasibility of a canal system for
Ohio in 1821.

In 1823, he was a canal commissioner in Ohio where he conducted

surveys, supervised construction, and solicited eastem capital for financing
the canals. By the 18.30 1 s 1 Williams was an affluent businessman with financial. connections in eastern circles and political. influence in Ohio and in
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Washington.

In 1831, he was appointed Surveyor General. of the Michigan

Territory. 18 Then in the early 1830's, he fonned an association with several
eastern financiers and land speculators including Arthur Bronson and Charles
Butler.

i11th the capital of these eastern f:inanciers and the leadership of

Williams, the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company was organized to conduct
a general banking business and to invest :in ram lands. Micajah T. Williams
was the company's first president. 19 With his knowledge of internal improvements, western banking, and national politics, Williams became one of
most important townsite pra::ioters.

Milwaukee'~

Although i:illiams invested in townsites

throughout the western states, 20 Milwaukee was his principal interest.

At

one point, Williams delineated what he believed were the ingredients of a
prosperous city:
The growth and prosperity of cities comes from several sources.
Location suited to commerce - a surrounding country well adapted
to agriculture, and invit:ing to those who may desire new hanes;
and, last, but by no means the least, men of high character,
ability, industry and a deep interest in the general welfare
among the populations.21
Having decided on the feasibility of townsite speculation at Milwaukee,
Kilbourn contacted Micajah T. Williams of Cincinnati, under whom he had
worked on the Ohio canals, about a partnership in the prcmotion of the townsite.

In

Mey, 1835, Kilbourn and Williams agreed that each would contribute an

initial $8000 for the purchase of the land on Milwaukee's west side and share
the cost of improvements.

2"
G

Thus Milwaukee now had two sections, each with

its own promoters and each hoping to be the town's principal business district.

In these early years the West Side came to be known as Kilboumtown

and the East Side as Juneautown.
To the south
Point.

or

Juneau town and Kilboumtown was an area called Halker• s

It was first settled by George H. vJalker and several friends all of
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wtiom were canparatively young men seeking a suitable occupation.

l:ialker was

involved in the Indian trade in northern Illinois before moving to Milwaukee
in 1834 where, along with his friends, he established a claim to the land in
Hilwaukee•s southern section. 23 Walker's Point never really threatened to
become Milwaukee's major business area because Walker had few initial connections with eastern financiers.

Walker's Point, nevertheless, provided bother-

some competition to the other promoters.
For several years, Milwaukee's speculators only had claims to the land
since the government did not conduct a public sale of the Milwaukee lands
until July and August of 1835.

At the government land sale in Green Bay in

1835 each of the promoters secured legal title to their claims. 24 Before the
sale, Byron Kilbourn discovered that his original investment was not sufficient to purchase the necessary lands. Thus he requested Micajah Williams to
obtain loans from several Ohio banks. 25 Kilbourn also drew additional eastern
capitalists into the Milwaukee project, one of whan was Charles Butler. 26
By late 1835, Milwaukee's speculators had secured title to the land and then

proceeded to improve and sell the property.
The maneuvers of Morgan L. Martin, Solomon Juneau, and Byron Kilbourn in
securing clains to Milwaukee lands and in arranging the plotting of town lots
brought the townsite to the attention of western entrepreneurs and eastern
capitalists.

In 18.35, the Green Bay Intelligencer canmented that

There is already a town laid out at the mouth of the Milwa.uky (sic),
where they are selling quarter-acre lots at $500 and $600. This
Fall there will be one hundred buildings up. Pifty people are
living there, and a gentleman supports a school at his own expense
• • • • Land speculators are circumambulating the country and
Milwaukee is all the rage.Zl
As news of the }Iilwaukee townsite spread across the country, a host ot
smaller speculators descended upon the town.

Some represented their own
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interests while others invested the money of eastern speculators.
contemporary described the mania for

~1ilwaukee

One

lots in the following manner:

Many of the most careful businessmen in the East came here so
anxious to invest their money that they often bought thousands of
dollar's worth of land unseen before sleeping~Awith full assurance
that it would double in value before moming.;;a:s
The original proprietors of the Milwaukee townsite sold town lots to a
variety of speculators who improved the lots and then sold to another specu).a.tor.

This constant exchange of property gave the impression of great

prosperity at Milwaukee.

But who were some of these speculators? John Haight

left his home in Vennont in 1835, and arriving at Milwaukee he observed that
"Milwaukee is a place of considerable importance and bids fair to be in a
short time as large a town as Chica.go. 1129 Haight and his father invested
their own capital and that of several eastemers including Daniel Webster,
Caleb Cushing, and Thomas H. Perkins in farm land and Milwaukee town lots.JO
Another of Milwaukee 1 s sma.ller speculators was Joshua Hathawa;y who came to
Milwaukee fran New York State.

He acted as agent for several New York financiers in the purchase of Milwaukee lots and fann lands. 31 Later Hathawa;v

.

established his own agency for buying lands in Wisconsin territory.

32 Arthur

Bronson also invested at Vdlwaukee through one of his Wisconsin agents from
Green B2'Y, Albert G. Ellis.33
But land speculation was not alone the province of eastem capitalists
and their western agents.

Emigrants to Milwaukee and its surrounding hinter-

land usually invested their small capital resources in one or two lots and
often bought land for relatives in the East.

William Gardner, for example,

came to Milwaukee in 1837 to practice law, but he also handled the investments
of friends and relatives. 34 All of Milwaukee's first citizens whether they
were doctors, lawyers, or artisans invested in town lots i f at all possible.
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one I:ilwaukee resident claimed that the chief business of the to\\'11 was land
speculation.

He refused to purchase farm land because•

I can s~ to you with the utmost confidence that I have no doubt
but what I can clear you 100 per cent every year at the least
calculation. 'l'his government land speculation is the surest,
but there is not so much to be made as there is in town property. 35
Small speculators bought and sold Milwaukee town lots for quick cash
returns, and they rarely improved the property to any significant degree.
Yet this was not true of the town's principal promoters.

Solomon Juneau and

Horgan L. Martin, for e.Y_ample, spent nearly $100 1 000 on their Milwaukee
property in building stores and houses and in grading streets.

Furthermore,

they built a hotel, and in 1836 paid a local contractor $5,000 to erect a
court house. 36 Juneau engaged bricklayers, carpenters, and general artisans
to handle the construction of buildings. 37 Later both Juneau and Martin
exerted political pressure en territorial representatives in Hashington tc
obtain the site of the post office, land office, and county offices in their
section of rfilwaukee.38 All these efforts enabled than to attract more
buyers for town lots; the profits from sales then being reinvested in additional improvements for the East Side.
Byron Kilbourn and Micajah T. Williams developed their section in much
the same manner as Juneau and Martin.

Beginning in September, 1835, Kilboum

exerted all his energies toward selling town lots to obtain capital for improvements.

To sell Milwaukee town lots more quickly, Kilbourn went to

Chica.go because of its greater population. 39 ~'hile in Chicago, he sold
Archibald Clybourne, a Chicago merchant, one-sixteenth of the entire Milwaukee
plot for $5,000.

Because Cl.ybourne was a prosperous merchant, Kilboum
figured that he could direct capitalists and merchants to Milwaukee. 40 At
Chicago, Kilbourn was anxious to sell as many lots as possible in order to
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give the impression that Kilbourntown would eventually be the central. business
section.

Purchasers of town lots, however, were usually required to construct

buildings or to survey streets. 41 Sal.es of town lots were brisk throughout
1S35 and 1836.

Reporting to his partner, Hicajah T. Williams, Kilbourn ex-

plained that HI have made some sales at from two to three hundred per-cent
above f onner prices, and in a few cases four hundred per cent. 114 2
But Kilbourn did not hoard his initial. profits from lot sal.es.

In 1837,

he claimed that all his profits had been used in erecting buildings and
paving streets.

The construction of buildings al.one, Kilbourn explained, had

cost nearly $13,000. 43 Moreover, Kilbourn constantly urged Williams to expend
capital. in Milwaukee.

Stores and warehouses are our most inunediate need,

Kilbourn explained, and they can be rented at a fair profit. 44 Kilbourn and
Williams, of course., were interested in eventually deriving huge profits from
their Milwaukee investment., but in the first years their major concern was to
make certain that the West Side would be the town's principal business area.
Explaining the abnonnal.ly large expenditures for improvements to Williams.,
Kilbourn explained that

11

• • • it was important in the highest degree that

the proprietors should do something in the way of improvement and business.,
by way of gaining an impulse, and to counterbalance in some degree the
efforts on the other side made by the proprietors there.'~5
At Wal.ker•s Point, the same process of townsite improvement occurred but
on a substantially reduced scale.

George Walker did not have the capital

resources to launch major improvement projects.

Moreover,

v~alker•

s Point

was innundated by small capitalists who had little interest in expending large
sums on further lot improvement.

In 1836, James Doty from Green

B~

bought

heavily in land at Wal.ker•s Point in conjunction with eastern financiers, but
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he continually advised selling this i8-l1.d for more favorable townsitcs elsewhere
on the lake. 46 Similarly John H. Tweedy settled at ~;alker' s Point and invested

the funds of many eastern friends.

tweedy soon discovered that Walker's Point

was handicapped because of the large tiumber of small property owners who
refused to agree on any specific imprOvements.

In desperation, Tweedy in-

structed one of his clients that
I hope sir you will came in person and put up a store on WaJ.ker's
Point. I advise you and Beres i£ you wish your purchases to turn
out well to be here on the spot .and put your own shoulders to the
wheel. More than half depends 0 tl the personal exertion of the
proprietors.47
At various times, Walker's Point seemed to threaten the interests of
Itilwaukee's more prosperous east and ~est sides.

In 1836, for example,

Solomon Juneau .feared that Walker's point capitalists were lobbying in
Washington to obtain the transfer of ~he post office to their section of

town. 48 As the years passed, Walker's Point declined as a viable contender
for the town• s business section.

The contest then centered between the East

Side controlled by Juneau and Martin .and the \·Jest Side of Kilbourn and
Williams.

For nearly a decade, these two sections competed for land sales,

merchants, and retail businesses.

By- spurring the pace of improvements, this

canpetition was healthy for all of Mi).waukee.

At other times, the competition

was a definite hindrance to the town as each section deliberately slowed the
progress of its neighbor.

Kilbourn, for exanple, located on the west side

of the 1'1dlwaukee River had acceso to the interior, and it was his intention

to monopolize the agricultural surpluses. Junoautown had greater access to
Lake Hichigan and hoped to monopolize trade and commerce.

In the original

political organization of Milwaukee, there were actually two towns.

In 1837,

Solomon Juneau was Hayor of the East Side wmle Kilbourn held the same posi-

~tion on the West Side.49 The quarrel- at times defied all. logical anal7sis for
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in order to prosper both sections needed access to Lake Michigan shipping and
the agricultural interioro
The rivalry between the sections was enlivened in July, 1836, when the
;1,ilwaukee Advertiser

was

established.

The paper was drawn to the

1-

est Side

by Byron Kilbourn and served as a propaganda organ specializing in slighting
the interests of Juneau and Ma.rt.in .. 50 Not to be outdone, 3olomon Juneau and
>Iorgan L .. Martin partially financed the Milwaukee Sentinel which was first

issued in Jtllle, 1837e 51 At times the quarrel between the two settlements
reached ridiculous proportions.

In

1836-1837, Byron Kilbourn constructed a

bridge across the Hencminee River to the south to divert traffic from Chicago
to the -,~est Side of the Milwaukee Rivero5 2 Yet Kilbourn refused to cooperate
in building a drawbridge linking the East and West Sides fearing the advan-

tage for Jtllleautown.

Writing to Williams in 1837, Kilbourn indicated his

hootility to such a bridge;
a •
And as to a bridge over the river, I consider it out of
the question; but if they should succeed contrary to all expectations in erecting it, I wi 11 take good care that they shall
have no use of it ••• 53
q

Kilbourn planned to purchase two small steamboats which he would pass
under the drawbridge so frequently that it could never be closed. 54

In the

1830's, Micajah Williams also opposed any bridge connection with the East

In 1840, he threatened legal action on the grounds that a bridge would

Side.

prevent the free navigation or the Milwaukee River. 55 Yet by 1840 Kilbourn
had retracted his earlier views and no longer blocked the construction of
bridges between the sections despite the objections of itiilliams~ 56
While competition between the sections continued,

~3olomon

Jtllleau and

Byron Kilbourn inaugurated canmercial improvements of their respective townsites.

In

1837, Jtllleau organized a stock canpany for building a steamboat
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to run between Milwaukee and Buffalo.

The largest shares were held by ¥.artin

and Juneau, but the project collapsed during the depression.5 7

In 1837,

Byron Kilboum built the steamboat, Badger, to ferry people from Lake Michigan
to the West Side. 58 Accoroing to a resolution of the heat 3ide Council
Kilbourn' s steamboat was to serve only the :iest Side:
But not in any case to touch on the east side of the river, nor
to take load or passenger on f ran the East Side in her upward or
downward trips ~t any time, or under any circumstances, during
the year 1839.5"1
Despite the rivalry between the sections, Milwaukee attracted more and
more emigrants fran urban areas in the East.

The largest group of people

were from small towns in New York and New Engl.and.

60

Their migration to

Milwaukee depended to a certain extent on the advertisement of Milwaukee
through newspapers and travel books.

In 1834, Peck's Gazetteer admitted that

Milwaukee was very sparsely settled but claimed that " • • • a beautiful town
site is said to exist, American families are settling it, and it is expected

61 .Because newspapers

to become soon a place of considerable business. "

reached such a wide audience, they were more effective in popularizing the
Milwaukee townsite.

The Green Bat Intelligencer first recognized the townsite

at Hilwaukee in 1835 and mentioned its possibilities as a commercial center. 62
The establishnent of Milwaukee's two newspapers, the ?Iilwaukee Advertiser and
the Milwaukee Sentinel, gave the town pranoters means through which Milwaukee's
advantages for fanning and urban emigrants could be explained. 63 Articles
increasingly appeared in eastern papers a.bout Hilwaukee in 18.37 and 18.38.
Typical of these articles was the statement of the New York Canmercial
Advertiser in February, 1837:
The main point in Wisconsin upon the lake, I have no hesitation
in saying, is this place. It is now not two years old, and yet
it presents quite the appearance, in the number of its stores,
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warehouses, and mechanics shops, and in its population and trade,
of an eastern lake port sane fifteen years standing.64
Personal correspondence also

pl~ed

and professional people to Milwaukee.

a major role in drawing mechanics and

Increase A. Lapham, for example, came

to Milwaukee at the request of Byron Kilboum to serve as his assistant in
handling land transactions.

Lapham had previously worked under Kilbourn when
he was an engineer on the Ohio canal system. 65 John Tweedy, who came to
vialker's Point in 1836, attracted many of his young friends fran Connecticut
66
to the new town.
There were al.WS\YS jobs for the emigrants on the various
construction projects.

Labor was so scarce that Juneau was forced to recruit

carpenters ani masons with promises of high wages and perhaps an interest in
one or two town lots. 67
The transition of eastern emigrants into town life at Milwaukee was
facilitated by the speculator's efforts in building stores and warehouses, in
paving streets, and in providing job opportunities.

Moreover, Milwaukee's

town promoters played a conspicious role in aiding the settlement of the
interior.

One of the major reasons for Milwaukee's slower development com-

pared to Chicago was that the public lands immediately adjacent to Milwaukee
were not opened for public sale until 1839. 68 Although many farmers squatted
on the public lands and established claims, they
claims would not be validated at the public sale.

alw~s

feared that their

Realizing that Milwaukee's

developnent depended on the settlement of the interior, Kilbourn and Juneau
assisted the farm population before the public sale.

In 183?, Byron Kilbourn

was the principal organizer of the Milwaukee County Agricultural Society for
inf o:rming new emigrants about the most fertile land and the most appropriate
products for cultivation.

Kilbourn served as the society's first president

with Solomon Juneau as vice-president. 69 Backed by the capital of Kilbourn
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and Juneau, the society issued an agricultural Journal and took steps toward
establishing experimental. rarms.70
The farmers of the Hilwaukee area. also organized the Milwaukee Claimants

Union.

The Union registered the claims of farmers in the Milwaukee region in

order to prevent confJ.icting claims and land speculation. 71

Milwaukee's town

promoters supported the Claimants Union wishing to see the interior• s orderly
settlement. 72 When the government finally held a public land sale in 1839,

the farmers and settlers secured their claims without competition from land
speculators.

The Claimants Union regulated the sale so that its members ob-

ta:ined their clairJS at the minimum government price.

A few speculators tried

to bid up the land's price, but '",hey were forcefully ejected from the sale. 7J
Both Hilwaukee newspapers agreed that the settlers received their ,just
claims. 74 Horeover, the Hilwaukee land sale occurred during the height of
the depression.

Many of the farmers were without sufficient capital to pur-

chase their claims even at the government price, but they were able to borrow
money, admittedly at high rates o.f interest, from town promoters.

Because

town prcxnoters and speculators were often the only source of capital for
fanncrs, they were needed and welcomed by the agricultural population surrounding Hilwaukee in 1839. 75
Unlike Chicago, Hilwaukee was hit by the depression just as the promoters
enbarked on a major scheme of town improvements in 1837.

Milwaukee, however,

did not stagnate during the depression because population and trade continued
to increaso, although at a slower rate than preceding years.

speculators were naturally affected by the depression.

Capitalists and

In :,!a.y, 1837, Kilboum

calculated that he was owed $37,000 fran lots purchased during the speculative
period.

76 Kilbourn realized that these outstanding debts would probably
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never be satisfied, yet he assured Micajah T. Williams that

11

1 • • • shall do

all in my power for our best interests, but at present I can affect but little;
I cannot change the times, but wait their results with hope for the future.

ir"fl

Kilbourn, though, prevented Williams fran disposing of his Milwaukee property
advising him that commarce and agriculture would eventually return to nonnal. 7
Increase Lapham, Kilbourn•s assistant, expressed the same attitude toward
Milwaukee during the depression:
We begin to feel the pressure of the times here in the woods,
money is scarce, provisions scarce and dear, very little doing
in the way of making improvements, in fact Milwaukee begins to
be a dull place and will now jog along at the rate of other
towns. There is no doubt however that it is a valuable location and will sustain itself through these hard times. It is
the natural port of entry for a large portion o:f Wisconsin, embracing some of her most valuable lands.79
Despite the hardships which the depression caused, 1".il:waukee 1 s promoters
and many of their eastern backers contributed to the establishment of retail
businesses and intemal improvement projects.

Sol0t1on Juneau, who directed

the expenditure of capital on the ::ast Side, was in considerable financial
difficulty, but he turned to Morgan L. Hartin for capital to sustain his
operation. 80 Kilbourn also tried to conduct business in a no:rmal pattern.

He operated a general land agency handling

investm~..nts

all over the territory.

At great personal risk, Kilbourn also supported various merchants in establish
ing or maintaining businesses.

Describing his financial operations at

Eilwaukee, Kilbourn indicated his :importance to the town's business section:
In my operations here, with an eye out to the improvement of the
place, and relying on payment being made to meet my engagements,
I incurred some liabilities contrary to all my fixed rules of
business - For instance in order to aid (Leland) in canpleting
his tavern, which is a large and expensive house, and to aid him
in furnishing supplies when he wanted a backer, I became responsible with him for about $3500 - To aid (Hinman) in erecting a
house, I endorsed for him at the Green Bay bank to the amt. of
$3s~OO - To get into operacion th3 ste;;un boat to keep up our interd
which
OU
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$2, 500 remains tmpaid • • • •82
Because of such large expenditures, Kilbourn soon found himself in
financial difficulty.

Through his partner, Micajah W:iJliams, and his eastern

banking connections, Kilbourn was able to borrow $10,000 to continue his
projects at Nilwaukee. 83 Williams al.so donated several town lots for significant cultural. improvements.

In 18421 for example, he provided a town lot :for

the building of a scientific l.yceum.84
During the depression, foreign capital played a significant role in
Milwaukee's banking establishments.

In 1836, the Wisconsin territorial. legis-

lature had authorized the organization of the Bank of Milwaukee with Sola:non
Juneau as one of its first directors.

Because of its involvement in land

speculation, the Bank of Milwaukee failed during the depression forcing the
legislature to repeal its charter.

Now, at the very height of the depression,

Milwaukee was without a. financial institution to exchange money and to loan
capital to tanners and merchants. 85 As in Chicago, however, George Smith
fran

~)cotland

used his capital resources and profits fran. land speculation

to provide banking facilities for Milwaukee's residents.
In 1839, George Smith received a charter from the Wisconsin territorial
legislature to establish the .Jisconsin Marine and Fire Insurance Company.
George Smith held the majority of stock in the canpany with smaller portions
controlled by citizens of Milwaukee and Smith's backers in Aberdeen, Scotland.
Because of Smith's involvement with a similar institution at Chicago, Alexander
Y.dtchell, Smith's assistant, supervised the
Insurance Campany.

~iisconsin

Marine and Fire

The company provided many services, otherwise unobtainable,

for Hilwaukee residents during the depression.

Businessmen unable to pay

debts and f anners lacking the capital to purchase land were able to obtain
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loans.

The company also made advances to merchants and .tanners involved in
86
trade with the East.
With the assistance of men like George

~>mith,

Byron Kilbourn, and Morgan

L. Martin, Milwaukee businesses did not collapse during the depression. Moreover, many of these seme IL.en attempted to secure large-scale internal improvements.

Unlike Chicago, Milwaukee did not have any significant projects, such

as roads and can.a.ls, underway before 1837. Milwaukee thus embarked on a. scheme
of internal. improvements just as financial conditions deteriorated across the
nation.

The course of improvements was affected not only by the depression

but also by a growing rivalry between Chica.go and Milwaukee.
the speculators had invested in all or

many

Because many of

of the lakeport towns and their

interest was in seeing all such towns advance, this rivalry was not at first
of great porportions.

Furthermore, Milwaukee and Chicago each had a well-

defined backcountry which ultimately would ship its agricultural. surpluses to
the closest port.

In 1836, Kilbourn recslenized this fact:

There are no conflicting interests between Green Bay, Milwaukee,
and Chicago, each ha.s its own appropriate country; and that naturaJ.ly united to Milwaukee by common interest is at least equal in
extent and fertility, and I hesitate not to add, will sustain a
!!21:2 dense population than either or the others.87
There were certain areas, nevertheless, lfilich seemed capable of
exploitation by both

~lilwaukee

and G'hica.go.

One was the Rock River region

which included south-central Wisconsin l:1Xi northern Illinois.

The competition

for the surpluses of this area was clearly indicated by the chief engineer of
the Milwaukee and Rock River Canal:
It is true that Illinois is ma.king great strides with her internal.
improvements, and will be able in a few years to give access to
Lake Michigan upon her public works for our produce. But will
Wisconsin remain inactive and suffer the ha.rd earned products of
her citizens to be carried away by Illinois to fill the coffers of
that state? It is a self-evident fact, that unless she makes use

r----------------------------------------------------------------o:f the advantages given her by the General Government, all the

important trade of the country will be diverted into the state
o:f Illinois by her canals and rail roads.SS

Fearing that Chicago might tap the agricultural resources of the Rock
River country 1 Milwaukee citizens were anxious to build a canal.

While com-

petition between Chicago and Milwaukee stimulated improvements in Milwaukee,
other town rivalries actually hindered the success of these ventures.

In the

first place, the Wisconsin Territory was divided among different sections a.11
contesting for political. power and control of appropriations for improvements.
Southwestem Wisconsin was the most powerful section in the 1830's primarily
representing the lead mining interests.

In the North, Green

B~

contested fol'

power while in the southeast Milwaukee was first coming to prominence. 8 9 On
the westem shore of Lake Michigan, at the same time, Wisconsin possessed
numerous towns compet:ing for appropriations for harbor and canal projects.
Finally 1 Milwaukee itself faced the competition of the east and west sides
for canmercial daninance.
ment.

All of these rivalries affected Milwaukee's

devel~

Like Chicago 1 however, most major projects were sponsored and led by

town promoters and eastem capitalists.

The Milwaukee and Rock River canal

and the quest for an adequate harbor at Milwaukee provided clear examples of
the workings of these .forces.
Fran the beginning, Byron Kilboum led the fight for intemal. improvements
at Milwaukee.

When the town was still little more than a fur trade post,

Kilboum wrote to Senator Louis Linn of Missouri at Washington soliciting his
aid in obtaining government appropriations for Milwaukee. 90

At a public

meeting in 1836, Kilboum urged Milwaukee's citizens to support either a canal.
or railroad to the Mississippi River. 91

According to Kilboum, a railroad or

canal would enable Milwaukee to capture the lead trade of southwestem Wiscon-
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River to New Orleans and then to eastern markets.

Kilbourn believed that lead

could be shipped overland to Milwaukee arrl then eastward by the Great Lakes.
But Milwaukee faced the canpetition of Green Ba.v over an improved FoxWisconsin waterwq. 92

In late 1837, the territorial legislature issued a

charter of incorporation for a company to build a canal from Milwaukee to the
Rock River.

In January, 1838, the Milwaukee and Rock River Canal Canpa.ny was

organized, stock sold, and a board of directors appointed with Byron Kilboum
as president. 93
The canal advocates were always faced with one major problem--money.

In

February, 1838, the Wisconsin territorial legislature drafted a petition to
Congress requesting a land grant to aid in the canal's construction.

The

legislature then appointed Byron Kilbourn to carry the petition to Washington
and lobby there for the grant. 94

Before his departure for Washington,

Kilbourn asked Micajah Williams, his eastern partner, to exert his influence
among the politicians in Congress. 95

Kilbourn remained in Washington for

several months carrying on conversations with influential politicians who
might hurry congressional action on the land grant. 96

The efforts of Kilbourn

and Williams were rewarded for in June, 1838, Congress granted alternate sections of land along the proposed route of the Milwaukee and Rock River canai. 97
The congressional
problems.

lam

grant solved only part of the canal's financial

Because of the depression, subscribers to canal stock were small

in number, and Kilbourn discovered that he needed additional eastern capital
in the form of stock subscriptions and loans.

He first contacted eastern

capitalists who held an interest in Milwaukee town lots.

Because he had few

connections with other bankers and financiers in the East, Kilbourn again
requested Williams' assistance:
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To this end, (that is to get money) and to gi. ve me some small
credit as I am properly entitled to with capitalists in N.Y.
I would request of you to furnish me with some letters to such
of the money men there as lQU may th ink proper and with whom you
are intimately acquainted.98
Because of the depressed state of the economy, Kilbourn was unsuccessful
in arousing significant interest in the canal among eastern capitalists. 99

As

he sojourned in the East seeking money, the canal project became involved in
state an:l town politics.

As the political feud worsened in Milwaukee and

throughout the territory, Kilbourn tenninated his eastern tour and returned to
Milwaukee in July, 1838.

100

The quarrel centered on the congressional land

grant which stated that the land was to be sold at $2.50 per acre with no
exemptions for actual settlers along the canal route.

101

Kilbourn soon dis-

covered that he was charged with obtaining the land grant knowing that settlers
would suffer.

102

At this time, Kilbourn was a candidate for a position on the

council of the Wisconsin state legislature.

He was opposed by Alanson Sweet

from the East Side, who along with the Milwaukee Sentinel, propagated the
charge that Kilbourn deliberately acted against the interests of the snall
.fanners.

The Milwaukee Sentinel and Sweet were joined in the fight against the

canal by Jmres Doty fran. Green Bay who favored internal improvement projects
elsewhere in the state.

In the summer of 1838, Alanson Sweet and Kilbourn

aired their quarrel in the pages of Milwaukee 1 s two newspapers 0 l03

The end

result was that Kilbourn. failed in his bid for election to the territorial
council.

Even more important was the fact that progress on the canal was

slowed by the opposition of residents of Milwaukee's East Side as well as the
resistance of town promoters in other areas especially James Doty of Green Bay.
S:ince Kilbourn 1 s efforts to finance the canal failed, the territorial
legislature established a new canal organization with additional powers of
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borrowing money for construction in 1839.

John H. Tweedy fran Milwaukee was
authorized to negotiate a loan in the East. 104 Yet Tweedy also ran headlong
into the conservatism of eastern financiers beset by a financial depression.

According to Tweedy, it was virtually impossible for western states to borrow
money in the East because
• • • The opinion was prevalent that the states generally, and
especially the new states, were attempting to do too much and
that ma.iv of their schanes of internal. improvements were extravagant and visionary. The opinion was frequently expressed by same
of the most eminent financiers, that the stocks of many of the
states might not find a ready sale for many years, and that they
would be compelled to partially suspend i f not entirely arrest the
progress of their public works.105
When the state failed to obtain loans for canal constructions, opposition
to the canal grew more vocal.

Kilboum fought to protect the canal project

fran collapsing because of the opposition of the East Side of Milwaukee and
the Green Bq interests.

In 1840, Kilboum claimed that the East Side " • • •

most certainly entertain so violent a hostility to the west side, that many,
if not most of them, would rather see the whole place sacrificed and sink out
of existence than that the west side of the river should prosper. 11106 In a
last desperate effort to save the canal project, Kilbourn again joumeyed to
the Fast and pleaded with eastern financiers to loan money for construction.
As Kilboum prepared to depart for New York, Micajah Williams instructed him
that loans would be virtually impossible to obtain but assured Kilbourn that
he had

11 • • •

opened an active correspondence on this subject, and am pushing

it in New York, and on this side of the mountains • ..,107
Kilboum and Williams, however, had little success in 1840 in negotiating
any further loans for the canal project.

After the national elections in 1840,

James Doty was appointed governor of the Wisconsin Territory.
repealed Kilbouzn's commission to negotiate loans.

He inmediately

Exerting pressure on the
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territorial. legislature, Doty succeeded by 1841 in ending the Milwaukee and
108
Rock River Canal project.
The history of the Milwaukee and Rock River canal
clearly illustrated the leadership of town promoters and their extensive
dependence on the capital resources of the East.

When eastern capital failed

to materialize in support of the canal project, its fate was virtually sealed.
Yet the project also faced the constant workings of state and town politics
which combined with financial conditions wrecked any hopes for success.
The efforts to construct a harbor at Milwaukee faced problems similar to
those which plagued the canal project.

While Chicago had received appropria-

tions for harbor construction from the federal government in 1833, Milwaukee
did not begin agitation for such improvements until 1835.

The site of a har-

bor at Milwaukee was surveyed in 1836, but with the onset of the depression
Congress refused appropriations for construction.109 Yet Milwaukee leaders
did not become quiescent with the govenmi.ent 1 s failure to act.

In late 1836,

Byron Kilbourn attempted to raise money among the citizens to start harbor
construction.110 Throughout the next several years, the Milwaukee newspapers
constantly editorialized on the need for a harbor.

In July, 1837, the

Milwaukee Sentinel mirrored the general attitude of the town:
Our bay is the safest refuge for shelter in a gale to be found
on the lake. In this particular, nature has favored Milwaukee
above her sister towns, and with the assistance of the government
we could soon have the best harbor in the West. The great and
rapidly increasing business of our town requires a speedy appropriation by Congress for its improvement.lll

In January, 1838, a meeting of Milwaukee citizens organized by Solomon
Juneau and others drafted a petition to Congress.ll 2 At the same time,
Juneau maintained contact with local politicians in Washington lobbying for
a harbor. 113 But why did Milwaukee face such difficulties in obtaining harbor
appropriations? Part of the reason undoubtedly was the depression and the

--reduced amount of goverrnnent funds available for such projects.

Furthe:nnore,

Milwaukee was in competition with other Wisconsin towns on the lake shore for
harbor funds.

By 1839, Milwaukee citizens realized that with the depression

onlY one or possibly two towns could possibly hope for an appropriation, but
Milwaukeeans were convinced that 11Milwaukee is the greatest commercial town
on Lake Michigan, save Chicago; her importance is generally acknowledged, and
her claims upon the attention of the general government are unquestioned.',114
In 1840, the citizens of Milwaukee presented a lengthy memorial to Edward

Curtis, Chainnan of the Committee on Canmerce of the House of Representatives.

In this memorial, Milwaukee residents admitted that Congress faced a difficult
task in deciding ltlich Wisconsin towns should receive harbor funds.

Yet the

memorialists then listed commercial statistics to prove Milwaukee's leadership
in population and trade over the other towns. 115
While rivalry among Wisconsin harbor areas certainly made Congress's
task more difficult, Milwaukee's interests were also hindered by an intra-

town squabble. When harbor construction was first discussed, two different
sites were suggested.

One was at the natural mouth ot the Milwaukee River as

it entered Lake Michigan.

Proponents of this location claimed that this would

be the least expensive location.

Yet Kilbourn and Juneau opposed this southeni

location, for it was a half mile from where the East and West sides had established the central business sections of the city.116 For many yea.rs, the
controversy excited Milwaukee citizens with charges of political corruption
hurled back and forth. 117 In 1843, the government finally appropriated money
for the construction of a harbor at the natural outlet of the Milwaukee River.
Kilbourn and his forces screamed political bribery, but they never identified
the source of this corruption.

Faced with this useless harbor location,
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Kilbourn then united the capitalists of the east and west sides plus interested
eastern investors and began construction of another harbor a half mile further
north where the business sections of the town were located. 118 Until the
1850 1 s, Milwaukee was hindered by this competition between harbor locations,
but then government funds were redirected toward Kilbourn and Juneau 1 s sec119
tions of the town.
All the efforts of the town promoters in the area of internal improvements
were intended to increase the town's economic position.

Each year population,

the munber of ship arrivals, and the anount of exports fran the Milwaukee
harbor increased.
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The depression, of course, slowed the rate of economic

develoµnent, but by 1841 the town seemed to have recovered. Milwaukee now
had reached the s.tage where its economy was practically self-sustaining.

The

interior was sufficiently developed to supply surpluses for the town and for
shi~nt

to the East.

In 1839 and 1840, for example, wheat first arrived

at Milwaukee for shipnent to eastern markets •121 In 1839, Milwaukee registered
122
exports valued at $43,568, in 1840, $53,828, and in 1841, $286,777.
The
people also recognized the importance of a developed agricultural interior.
As early as September, 1837, the Milwaukee Sentinel commented that
People generally have turned their attention to the tilling of
the land during the present season, and spend their capital in
improving their fam.s instead of buying lots in paper Cities and
Villages; - all this has a tendency to increase the growth of our
tolffi materially, and as the back country increases in population,
so must the town increase - as the rich farming sections lying
West and Southwest fills up, and the prairies and openings becane
converted into rich and productive farms, it will .tom. the only
sure basis on ltl.ich a city can safely be built up, and will be the
surest evidence of future success and prosperity • • • .123
With the semblance of a balanced econany, Milwaukee thus had bridged the
gap between a frontier village and a town.
to that of Chicago.

Its developnent was ver-y similar

Both towns were originally established by town speculators

...
or promoters with the financial aid of eastern capitalists.

As the years

passed, the Milwaukee promoters like Morgan L. Martin, Solomon Juneau, Byron
Kilboo.rn, and Micajah T. Williams supplied the capital
the majority of Milwaukee's improvements.

am

the leadership for

Again this emphasis on town specu-

la.tors and eastern capitalists does not diminish the equally important role
of smaller merchants, yet it becomes increasingly clear that the pranoters
led the way in the most significant areas of Milwaukee's development.

In 1841, however, Milwaukee was in no sense the equal of Chicago.

A

comparison of the basic commercial statistics of the two towns indicated that
Chicago surpassed Milwaukee by a considerable margin in population, in ship
arrivals, and in the value of exports.124

Chicago had an advantage over

Milwaukee merely because of geography and its consequent earlier settlement.
Located further north on the lake shore, Milwaukee waited on the natural
movenent of people to settle its agricultural interior.

Chicag0, moreover,

had embarked on needed improvements, such as a canal and a harbor, several
years before Milwaukee.

Thus Chicago earlier attracted merchants, camnerce,

and eastern capitalists.

WhEl'l. Milwaukee did enter the stage of town develop-

ment, it was confronted with state sectionalism, intra-town rivalry, and competition from other Wisconsin towns on the lake shore.

While Chicago also

faced state and intra-town competition, it was of little significance canpared
to that at Milwaukee.

Through a canbination of geography, state sectionalism,

and town rivalry, Milwaukee in 1841, while reaching the status of a town,
found itself considerably behind the colossus of the lakes--Chicago.
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MILWAUKEE'S OOMMERCIAL GROWTH
TABLE 1 -- Land Sales at Milwaukee. The majority of faming land surrounding
Milwaukee was not opened for public sale until 1839. The figures
represent the amount of money received at the Milwaukee Land
Office.a

1836
1837
1838
1839

1840
1841
1842
1843

• • • $88,432.10
• • • $90,131.81
••• $69,350.24
••• $785,950.57

• • •
•••
•••
•••

$138,661.02
$103,547.48
$149,816.75
$192,401.11

a

"Address by Increase Lapham, 11 cited in the Western Historical Can.pany,
History of Milwaukee, p. 192.

TABLE 2 -

Population Growth of Milwaukeea

1836 • • • 700
1840 ••• 1,712
B..rhere are no adequate figures for Milwaukee's population during the
early period. The above figures were the most reliable estimates from Still,
Milwaukee, p. 570, and Jam.es s. Buck, Pioneer History of Milwaukee (Milwaukee:
Milwaukee News Company, 1866), I, p. 49.

TABIE 3 -

Ship Arri val.s at the Port of Milwaukee. a

1835 • • • 2
1836 ••• 19
1837 ••• 97
a 11

1838 ••• 126
1839 ••• 18.2
1840 • • • 174

Address by Increase Lapham, 11 cited in Western Histcri..cal Company,
History of Milwaukee, p. 192. Also see the Milwaukee Sentinel, March 10, 1840.

TABLE 3 -- Imports and Exports at the Port of Milwaukee. a
E:xport

Import
1835-1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841

•••
•••
•••
•••
•••
•••

$588,950
$641,2.35
$783,458
$866,740
$1,147,803
$1,805,277

$26,145
$47,745
$47,690
$43,568
$53,828
$286,777

aAddress by Increase Lapham, 11 cited in Western Historical Company, Histo"M
of Milwaukee, p. 1920
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2ll
Narrative of Horgan L. Hartin, 11 WHC, XI, PP• 404-407. Morgan L~ Martin
was boni in New York where he attended college and studied law. He practiced
for a short time at Detroit and then came to Green ~. He was a prominent
citizen of Green Ba.Y 1 and he was often involved in territorial politics. From
1631 to 18.35, he wa.s a member of the legislative council of .Michigan Territory.,
which at that tima included Wisconsin. For biographical infonnation on Martin
see Reuben G. Thwaites, 11Sketch of Morgan L. Hartin.," !ilif 1 XI, .380-.381.
8

9Narrative of Morgan L. Martin, 11 WHC, XI, p. 406.
lOMorgan L. Ma.rt.in to .TameR Buck, September 1, 1876., in James s. Buck,
Pioneer History of Milwaukee (M.Uwwkee: Milwaukee New Publishing Campany.,

I"B76), I, P• 17.

11still, Milwaukee, P• 11.
1 2solanon Juneau to Morgm L. Martin, December 1 18.33, Morgan L •.Martin
1
Papers., Box III, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
There are three collections of Martin Papers. One is found in a larger collection of Green B~ material at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin and
entitled the Green Bay and Prairie du Chien Papers. There is also the Morgan
L. Martin Papers consisting of fourteen separate boxes. Finally, there is a
collection of Martin Papers at the Green Bay Historical Society which have been
microfilmed. The collection cited in this footnote will hereafter be designated as the Martin Papers, Box, ~ms.
13Solcmon Juneau to Morgan L. Martin, MSiY 6, 18.35, Hartin Papers, Box III,

was, and Still, Milwaukee, p. 15.
14.rwo of Solomon Juneau's biographers have taken a different view about
Juneau's importance to Irilwaukee. Earlier historians preferred to stress
Juneau's involvement with early Milwaukee life without acknowledging Martin's
influence on him. See Isabella Fox, Solomon Juneau (Milwaukee: u,'Vening
Wisconsin Printing Co., 1946), p. 16; and Marion Lawson, "Solomon Juneau:
Milwaukee's First Major, n Wisconsin 11agazine of History, XLI (1957-1958)
,111

113-12.3.
15Legal contract between Mr. Sheldon Thompson, De Ga.rmo Jones, Charles
Townsend, George Coit, J.R. Doer, John K. Griffith, William Griffith, David
Griffith, John Griffith, and Morgan L. Martin, May 10, 18.35, Green B~ and
Prairie du Chien Papers, Volume 84, M-IS.

16Ibid.

There is another copy of Martin •s agreement with the easteni
capitalists :ln the Martin Papers, Box III, WHS.
l7Infonnation on Kilbouni's early career can be found in Still, Milwaukee,
p. 13; Howard L. Conrad (ed.), History of Milwaukee Fran Its First Settlement
.lo the Year 1895 (Chicago: American Biographical Publishing Canpany, 1895),

I, pp. 21-22.

I
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18
Harry N., Scheiber, "Entrepreneurship and Western Developnent:

The Case
of Ilicajah T. Lilliams, 11 Business Histopr Review, XXXVII (Winter, 1963),
347-355. Information on Williams• early career can also be found in Samuel
M. Williams, 11 Micaja.h Terrell l·:illiams, A Sketch, 11 Wisconsin Magazine of
History, VI (1922-19~3), 307-310.

19scheiber,

11

Entrepreneurship and We stem Developnent,

11

p. 367.

20

Williams invested in townsites throughout the western states. Info1mation on his investments in Ohio can be gained through the article by
Scheiber, 11Entrepreneurship and \.estern Developnent, 11 'riilliams also had a
major interest in Lockport, I::..linois. See William B. Archer to M.T. Williams,
August 2 1 1836, Hicajah T. Williams Papers, Hicrocard No. 34, Ohio State
Library, Coll.III.bus, Ohio. There is a microcard edition of these papers at
the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin. Hereafter
this collection will be cited as Williams Papers, Card No., OSL.

~·licajah

'f. >,illiams,

6ketch of the Life of lticajah T. /Jilliams,

1

11

Williams Papers, 64, OSL.
22

Contract between Byron Kilbourn and r{icajah Williams, Hay 5, 1835,
Williams Papers, OSL.
23nuck, Pioneer History of ffdlwaukee, pp. 12-13; .Still, Hilwaukee, P• 12.

24still, Milwaukee, PP• 15-16.
25Byron Kilbourn to Hicajah Williams, t1ey' 19, 1835, Williams Papers, 31,
OSL.

26

-·
Ibid

27Green Bay Intelligencer, 1835, as cited in :.iestern Historical Company,
History of Hilwaukee, Wisconsin, p.

a:>o.

2811Reminiscences by 1Uexandcr F. Pratt, '1 cited in
Company, History of Milwaukee, l:isconsin, p. 167.

~·Jestern

Historical

2

9John Haight to Miss E. Holmes in Vennont, November 8 1 1835, John T.
Haight Papers, Box I, State Historical Society of Wisconsin •
.30Contract between Stephen Haight and John Davis, January 141 1836,
Haight Paper:::, Box I, WHS.
3lJoshua Hathaway to Levi Beardsley of Cherry Valley, New York, May 27,
1837; June 101 1837; and October 30, 1839, Joshua Hathaway Papers, Box I, WHS.

3 2circular for the Hathawa\V Land Agency, May, 1842, ~·

33Albert G. Ellis to c.!ames Murra\V,
29, CHS.

July 11,

1836, Bronson Papers, L.F.

i

213

34,dlliam

N., Gardner to Eg H. Porter in New York, Harch

'•t}ardner Letters,

.i

Wisconsin Magazine of History, XVIII

15, 1837,
207 ..

(1934-1935~,

35;.:;. W. Edgerton to Elisha r.ligerton in New York, August 31, 1836, cited
in John S~ Gregory, History of Hilwaukee, Wisconsin (Chicago: S.J .. Clark
Publishing Company, 1931), I, p. 90 ..
36

~forgan L .. :'1artin to James Buck, September 1, 1876, cited in Buck,
Pioneer Histo:cy of Milwaukee, I, p. 17; Articles of agreement between Solomon
Juneau and Enoc Jarling to build a court house, April 2, 1836, Martin Papers,
Box IV, WHS.
37Nelson Olin,

Reminiscences of :1ilwaukee In 1835-1836,
Nagazine of History, XIII (1929-1930), 201-223.
11

11

\dsconsin

38solo:.lon Juneau to Morgan L. Martin, September 20, 1836, Martin Papers,
Box IV, \>iHS.

39Byron Kilbourn to Micajah 'dilliams, September 16, 1835, dlliams
Papers, 32, OSL.
4°t3yron Kilbourn to .Micajah Killiams, October 6, 1835, ibid.
41Byron Kilbourn to Micajah i.'illiams, October 30, 1835, ~ ..
4 2i3yron Kilbourn to Micajah V•'illiams, Mey 21, 1836, \iilliams Papers, 33,
OSL. Also see Byron Kilbourn to Hicajah ;·iilliams, Mey 9, 1836, ibid.
43 Byron .Kilbourn to Micajah \'lilliams, February 27, 1837, Byron Kilbourn
Letters, Letter Folder I, State Historical Society of .1isconsin.

44 Ibid.

-·

45Ibid

46See letters of James Doty to G. A. Patterson, December 30 1835; Jam.es
1
Doty to Messers W. s. Packer and Benjamin Clapp 1 January 1, 1836; and James
Doty to Benjamin Clapp, October 18, 1836 1 James Duane Doty Papers, Henry ~.
Huntington Library, San Marino 1 California. Hicrofilms of the Doty Papers
are available at the State Historical Society of v:isconsin.

47 rsaac Burns to John Tweedy, January 3, 1837, and John 'l'weedy to John c.
Barth, March 13, 1837, John H. Tweedy Papers 1 Box I, State Historical Society
of Wisoonsin.

48solomon Juneau to Joshua Hathaway in \·:ashington, Januar.r 5, 1836,
Hathaway Papers, Bax I, WHS; Solomon Juneau to Horgan L. Martin, March 31,
1836, Hartin Papers, Box IV 1 WHS.

A description of the fe11ding between the different sections of. Milwaukee
is found in Buck, Pioneer History of Milwaukee, I, p. 95. In 1839, the two
original villages were legally united into the town of Milwaukee, but this
move did not end the sectional quarrel. See Still, Milwaukee, p. 36.
50Bayrd Still, ''The Growth of Milwaukee As Recorded by Contemporaries,
vlisconsin Magazine or Histo:ry, XXI (1937-1938), 265.

11

51viestern H:istorical Company, History
Gr,;gory,

garly .lisconsin ~di tors,

11
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of Hilwaukee, p. 175; John G.
Wisconsin Magazine of Histocy, VIII (1924-

1925), 175.
52Byron Kilbourn to Hicajah :villiams, February 27, 1B37, Byron Y..ilboum
Letters, L.F. I, l'JHS.

53Ibid.
54Ibid
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55Micajah

liilliams to (Unidentified), April 7, 1840 1 Williams Papers, 60,
OSL. Also see Increase Lapham to D. Laphan, June .21., 1840, Increase A. Lapham
Papers, Box I, WH..c.>.
56
Micajah Williams to Byron Kilbourn, May 28 1 1840 1 ifilliams Papers, 60,
OSL. Milwaukee was plagued by the bridge question well into the 1840's. In
1845, the 'rrlridge }var 11 reached the proportions where residents of the two
sections were prepared for civil war.
57solomon Juneau to Morgan L. Martin, November 19, 1836, Hartin Papers,
Box IV, WHS; Gurdon Hubbard to Morgan L. Martin, June 28, 1838, Green Bay and
Prairie du Chien Papers, Vol. 6, WHS; Solomon Juneau to Morgan L. Martin,
January 26, 1838, Morgan L. Martin Papers, Microfilm Reel 3, WHS.

58Milw!iukee Sentinel, August 1 1837.
1
59western Historical Company, History of Milwaukee, p. 2)8.

60 In 1869, the Vdlwaukee Old Settler's Club compiled a list of names or
the earliest settlers and their place of residence before the migration to
'•:isconsin. This list clearly indicated the great predominance of New England
people from snall urban areas. The list was published in the Western Historical Company, History of Milwaukee, pp. 147-151. Also see Still, Milwaukee,
pp. 71-72.
61
John M. Peck, A Gazetteer or Illinois (Jacksonville, Illinois:
Publishers, 1834), P• 366.
6

2c;reen Bay Intelligencer, August 6, 1835.

6
3Milwaukee Advertiser and i'-:ilwaukee Sentinel, passim.
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4 New York Commercial Advertiser, February 4, 1837, as cited in' the
Milwaukee Sentinel, August 22 1 1837.
65

s.s. Sherman, Increase Allen
ham A Bio ra ical Sketch (Hilwaukee:
The Milwaukee News Company, 1876 1 pp. 5-6. Once in Milwaukee, Lapham also
became involved in land speculation with the support of .¥.J.cajah Williams. See
Increase Lapham to Micajah l'/illiams, September 26, 1836, Williams Papers, 35,
OSL.

66
ttenry Kingsley to John Tweedy 1 May 23 1 1837; C. Coffing to John Tweedy 1
July 29 1 1837; and Churchill Coffing to John Tweedy, August 23, 1836, John
Tweedy Papers, Box I, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wiscons
6

7olin 1 "Reminiscences of Milwaukee In 1835-1836," PP• 210-218.

68
The best discussions of the settlement and development of the agricultural interior were found in the -works of Joseph Schafer. Schafer utilized
census reports, soil survey maps, and other statistical evidence to chart the
growth of the interior. For this study, the t-wo most helpful works were
Joseph Schafer, Four Wisconsin Counties (Madison: State Historical Society of
Wisconsin, 1927) and Town Studies (Madison: State Historical Society or
~v'isconsin, 1924).
6911Add.ress by Increase Lapham, January, 1874," as cited in Western
Historical Company, A History of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, p. 183.
7011 constitution of the Milwaukee County /\gricultural Society January 28
1
1
1837," Increase A. Lapham Papers, Bax I, WHS.
711 rconstitution or the Milwaukee Claimaits Union, II in the Reverend Jason
Lathrop, 11Historical Sketch of Kenosha County, Wisconsin, 11 WHC, II, pp. 475479.
7 2shortly after the founding of the claimants union, Milwaukee area
fanners decided it was too large and formed another union which more closely
represented the interests of the town of Milwaukee and its immediate interior.
See Conrad, History of Milwaukee, I, p. 36; "Address by Increase Lapham, 11 in
Western Historical Company, A History of Milwaukee, p. 182.
73weatern Historical Company, A History of Milwaukee, p. 118.

74-rwfilwaukee Advertiser, February 23, 1839, and the Milwaukee Sentinel,
May 23 1 1839.

75~.,
76

OSL.

and Joseph Schafer, Four Wisconsin Counties, pp. 74-75.
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still, Milwaukee, pp. 55-59; John H. Kennedy, "The Financial and
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P• 311.
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Advertiser, July 28, 1836.
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Report of the Engineer of the Territory on the Milwaukee and Hock River
Canal to Governor Henry Dodge, October, 1838, in the Milwaukee Sentinel,
December 17, 1839.
89
The sectionalism of territorial politics in Wisconsin, of course,
first really came to the fore when the area was designated as a territory in
1836. A good description of territorial politics is found in Alice Smith,
Janes Duane Dot): Frontier Promoter (Mad.ism: State Historical Society ot
Wisconsin, 1954 •

90Byron Kilbourn to Senator I.Duis Linn of Missouri, 1835, as cited in
Western Historical Company, Histor.y of Milwaukee, pp. 153-154.
91.John G. Gregory, History of Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Chicago:
Publishing Co., 1931), I, P• 345.
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92Memorial of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of \:isconsin
Presented to Congress. December ;·i. 1837. for an Appropriation for a Railroad
from Lake Michigan to the Mississippi River, Miscellaneous Folder, State
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the Lead Shot Trade In Early Wisconsin History, 11 !ill.£, XIII, pp. 293-334•
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1848 (Madison:
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Letters, L.F. I, WHS.

5, 1836, Byron Kilbourn

~ilwaukee Sentinel, July 18, 1837.
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ll3Solom.on Juneau to Joshua Hathaw~, Washington, January 5, 1836,
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See map at the end of the chapter.

117Milwaukee Sentinel. July 18, 1837.
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Byron Kilbourn to Micajah Williams, July 20, 1843, Williams Papers,
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History of Milwaukee, I, P• 312.
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120
See statistical. tables at the end of the chapter. In 1839, the value
of exports did decline, but immediately increased the next year.
1?1.._

~ilwaukee

12
1

Sentinel, September 7, 1841.

2see statistics at the end of the chapter.

23ifilwaukee Sentinel, September 12, 1837.

124see statistics at the end of the chapter. For a comparison with the
statistics of Chicago's develop1113nt see the tables at the eni of Chapter V.

CHAP1'EH VII

The Secondary Towns: Townsite '.Jeveloµnent at
Green Bay, Hanitowoc, Kewaunee, Sheboygan, Racine, and Kenosha
While Chicago and Hilwaukee were the two most important commercial
centers in the 18J0 1 s, townsites were plotted at almost every juncture of
rivers and Lake Michigan.

Except for Green Bay, most of these townsites in

the 1820 1 s were little more than occasional meeting places of the fur traders
and Indians.

During the speculative period of the 1830 1 s, some locations,

such as Green Bay, Racine, and Kenosha, attracted considerable attention,
while others such a.s Kewaunee, 1'ianitowoc, and Sheboygan were speculative.
dreams which did not actually develop until the lS4C 1 s and 1850 1 s.

Despite

the varying degrees of success encountered by these townsites, the patterns
and methods of develoµnent were remarkably similar to those observed at
Chicago and Milwaukee.

After the decline of the 1'ur trade and the cession of

Indian lands, capitalists and land speculators plotted the towns before the
arri. val of urban and fanning emigrants f ran the 1ast.

At each townsite, the

speculators const:nicted stores, paved streets, and attempted to establish
communications with the interior and the East.

The leadership for these

projects was, as before, a combination of eastern and western capitalists.
Green Bay was the largest of the fur trade villages on the western shore
of Lake Nichiean. 1 During the 18aJ' a, Green Bay had attracted a small number
of merchants and professional people desiring to make a new start in the West.
f lie.

Arriving iW-820 1 s, were persons to be significant during the period
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or

town

growth.

Horgan L. Martin, Daniel Whitney, James Doty, and Albert G. Ellis. 2

Until the 1830 1 s, however, these people were forced to engage in occupations
related to the fur trade.

Daniel 1..hitney, for example, employed his own

traders to compete with the .American fur Company while Jaines Doty served as
agent and lawyer for the American Fur Company.

Actual town growth did not

begin until the 1830's when the fur trade declined, Indian lands were ceded,
and the tide of white settlement moved viest. 3
Defore town development could begin, Indian title to the land around
Green Ba;y had to be secured by the national government.

This process actually

began in 1825 at Prairie du Chien when tho Indians a.greed to the military
occupation of Fort Howard at Green B~v as well as white settlement there. 4
In 1831, the Menominee Treaty secured most of the land in the Green BaJ' area

for settlement. 5 After government surveys, the land was opened for public
sale in 1835 at the Green Bay Land Office.

At this sale, hordes of speculators
descended upon Green Bay as did farmers anxious to secure squatter claims. 6
Famers am speculators who came to Green Bay in 1835 were probably
somewhat surprised to discover that three separate towns were rapidly rising
in the region and contesting for business and commercial hegemony.

Actually

the designation, Green Bey, in this period, referred to a cor.iplex of towns
around the juncture or the Fox River and the bay leading to Lake Michigan.7
Geographically the most prominent townaite was plotted by the officials of
the American Fur Cornpaey and appropriately named Astor.

A short distance

away was the village of Navarino laid out by Daniel Whitney, and then further
south was

De

Pere.

In point of time, Navarino was the first town plotted.

proprietor, Daniel Whitney, had first come to the Green Bq area during the
heyday or the fur trade.

He certainly did not conform to the pa.ttems of

Its
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the normal. frontier trader, for \.;hitney was involved in a number of econcmic
enterprises.

Yet his principal occupation was in supplying goods to matlY'

residents of Green Bay not connected with the American Fur Company. 8 Throughout the early 1820 1 s, vJhitney extended easy credit to many Green Bay traders,
and by 1826 he was receiving their land claims in

debts.

In 1829, he laid out the town of Navarino.

p~ent

for outstanding

Because settlers and

capitalists had not as yet reached the area of Green Bay, the sale of lots a.t
Navarino was extremely slow until 1834. Whitney, nevertheless, made necessary
:improvements, such as building stores, and houses, in anticipation of the
territory's eventual settlement.

Navarino first attracted wisespread atten-

tion in 1833 1..tien •ihitney assisted in the establishment of a newspaper, the
Green Bf.LY Intelligencer.9
The Green Ba.y Intelligencer provided Navarino as well as other townsites
in the Green Bay area with advantageous publicity, in its first issue, the
Intelligencer claimed that one of its principal goals was
ment of the countr;y west of Lake Michigan.

11

•

•

•

the advance-

In this we have a direct and

intense interest, 'Which we shall be very unlikely to .f'orget. 1,lO The Navarino
townsite was recamnended to emigrants because of the camnunications network
of the Fax and Wisconsin Rivers and the availability o:t government lands. 11
As more and more settlers approached the Green Bq area in 1835, the sa.le of
Navarino lots increased. Whitney himself' purchased land throughout the
territory and established a forwarding and camnission house at Navarino.

But

Navarino did not attract heavy eastem investment confining it to the cl.ass
of a secondary townsite.12
Five miles south of Navarino, several Green Bay capitalists including
James Doty, Morgan L. Martin, and George Lawe organized the Fox H:iver Hydraulic

222
Com~ny

in 1836 to construct a dam on the Fox River.

The men then extended

their investment to plot a townsite near the dam called De Pere.

De Pere

advertised extensively for laborers and made a few efforts to attract capitalists, professional people, and political institutions to its location. 13

The

town, however, never succeeded in gaining the interest of eastern capitalists
or even the whole-hearted attention of western entrepreneurs.

riorgan L.

Hartin, for example, was primarily promoter of the Astor townsite and invested
at De Pere mere).y to increase the general develoµnent of the territory.

He

never considered it a threat to the Astor location a short distance away. 15
In the Green Bay region, the most viable townsite was at Astor.

It was

plotted as an indirect result or the American Fur Canpacy 1 s control of the
fur trader.

As the fur trade dwindled :in volume and profitability, the French-

Canadian traders surrounding Green Bay gradually deeded their land claims
and land titles to John Astor's American Fur Compa.ny. 16 Observ:ing the success
of townsites at Chica.go and Daniel .ihitney•s project at Navarino, Astor decided to lay out a town on the land obtained fran the fur traders.

John

Astor was not a novice at land speculation since he already had extensive
investments in New York state and in Ganada. 17 To supervise the building and
management of the townsite, Astor required a western agent, and James Duane
Doty was the most logical choice.

Doty had arrived at Detroit in 1818, and,

at the age of n:inett?en he was admitted to the bar.
a Michigan territorial judge.

In 1823, he was appointed

At the same time, Doty worked for the American

Fur Company in securing land titles fran the old fur traders.

Moreover, he

was well-acquainted with the agricultural and commercial possibilities of the
entire territory having participated in several exploring expeditions. 18 Thus
on March 5, 1835 1 John Astor,
,

Rams~

Crooks, Robert Stuart, and James Doty

l

united in partnership to plot the town of Astor.

The property was originally

valued at $2500 with Astor controlling 75 per-cent; H.amsq Crooks, 20 per-cent;
Robert Stuart 5 per-cent; and James Doty 25 per-cent.

Doty was to earn his

share of the property by acting as the townsite•s general agent in selling
lots and inaugurating improvements.19
Doty 1 s first problem was the hostility of the old fur traders toward the
Astor townsi te which was located on land they earlier had owned. Many of the
traders felt that John Astor had treated them harshly in appropriating their
land claims for past debts.

Since John Lawe was the acknowledged leader of

the old community, he was allowed to retain part of his land claims.

A

lenient policy toward John Lawe, Doty explained, would temper the hostility
of local inhabitants who otherwise might jeopardize the developnent of Astor. 20
Doty next turned his attention toward plotting the physical dimensions of the
town.

He arranged streets and avenues, measured lot sizes, and established

lot prices.

The town's main streets were to run parallel to the Fox River

giving Astor the greatest possible number of lots fronting on the river.
Various lots in the town were then reserved for future public buildings such
as the post office, the land office, and the county seat; all of which Doty
ultimately hoped to attract to the town. 21
Once the physical layout of Astor had been surveyed, the proprietors were
prepared to sell lots to speculators and town emigrants.

John Astor, H.amsay

Crooks and Robert Stuart held very definite views on the proper method of lot
sales.

To attract business interests to the town, Doty was instructed to
22
sell at low prices to merchants and artisans.
James Doty was in full accord

with this view, and he concentrated his sales on merchants often requiring

them to build stores and warehouses.

Observing the methods of town promotion

'I

II'i

elsewhere in the West, Doty hoped that after a year the remaining lots could
be sold at competitive prices since Astor, by then, would naturally attract
capitalists and merchants 23 In August, 1838, Doty delineated his methods for
building an :image of Astor's prosperity:
I agreed to sell about 30 lotf'I at naninal prices, in order to
establish canmercial and mercantile business there, that it might
immediately compete with the adjoining town. This is the principal
reason of its rapid increase in value, as it placed it on a footing with other Western Towns. I also made a similar arrangement
with some of the officers and several mechanics. Having now enough
of these, I should canmence selling lots at their market value, as
this will be the surest method of increasing the value of the whole.
The sale of one lot, either by the Proprietor of a Town or by one
to whan he has sold, increases the value of those he retains. The
price of lots in the Town of Chicago was created in this manner.
There is much speculation now in this country, I therefore think it
is best21;o sell largely at prices which I have no doubt can be obtained.
For the first two years of Astor's developnent, Doty sold lots at minimal
prices to any interest which might possibly increase the townsite•s potential.
In this manner, he attracted the government land office, various county

offices, and professional people to Astor.

In 1837, for example, Doty enticed

the postmaster, then at Navarino, to Astor promising him several town lots at
reasonable prices and a new office building. 25 while Doty o~inally intended
to increase lot prices after a year, he soon found that merchants and professional people could only be drawn to Astor through reduced lot prices.
John Astor grew impatient with this scheme, but Doty explained that it was
necessary in order
To obtain improvements ••• to sell at very low rates, because
this appears to be the custom of Proprietors in other towns. I
have lately been at Milwaukee where I find this is the case; and
where the proprietors are expending abot _t $20,000 in grading
streets.26
1

Doty thus followed his own inclinations and continued to attract
merchants and artisans to the town by very low lot prices.

Many times, he
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')7
loaned money to merchants preparing to build a store or warehouse.""
Yet Doty and John Astor not only sold lots at Astor to merchants and
artisans, but they early recognized the need of drawing more and more capitalists into involvement with the townsite.

In 1835, Doty suggested that sane

lots at Astor should be sold in New York at a general auction sale where higher
28
prices could be obtained.
John Astor, however, sold shares of Astor to a
mun.bar of selected eastern capitalists including Samuel Stocldng, Chester
Jennings, and Charles Butler29 Thus the town of Astor had interested eastern
financiers whose money could be employed for further improvements.

Canmenting

on the sale of shares to Samuel Stocking, John Astor indicated the reasons for
attracting such people:
This disposition we deemed the more valuable and important, as
Hr. Stocldng is wealthy, is considered one of the most prudent
men in the state, and is possessed of much practical knowledge
connected with the building up of country towns, and land operations generally.JO
In Mq, 1836, James Doty undertook a journey to the East in order to

confer with Astor and solicit the interest of additional. eastern capitalists.31
Having little success in New York City, Doty then traveled to Buffalo in
order " • • • to interest those in this city who have control of the greatest
number of vessels on the Lakes - and this is the most favorable point to
secure this object. 11 At Buffalo Doty encountered Jacob Barker, of the large
forwarding finn of Barker and Holt.

Learning that Barker was departing for

the West, Doty decided to take passage on the same steamboat with hopes of
using the voyage to interest Barker in the Astor project.

Jacob Barker,

however, refused to invest at Astor since he was al.ready involved at Racine,
Wisconsin.3 2
In addition to eastern capitalists, Doty al.so sold lots to town residents

and western speculators.

In July, 1836, he conducted a general auction sale

of the real estate at Astor. 33 At other times, Doty sold lots to speculators
who traveled throughout the territory reselling property as they journeyed

from town to town.
Mr. Van Dom.

In 1836, for example, Doty sold fifty-eight lots to a

Van Dom then stopped at St. Louis, New Orleans, and Philadel-

phia where he sold the lots.

Doty, of course, hoped such sales would publicize

the townsite at Astor and attract new investors.34
When John Astor, Ramsay Crooks, and Robert Stuart originally established

the Astor townsite, there was never any general agreement as to how long they
would remain connected with the project.

Periodically, John Astor received

offers fran entrepreneurs interested in purchasing the entire townsite.
Worried over the threat to his investment at Navarino, Daniel Whitney offered

$25 1 000 for Astor in May, 1835.35 While John Astor was often tempted to
liquidate his interest, Ramsay Crooks and James Doty prevented such action by
assuring John Astor that the property would double in vc:.lue.
James Doty

optimistic~

In August, 1835,

reported to Astor that

I.f money continues to flow t'ran the "::a.stern cities to the West
for the next years as it has for the last six months, this
property should not be sold for leas than $100 1 000. Whether it
will so cont~ge you are of all men the moat competent to
judge • • • •

John Astor, however, was never satisfied with the townsite 1 s progress.
Often he criticized Doty 1 s handling or the concern because of excessive sales
at low prices to merchants and artisans.

At other times he objected to Doty•s

prolonged absences fran Astor to attend legislative sessions of the territory.
Moreover, John Astor continuall.y fretted over the competition of other town.sites in the Green Bay area.37 Doty did his best to reassure John Astor that
their townsite possessed the greatest potential for future growth.

According

to Doty, both Navarino and De Pere were secondary locations incapable of
serious can.petition unless capital.ists turned their attention in that direction.

In February, 1836, Doty explained to Jolm Astor the relative position

of their townsite:
This town, like all others, must have its rival.a; and whether it
will be able to compete successfully with all, time al.one can
determine. I see none from which any fears ought to be entertained at present. But there certainly are points near us, where,
if a large amount or capital should be invested in improvements
and in trade, it would greatly lessen the val.ue of real. estate
here.38
James Doty actually had left the chal.lenge clearly up to J olm Astor and
his eastern associates warning them that town promotion required continued
lot sal.es and significant investments of capital for improvements.

Like

western entrepreneurs in other towns, James Doty tapped the resources of
eastern capitalists to inaugurate improvements at Astor.

To expedite the flow

of capital from East to West, John Astor obtained the general consent or the
major eastern investors to expend their capital for improvements at Astor.3 9
Doty, or course, had to continually request John Astor to release these funds.

In 1836, for example, John Astor balked at donating several lots for the
Presbyterian Church, but James Doty insisted that
to the town.

thi~

edifice was essential

I<.ventually Jolm Astor donated the required lots and even con-

tributed $300 to the church's construction. 40

In 1837, James Doty subscribed

$2 1 000 to erect public buildings for housing county offices and professional.

people and requested additional. capital. fran John Astor for "it is usual for
Proprietors of \-Vestern towns to contribute something towards works of a public
nature, and where there are rival

to~s

this seems to be indispensably neces-

sary. ,,41

Doty early recognized that one of the
was a oublic house or hotel.

to~site•s

principal requirements

According to DotY .. manv stranJ?ers visited Astor
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but rarely stayed to investigate its potential because of the absence of
public accommodations.

Thus Doty set aside four lots for a hotel, but its

actual construction required considerable capital.

J,Xplaining the need for

a hotel to John Astor, James Doty calculated that the project would cost
$10,000; funds which were just not available in the West. 42 Thus Doty threw
the burden on John Astor who turned to the other eastern investors for capitai. 43 When sufficient .fimds had not been procured by 18.37, Doty reminded
John Astor that Navarino now possessed a hotel providing serious canpetition
for their townsite.44 Eventually, Astor possessed a hotel reputed to be one
of the finest in the West.
Doty inaugurated a number of other improvements to increase Astor's
attractiveness.

With the aid of John Astor and the other eastern financiers,

Doty supervised the grading of streets.

In 1836, he constructed a dam across

the Manitoo River to bring fresh water into the town.45

Later Doty built a

bridge across the Manitoo H.iver enabling Astor to receive the majority ot
emigrants travelling overland to the Green Bq region.

To increase the town-

site's connections with the interior, Doty proposed a network of roads costing
$10,000.

\·i'hile many of these projects were rejected by John Astor, Doty 1 s
persistence succeeded in garnering many improvements for the town. 46
During the 1830 1 s, James Doty also plqed an important role in all of

Wisconsin's internal improvement schemes.

He did not believe the region could

develop without a general system of roads and canals throughout the territory. 47 Yet Doty had his pet projects dependent on where his economic investments were concentrated.

Besides his interests at Astor, Doty was also the

principal proprietor of Madison, a town which was later designated as the
territorial capital. 48 Moreover, he was involved at Manitowoc along with
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various eastern capital.ists.4 9 For the first year of their association, John
Astor criticized Doty•s projects throughout the territory feeling that it
affected his care of the Astor property. 50 By late 1836) however, John Astor
changed his view and gave Doty additional capital to invest in townsites and
canal projects throughout the territory. 51 Doty, nevertheless, pushed for
improvement of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers to increase the commercial possibilities of Astor.

As early as 1832, he wrote to a New York financier request-

ing funds for a canal. company becaURe

It must be obvious to all who look with an intelligent eye to
that portion of the western country, that the great northern
thoroughfare between the Great Lake and the Mississippi River,
is, and for an indefinite period must continue to be, by the
Fox and Wiskonsin (sic) rivers • • .52
Doty, however, was certainly not unique among town promoters, for all the
Green Bay capitalists and speculators considered internal improvements, in the

fonn of canals and railroads, an important step to camnercial developnent.
Capitalists in the Green Bay region unfortunately faced the problems of inadequate financing brought on by the depression in 1S37.

Similar to the

situation at Milwaukee, Green Bay never launched significant projects until
the depression period when their efforts were seriously handicapped.

Moreover,

the Green Bay region faced the econanic and political competition of other
towns on the lake shore as well as the sectional rivalry of southwestern
Wisconsin's lead mining region.

Those projects which were inaugurated, never-

theless, derived capital from the East and leadership from western entrepreneurs.
The first plan to attract the interests of Green Bay residents was the
improvement of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers.

This route had been employed for

generations to transport furs from the interior to Green Bay, but by the late
1820•s western

entrepreneurs~

such as Daniel Whitney and Morgan L. Martin,

Z30
saw that the lead mined in Routhwestern Wiscons1n could be shipped to Green
Bay rather than its normal route down the Mississippi River to New Orleans
and then to eastern markets. 5.3

At the first public meeting held at Green Bay

L. Hart1n and others petitioned Congress for funds to improve
the Pox and Wisconsin Rivers. 54 In 1$29, a canal COCJ.pany was organized under
the direction of liartin but little was ever accomplished. 55 Daniel Whitney

in 1829, Morgan

opened a shot-tower on the lower Wisconsin River at Helena in 1830 hoping
eventua.]J.y to transport lead shot to Green

~. 56 Yet capital was always

insufficient to construct such a carmunications network.
As the region became more settled in the mid 18,30 1 s, Morgan L. Martin,
James Doty, and Daniel \'i'hi tney renewed their ef.forts to launch a cannl company.
Improvement projects were recommended by newspaper editorials and public
meetings.

In 1836, thv Green Ba.y Intelligencer contained an editorial entitled

''Everything As Individuals - Nothing As a Comm.unity 11 in which citizens were
asked to support a canal between the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers.

The

editorial

pointed out that
:.1hile we are 1nactive, the people of Milwaukee and Chicago are
alive and doins; the one are starting a railroad and the other
a canal to communicate with the Mississippi - all over new
routes, while we in possession of the old long travelled route,
are asleep, and letting them take away the commerce fran us.57

1

The

Gre~n

Ba,y Intelligencer further recognized that the smaller cities

on the western shore of Lake Hichigan, such as Manitowoc and Ra.cine, were already discussing canal schemes to link them with the interior.

To a certain

extent, these smaller towns represented a threat to Green Bay's hopes for
commercial hegemony,
Another start was made in an effort to improve the Fox and Wisconsin
Rivers 1n 1834 with the establishment of the Portage Canal Canpany headed by
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Yet again the project was stymied by insufficient capitai. 58

Daniel 1>hitney.

As the years passed, Wisconsin politicians and capitalists petitioned Congress
for ap1Jropriations.

In 1837, a bill for granting an appropriation for the

development of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers was before Congress, and Doty
urged John Astor to exert his influence among various members of Congress.
Yet the Milwaukee and Rock River Canal received the only major appropriation
for territorial improvements. 59 Green Ba,,y promoters now turned to other
devices.

In 1838, Doty, with other area capitalists, formed the Fox rdver

Transportation Company to move merchandise fran southwestern \;isconsin to
Green Bay.

60 Doty personally journeyed to the lead mine area to obtain con-

tracts for shipping lead via the Fox River Transportation Company to Green Bay.
Doty, of course, hoped Jolm Astor would invest capital in the finn.

Noting

the establishment of the Fox River Transportation Campany, Doty explained to
Astor that

11

•

•

•

there is not sufficient capital in this countr-J to prosecute

this business as extensively as it ought to be. 1161
Despite numerous attempts, Green Ba,,y never succeeded in capturing the
lead trade of southwestern Wisconsin or tapping the agricultural interior
along the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers.

While in 1839 and 1840 the 1:lisconsin

Democrat bragged that more and more lead was f:inding its way to Green Bay, 62
:in actual fact Milwaukee and Racine were rerouting the lead trade overland to
their ports on Lake ftlchigan. 63
In their attempts to secure an ad.equate harbor and steamboat connections

with the East, the promoters in the Green Bay area encountered many of the
same difficulties as in their drive for improvement of the Fox and Wisconsin
Rivers.

These capitalists

suc~eedad

in obtaining a few improvements, but

nowhere near the achievements at Chicago and Hilwaukee.

The principal de.fi-

232

Navarino and James Doty at Astor were not able to can.'lland the financial
resources that were available to Chicago and Milwaukee speculators.

Harbor

facilities were early rec4gnized by the speculators as a necessa.Ij' ingredient
of future commercial growth.

In 1835, there was not a harbor of any conse-

quence at Green Bay, and thus it was very difficult for ships to approach the
mouth of the Fox River to deposit goods and passengers.

Fearing the possi-

bility of rwming aground, many ship captains avoided Green Bay.

In 1835,

the Green Bay Intelligencer called on the people to improve their own harbor
warning them that
• • • Unless the people of Green Bay will incur the paltey
expense, (and that right soon) of a few dollars or a few hundred
dollars in improving their harbor, they must be content to see
the commerce of the Lakes find another channel to the Mississippi. 64
Few Green Bay citizens, however, had the necessar.r capital reserve to
contribute to harbor construction.
improvements on his own. 65

Thus Daniel 1.;hitney undertook the required

In 1836, James Doty pressured Congress into sur-

veying the Fox River for a pennanent harbor.

Because of the depression, Green

Bay, like Milwaukee, never received government appropriations until the

1840's.

66

Commercial developnent at Green Bay was also hindered because of its
inability to establish steamboat or water communications with the East.

Fran

their inception, Astor and Navarino were avoided by captains of lake vessels.
According to contemporaries, captains of lake vessles considered the time and
expense of stopping at Green Bay excessive when the majority of passengers
and cargo were destined for Chicago. 67 James Doty attested to this fact and
indicated its effect on the Astor townsite:
I was greatly delayed in my return in consequence of the refusal
of steam-boats to touch at this place on their way to the head
of the Lake; and for the same reason I saw more than a hundred
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emigrants go from Detroi~ to other places, when they were extremely
desirous of coming here. 8
Doty warned John Astor that the townsite would never attract widespread
attention until steamboats regularly plied between Astor, Detroit and Buffalo.
Unless Green Bay citizens used their own capital to finance a steamboat cam-

pany, the Green Bay Intelligencer predicted that Green Bay would continue to
fall behind other towns on the lake shore. 69
Jam.es Doty again took the lead in encouraging Green Bay capitalists to
build or charter steamboats.

In 1836, Doty requested John Astor to subscribe

capital for a steamboat to run between Green Bay and Detroit.

According to

Doty, the proprietors of Astor must assume a large portion of this stock even
though "• • • it should only return their simple interest, for it is

c~rtain

that without a regular communication of this kind the public can never be made
to realize the value of this point. 11 John Astor agreed to the proposition, and
Green Bay soon had at least one regular steamboat.70
But one steamboat was hardly sufficient when other lakeports, such as
Chicago, had regular packet service with eastern ports. 71 At other times,
Doty suggested additional steamboat investments, but John Astor steadily refused. 72 Throughout its early history, lack of proper camnunications with the
East remained a glaring inadequacy of Green Day.

As late as 1847, John

Astor's agent at Green Bay claimed that it was the most inaccessible spot on
the lake shore.

Merchants who ordered goods from the East often had them

shipped to Chicago, then transferred to smaller vessels plying the trade along
the lake shore. 73 Green Bay, therefore, despite the efforts of Doty and
occasional subscriptions of capital by John Astor failed to develop a cormnunications network.
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As in all .frontier communities one of the most important and needed
I

institutions at Green Bay was a bank.

In this project also, James Doty and

:forgan L. Martin led the way with the assistance of eastern capital.

The

history of banking at Green Bay again showed the conflicts among the dif.ferent
sections of the territory for commercial and political leadership.
In 1835, Horgan L. Martin was chiefly responsible for obtaining a bank

charter .from the Michigan Territorial Legislature.

Assistance in framing the

charter and securing capital was provided by Martin's two brothers, John and
:iilliam, who lived in New York State.

1

The bank was capitalized at $100 1 000

and governed by a board of elected directors which included :'1organ L. and John
Martin and James Doty.74
While Horgan L. Martin and John Martin were primarily responsible for
obtaining the charter, it was never certain who would control the bank's stock
or where it would be located.

According to the charter's provisions, the

major stockholders reserved the right to locate in either Brown or Iowa counties.

There were several different factions contesting for the bank's control.

Primarily they were divided between Doty, Martin, and Whitney representing the
North and Green

Ba.v

ing the South.

In 18.34, Lucius Lyon had a.greed to invest in farm land and

and Lucius Lyon and Frederic and Arthur Bronson represent-

townsites for Arthur Bronson of New York. 75

Iqon himself was a delegate to

Congress fran the Michigan Territory in 183.3, when Wisconsin was still part
of Michigan Territory. 76 When Arthur Bronson first learned of a proposed bank,
he wrote to Horgan L. Martin offering his capital resources and financial
leadership:
From my knowledge of the country it strikes me that this institution
if confined to the management of discreet skillful a.gents, with
advantageous connexions (ili) fonned in this city , and elsewhere 1
and well organized, may be made one of the most productive stocks in
the countrv. and at the same time of p;:reat public benefit.77
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Bronson, however, seemed to have ulterior motives.

,/

I,

It was his intention

I
I

!i·,

.,,.

to secure control of the Bank of Wisconsin and then move the bank to Cassville,

l'

a townsite development on the Hississippi Iliver in the southwestern part of
the territory. 78 Bronson's plans were defeated because Green Bay speculators
were able to gain control of the bank.

John Astor subscribed $10 1 000 in bank

stock and Morgan L. Martin, through his brother John in New York, managed to

11·'

'I

1,i

interest other eastern capitalists thus garnering the majority of the bank's
stock. 79
But where was the bank to be located within the Green Bay region-Astor
or Navarino? Doty immediately requested John Astor and the other eastern
proprietors to donate lots and supply capital for building a bank building
because
It is the only institution of the kind chartered in this country,
and wherever it is located it is likely to detennine the business
to that point. We are contending with a Town which has its business established. (Navarino) Mr. Whitney paid I am infonned
about $2 1 000 premium upon shares of stock purchased by him, to
obtain a majority of the votes in order to secure its location in
Navarino, which shows that he regards it as a measure of considerable importance.SO
Because Doty succeeded in donating lots for a bank building, it located
81
at Astor in 1837.
After defeating the southern interests for control of the Bank of
Wisconsin, William and John Martin in New York advised their brother, Horgan
L. Martin,to sell their controlling shares of stock because of the country's
deteriorating financial condition. Morgan L. Martin always resisted the
idea. 82 By 1838 1 however, the Bank of Wisconsin was in financial trouble and
8
the Martins were held responsible. 3 Anxious to preserve the bank's financial
standing, Morgan L. Martin approached George Smith who was involved in both
the Wisconsin Marine and Fire Insurance Company at Milwaukee and George Smith

1

1

,,
1

'·

1

2.36
and t.;ompany of Chicago.

4 Smith considered taking controlling interest or

the bank, but before he could act, the territorial legislature investigated
the bank's financial position and then revoked its charter in 1839. 85 The
Bank of Wisconsin failed during the depression, but its establishment through
the leadership of Horgan L. Martin and the capital. of ea.stern financiers
mirrored the basic course of town development.
The financial depression had effecta on all segments or Astor and
Navarino's econany; internal improvement appropriations were just not available
from the national govenunent, eastern money was more difficult to obtain, and
banking credits were restricted.

Beginning in 1837, Doty•s letters to John

Astor became extremely pessimistic as capital was more difficult to procure.
To attract merchants and artisans, Doty sold lots on credit knowing that payment might be delayed for years. 86 By 1838, the Wisconsin Democrat filled
each issue with notices of lots at Astor and Navarino available for public
sale because of failure to pay taxes.87 While John Astor reraained involved
with the Astor townsite, many eastern investors were overextended and forced
88
to sell-lrheir property at Astor or stop payment on their original shares.
Expressing the general condition of the townsite in Jtm.e of 1839, James Doty
claimed that

11

the times are no better here, but rather worse.

There is no

money in this comtry and we are living by barter. 1189
By 1840, Jam.es Doty himself was in financial difficulty.

As a member of

the territorial camnission for erecting public buildings, Doty had used part
of the money for his improvement schemes.

Panic-stricken by a possible

territorial investigation of his financial affairs, Doty requested John Astor
to loan him $12,000 to cover the missing ftm.ds. 90 Robert Stuarl comselled
John Astor to grant Doty•s request because Doty•s "• •• inability not to do
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so (that is pay back the money), would at once destroy his credit and political.
:influence, and this would be a greater loss to the Astor propertz alone, than
twice ;~12,000. 1191 Doty thus was supported by John Astor during the depression;
his reputation was preserved leading eventually to his appointment as governor
of the Wisconsin Territory in 1841. 92
Both Astor and Navarino suffered during t.he depression, but as in other
lake towns, the easing of the financial contraction began in late 1839 and
1840.

The most encouraging sign for the Green Bay region was basically a

change of attitude, a realization that further town developnent required a
surplus-producing agricultural. interior.

In an editorial in the Wisconsin

Democrat in 1839, this change of economic orientation was apparent:
If but one-half of the money which has been expended on useless
buildings had been applied to the improvement and cultivation or
f a.rms instead of now being can.palled to expend our thousands for
the benefit of foreign markets, we might have a surplus of agricultural products for exportation.
Unoccupied stores, the high price of provisions, and the general
complaint of hard times, should admonish business men, men of
capital, that if they wish to invest funds in a manner that will
ultimately tend to their own advantage as well as to the substantial good of the comm.unity, they must turn their attention to
the cultivation of the soil • • • • 93
But f a.rm.ing did not develop as quickly in the :1.nunediate hinterland of
Green Bay, and in this lay one of the chief reasons for Green Bay's slower
growth ca:n.pared to Chicago and Milwaukee. 94 Geography again plB\fed a large
role in western develoi:ment.

The overland routes to the West ran along the

southern shore of Lake Michigan, then turned north to Milwaukee and Green Bay.
Thus Green

B~

waited on the natural movement of population to the North.

But geography was not the sole reason for Green Bay's slower cteveloi:ment, for
transportation connections with the East were never established.
efforts of James Doty1 Green

B~

Despite the

never established a regular line of steamboats
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with the principal port of Buffalo.

Moreover, the town.sites at Astor and

Navarino did not have access to the large number of capitalists as did Chicago
and Milwaukee. 95
South of Green Bay, the majority of secondary towns were located within
the present-day boundaries of Wisconsin.

The United States government pur-

chased Indian title to the lands along the westem shore of Lake Michigan at
two treaties.

The Menaninee Treaty of 1831 purchased the land on which

Kewaunee, Manitowoc, and Sheboygan were later plotted while the Indian Treaty
of 1833, negotiated at Chicago, cleared title to the land where Kenosha,
Racine, and Milwaukee were located. 96 Between 1833 and 1835, the majority of
this land was surveyed and then sold at the government land sale at Green Bay
in 1835. While townsites were already underway at Green Bay, Chicago, and
Milwaukee, speculators and capitalists utilized every available location.
1836, the Green Bay Intelligencer mentioned six separate settlements with:in
Wisconsin which voiced pretensions of town status. 97 Later that same year,
the Green Bay Intelligencer described the mania of townsite speculation:
In a few days after the close of navigation the excitement attendant
on the Land Sales seemed to die away, and little was expected till
the opening of the season. But the speculators cannot rest. Within the last three days many thousand dollars have been paid in the
entry of lands at the Green Bay Land Office: Agents are sent on for
companies - monies remitted to the Clerk of the Office, citizens or
this place employed to make the entry, and in one way or another the
business of entering Public lands is going on at a brisk rate. The
principal points now sought are Manitowoc and Rock Rivers • • • •
A year ago Milwaukee was suspected of having sane pretensions to a
townsite. But now we have done speaking of that place; the speculators are aJ.l past there - it is an old place; Lots have reached
the maximum - say 1000 to 5000 - The attention is now directed further down the Lake. Sac Creek, Sheboygan, Sleeping River, and
Manitowoc are at this manent the rage. Within a week the lands
have risen .fran $10 to $250 per acre at Manitowoc - they talk or a
communication direct fran thence to Fort Winnebago! At the Sheboygan,
the most bea.utifulA and we doubt not thanost important town site on
the Lake • • • • 9

In
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Next to Green Bay, the first townsite on the northwest shore of Lake
Michigan was Kewal.lllee.

It was first brought to the attention of western

capitalists in September, 18.36, when the Wisconsin Democrat advertised its
location in an article most likely written by the town's promoters.

According

to this article, Kewaunee's two most notable attractions were the Kewal.lllee
River which was navigable five miles into the interior and even shoreline
which would permit harbor construction. 99 The Kewal.lllee townsite was under the
direction of Joshua Hathaway who had previously invested at Milwaukee. 100
Hathaway advertised extensively throughout the Wisconsin Territory and in
Chicago for merchants and artisans.

Lot purchasers were pranised a reduction
101
of 40 per-cent if a dwelling or store were erected.
Hathaway also had
financial backers, chief of wham was Levi Beardsley, a New York banker.102
Shortly after the Kewaunee site was established, the depression of 1837
forced many of its supporters to withdraw.
Hathaway that he could not meet his

One Chicago lawyer infonned

Kewal.lllee,
then, faded from the list of viable townsites until the late 1840 1 s. 103
p~ents

on lot purchases.

South of Kewaunee, the next most popular site was Manitowoc.

This

location was at first the creation of western entrepreneurs led by James
Duane Doty of Green Bay.

After establishjng Manitowoc, Doty planned to con-

nect the Manitowoc River by canal with a small stream running into Lake
Winnebago.

According to Doty 1 s scheme, this canal would tap the resources of

the agricultural interior as well as increase Manitowoc's potential as a port
city. 104

In 18.35, Doty began directing eastern capital to the townsite. He
interested two New York capitalists, Benjamin Clapp and John

c.

Halsey.

Doty

had met both men through his earlier association with John Astor's American

Fur Canpany.

Clapp was an executive in the New York offices of the American

Fur Company while John Halsey operated an eastern retail firm which, for many
years, had supplied the American Fur Company with goods.l05

In 1SJ6, Doty

persuaded the two men to sell their land at Milwaukee and then reinvest the
money at Hanitowoc. 106 Associated with James Doty in plotting the Manitowoc
site was Albert G. Ellis of Green Bay.

Ellis was part-owner of the Green Bay
Intelligencer and also operated as a 1&1d agent for eastern financiers. 107

His principal eastern connection wa.s James B. Murra\}T, a brother-in-law of
Arthur Bronson. Murray was attracted to the Manitowoc site because Ellis and
Doty claimed it had excellent harbor facilities and would soon be linked by
canal with Lake Winnebago. 100
Various attempts were ma.de by the chief speculators at ;.1anitowoc to
obtain the necessary internal improvements.

In January, 1837, Ellis, Doty,

and James Murray urged Wisconsin's territorial delegate, George Jones, to
petition Congress for harbor appropriations at Manitowoc. 109 George Jones
requested congressional aid, but the depression had brought the curtailment
of govelTl!llent spending ending Manitowoc's hope for harbor construction. 110
Located south or Manitowoc, Sheboygan experienced a sjmilar develoµnent.
In 1835, a government surveyor judged that Sheboygan was a better harbor

location than Milwaukee since .forested land in the interior provided ample
building materials.lll The obvious availability of the Sheboygan site did
not escape the eyes of western capitalists.

At the Green BS¥ land sale in

1835, Daniel Whitney, Joshua Hathaway, and George Smith purchased most of the
land surrounding Sheboygan.

These entrepreneurs then formed a company,

plotted the village of Sheboygan, and commenced selling lots to interested
ea.stem capitalists. 112 The proprietors built stores and a hotel in 1836.

They al.so felt confident that the Troy and Erie Steamboat Line from
would make regular trips there.113

~uffalo

Initial publicity through the Green Bay

Intelligencer was excellent since the newspaper claimed that
The site is unquestionably the most beautitul one upon the western
shore of Lake Michigan, and the land in its vicinity and fran
thence to Lake Winnebago surpassed by none in the Territory.114
In 1835 and 1836, many of the most important western speculators purchased
land at Sheboygan.

James Doty, Morgan L. Martin, William B. Ogden, and Gurdon
Hubbard directed eastern capitalists to the site. 115 Moreover, Sheboygan
attracted a number of merchants and lawyers all believing that it would
eventually dominate Lake Michigan's western shore.

With the onset of the

depression in 1837, however, many speculators found themselves overextended,
harbor construction faltered, and the backcountry failed to attract f'a:nners.
Slowly the town's merchants and artisans moved awa;y, perhaps to Milwaukee and
Chica.go.

A contemporary resident described the failure of the tCJrlnsite:

A number of' framed dwelling-houses and stores were erected during
the fall and village lots rose rapidly in value. A lot which two
years afterwards could not have been sold for as many shillings,
was considered a bargain at five or six hundred dollars. At the
same time there was not a farm in the country; not twenty acres of
cul ti va.ted land within forty miles. But this was no obstacle to
building a western city in 1836. No one stopped to consider that
in order to establish camnerce, to sell merchandise, to ply the
various mechanic arts, there was a necessity for a productive class
in the vicinity. Everybody wcs expecting sudden affluence fran the
rise in the prices of wild lands. There was a t.emporary show ot
prosperity, while they were patronizing one another which continued
during the time they were fitting up their houses, and getting
settled in them. This was very encouraging while it lasted. But
all of a sudden, it was discovered that eve:rybody was out of money
and that nobody had anything to do • • • • ll6
While the settlements between Green Bay and Milwaukee experienced great
difficulty, two other townsites south of Milwaukee, Racine and Kenosha,
achieved limited success.

On

numerous voyages along the western shore of

Lake Michigan, Gilbert Y..napp, an ex-naval officer, was the first to consider

a townsite at Racine.

Once the Indian title to the land was cleared. by the

Treaty of 1833, Knapp interested Gurdon Hubbard, one of Chicago's major speculators, in plotting a town.site there. 117 But neither Hubbard nor Knapp had
the necessary capital resources.

r'ortunatel.y, Benjamin Barker, an eastern

emigrant, visited the Ra.cine area in 1835, Barker had been supported in his
western migration by his brother Jacob Barker, a partner in a large Buffalo
forwarding business.

On

the advice of his brother, Jacob BA.rker then f omed

a partnership with Hubbard and Knapp to share in the expense and profits of
the Racine project.118 Since Gurdon Hubbard lived at Chicago and Jacob Barker
at Buffalo, the majority of promotional -work fell to Gilbert Knapp and Benjamin
Darker, acting as his brother's agent. 119
To attract more capitalists and merchants to the Racine area, Jacob
Barker sold many of his town lots •120 In 18.37, he sold a halt interest in his
property to Stephen Ives and Marshall Strong.

Marshall Strong was from New

York, and, although a lawyer by profession, he operated a dry goods store in
partnership ld.th Stephen Ives at Ra't:ine.121 The town's principal landholders
also led the way in establishing Ha.cine's business potential.

Benjamin Barker,

with the financial support of his brother Jacob at Buffalo, built a warehouse
and a general store.122 Gilbert Knapp sold lots at reduced prices to merchants who agreed to construct stores and houses.123 Later Knapp and Hubbard
erected a public building to acconunodate a court house and county offices.
To improve Ra.cine's connections with the interior, Benjanin Barker and Marshall
Strong constructed a bridge across the Root River running through Racine. 124
One of the inmediate needs of any frontier town was adequate publicity
which usually depended upon the establishment of a newspaper.

As early as

18.36, Gilbert Knapp expressed his desire for a newspaper, but at first he

lacked the necessary capital.

'1;ritiruz to Jacob Barker. Knaoo emphasized the

great need of a newspaper for

11

•

•

•

one man can do much to praise his

country,, but when the newspaper talks it is with a thousand tungs (sic) 11125
Thus Knapp asked Jacob Barker for .financial support and aid in lining up
eastern subscribers. 126 Because of the depression, however, Knapp was not
able to establish a newspaper until February, 1838,, and then it was only in
circulation until October, 1838.

Yet the newspaper was a joint undertaking

of the major town pranoters including Knapp, Stephen Ives,, and harshall
Strong.l'Zl
During its short existence, the jE1cine Areu:s advertised the town's
advantages to merchants and famers.

In one issue, the Ra.cine Argus claimed

that the town's merchants were incapable of handling the large retail trade. 1 2$
In l!arch, 1838, the newspaper camnented that

• • • It (Racine) was first settled about three years ago. Its
growth since that time, although not as rapid as some others, has
been gradual and pemanent. While many places that, during the
rage of speculation for the last two years,, have outstripped us,
now retrograde, or at least have to stand still for the country
which sustains them to settle and improve, our march, not having
been in advance of the surrounding country, which is now rapidly
settling, will continue onward.. There is not, in our estimation,
any place in the Territory that promises a more rapid and pennanent growth, nor any place where the enterprising capitalist could
use his money to better advantage than this.129
Despite such promotional efforts,, Racine grew slowly.

The depression

handicapped commercial and retail businesses and slowed the pace of improvements.

At one point,, Gilbert Y!.llapp and other capitalists tried to establish a

bank and later a mutual .fire insurance company, but both projects .failed to
attract sufficient stock subscriptions.130

Internal improvements,, such as a

harbor and a railroad to the interior, were also stymied by the lack ot capital.

As in all lakeport towns,, the proprietors immediately realized the need

for harbor improvement.

In 1836, ships were forced to unload passengers and
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cargo into smaller vessels which could navigate the shallow waters ciose to
the shore.

Both Benjanin Barker and Gilbert Knapp :improved this mode of trans-

portation by building small vessels to carry passengers and goods from the
larger sailing ships.l3l Knapp also purchased a full-sized schooner in
1836.l3 2 Of course, Hacine possessed a decided advantage because Jacob Barker
owned steam.boats and a forwarding house in Buffalo.

Yet Barker's camnercial

connections were of little value without an adequate harbor.

While government

surveys were made at Racine for a harbor, no government action followed.
Gilbert Knapp twic'9 journeyed to Washington to lobby in Congress. 133 Jacob
Barker signed petition after petition and encouraged praninent eastern businessmen to support harbor improvement at Racine.l34 The lack of harbor appropriations at Racine was again due to the .financial depression; Congress did
not have the necessary funds for harbor improvement anywhere on the western
shore of Lake Hichigan i.mtil the mid 1840's.135 Through capital subscriptions
by Racine citizens, a minimal program of harbor improvements was undertaken in
1840.136 In order to tap the agricultural resources of the interior, the
Racine promoters chartered two railroad lines in 183S known as the Root River
Railroad and the Racine and Rock River Railroad Company.

Both charters, how-

ever, were soon forfeited when the promoters failed to obtain the required
stockholders. 137
The depression also affected the economic position of many of the town's
proprietors.

In late 1837, Banjamin Barker left Racine to return to Joliet,

Illinois, because of financial failure.

His share of the Racine property wa.s

claimed by creditors throughout the territory. b'ventually, Jacob Barker was
forced to satisfy his brother's debts. l38 Harhhall Strong in 1839 considered
leaving Racine because " • • • the growth of Racine has been too slow for me.

I find myself embarrassed with debt, with no means or prospects, if I stayed,
of extricating myself. 111.3 9 It wa.s not until the early 1840 1 s with the increasing agricultural production of the interior that Racine became a viable
townsite.
The original settlement of Kenosha. was unique for its primary purpose was
settlement and not speculation.140 The origins of Kenosha or Southport as it
was called in the 1840's actually began at Hannibal, Oswego County, New York,
where in 1834 a number of £armers and businessmen talked increasingly about
moving to the weatem states.

John Bullen, Jr., who was then post-master at

Hannibal, took the lead and invited the most respected camnunity members to a
dinner at his home where the principal topic of conversation was westem migration.141 To render the move as cheap and quick as possible,, the Western
Emigration Canpany was established.

In Article I of the company's constitu-

tion, its aims were clearly stated:
For the purpose of aiding those disposed to emigrate to the Westem
States or Territories, in the purchase of land and the pursuit of
agriculture, manufactures,, mechanics and other branches of industry,
and the fonnation of a desirable community • • • .142
In the spr:ing or 1835, the lilestem I!lnigration Compa.rzy- dispatched several

members to explore the westem shore of Lake Hichiga.n for a possible townsite
and fertile :fa.ming lands.

The exploring party stopped at Hilwaukee,, but

found that land prices there were too high.

Racine offered little inducement

since Gilbert Knapp and Gurdon Hubbard had already claimed the majority of
land.

Finally, the W13stem .&nigra.tion Company decided on Pike Creek, a sm.aJ.l

stream flowing into Lake Michigan about ten miles south of Racine.

Once the

news reached Hannibal,, New York, a small party of eight families came West to
settle at Pike Creek.143
It was only a short time until the settlement at Pike Creek attracted

the interest of speculators all over the territory.

In late 1835, a Chicago

land dealer, Augustus Garrett, offered to purchase the whole tract.144 In
1836, Charles

ll.

Turner, a member of the i:estern Emigration Company, became

dissatisfied and staked out a claim to lands along the Pike !liver, a mile
north of Pike Creek.

Then other investors came to the two settlements from

F..a.cine, Milwaukee, and Chicago.11+.5 By 1836, however, the Western 11nigra.tion
Company disbanded by the mutual consent of its members.146
Little information remains about the early history of the settlements at
Pike Creek and Pike River, but occasional bits of infonnation indicated that
the progress of the towns was similar to that at other points on the lake shore
For example, the original members of the Western rl:nigration Company had claimed
farm land as well as plotted a town, but as in the Hilwaukee area they were
forced to wait until the government land sale in 1839 to secure legal title
to the land.

Thus the leaders of the comnnmity fonn.ed the Pike River

Claimant's Union in 1838 to protect the settler's land until the public
sale.11+.7 Harbor improvement was also an early demand of residents of both
bommunities.
1i~·ashington

In 1837, the settlement of Pike Creek sent Charles Durkee to

to lobby for harbor appropriations.

But he also ran into the

probltms created by the depression, and government funds were refused.148 Yet
Pike River and Pike Creek also contested for a possible harbor site, a quarrel
which prohibited developnent at either point.

William Ogden of Chicago was

the largest investor at Pike River, and he, of course, desired the harbor to
be located contiguous to his property. When Ogden learned that Charles Durkee
of Pike Creek had been sent to Washington, Ogden also considered journeying
to that city to prevent Durkee fran gaining an advantage.149 By 1839,, the two
settlements were united in the village of Southport and both now worked for a

harbor appropriation.

O A local citizen indicated the .importance of harbor

construction to the struggling town:
Building lots are wurth here frcm 75 to 200. If the Govt. would
make an appropriation for a harbor here we should shortly have a
right smart place. vie have one of the finest and most healthy
backcountries you can imagine • • • • Ifo man can .form anything
like a correct idea of the country without seeing it - Govt. ought
to make an appropriation soon - for in less than five years there
will be a large surplus of butter, cheese, Pork Lard, wheft & beef
dependent on eastern and southern markets for sale • • • • 51
Despite the absence of government aid, the t.itizens undertook many
.improvements such as roads and bridges. Construction wa.s begun on a harbor,
but it never proved userui. 152 Similar to other lake shore towns, Kenosha
waited until the 1840's and government funds for an adequate harbor. 153
Not all townsitcs on the western shore of Lake Hichigan could emerge as
major camnercial centers, even though ea.ch promoter envisioned that result.
There were various reasons for the slow developnent of these secondary to1-msites.

Kewaunee, Manitowoc, and Sheboygan faced the same problem as Green

Bay; agriculture did not develop in the north until later decades.
was stymied.

Thus trade

South of Hilwaukee, Racine and Kenosha had more settled interiors

but they faced the canpetition of the already thriving commercial ports of
Chicago and Milwaukee.

lforeover, all the secondary townsites confronted the

financial difficulties caused by the depression.

Harbor .improvement, canal

connections with the interior, and the general construction of stores and
houses were all slowed by the scarcity of capital.

Yet the origj_nal settle-

ment and pranotion of the secondary townsites exemplified many aspects or
western town growth.

In the first years, speculation played a major role in

the econo."Ilic life of the towns.

The speculators plotted the towns, attracted

emigrants, and provided jobs in constructing stores and houses.

Initially

western entrepreneurs located the secondary townsites, but they eventually

turned to the resources of eastern financiers.
Hubba.rd depended on Jacob Barker at Buffalo.

Gilbert Knapp and Gurdon
James Doty worked closely with

John Astor and solicited the funds of additional easterners such as Benjamin
Clapp and John Halsey.

Horgan L. Hartin financed his interests in the Bank

of Wisccnsin and in land in the Green Bay region through his brothers, John
and ;':illiam, frcm New York.

As in Chicago and :·ulwaukee, the pattern was

clear; town growth was a cooperative venture of eastern capita.lists and western entrepreneurs.

~- ,

- ~·. ,;\ _,)

.~'-' .J'

;
'
~
"'

/;~
/

~

/ } <.1;.'l,,,,

''1•1,.,,,.

,,, .

"\
/J

/

\

.

.J

~ ~,~~

\·~

"•

r•
:--

_,......~,
r

p
t:

C'..t
~

II

.\I

>'.
1;.,..,... ,,.

~\

.

:\ .

t:

II

.'J

::::
'- !/-: .,I,
\

'
/

/_

.~-

'/

II

1:1

II

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VII
1

The Green Ba.y area has not attracted the attentions of either the
amateur or professional historian during the period of town growth. There
are, however, two early histories of Green Bay which are encyclopedic in
character and provide a f'und of useful info:nnation: l.:J.la Hoes Neville,
Sharah Greene Martin, and Deborah Martin, Historic Green Bay, 1634-1840 (Green
Bay: Published by the authors, 1893); Deborah Martin, History of Brown Countz,
Wisconsin (2 vols.; Chicago: The s.J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1913); and
William A. Titus, Histo
of the Fox lliver Valle
Lake W:inneba o and the
Green Bay Region (3 vols.; Chicago: The S.J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1930 •
The most authoritative information on Green Ba.y is found in the more
recent w:>rks of Alice Smith especially her biography of James Doty: Alice E.
Smith, James Duane Doty, Frontier Promoter (Madison: The State Historical
Society of r:isconsin, 1954).
4rhe arrival of numerous white settlers at Green

Ba.v

has been described

by two contemporaries: Ebenezer Childs, "Recollections of Wisconsin Since
1820, 11 !ill£,, IV,, pp. 153-195; Albert G. fil.lis, "Fifty-Four Years' Recollections

of Men and ..!.'Vents in Wisconsin," lli!Q, VII, PP• 2fJ7-268.

3For a brief period, John La.we, the fur trader employed by the American
Fur Company, purchased land in the Green ~ area between 1824 and 1829, and
laid out the small town of Menomineeville. During this period, however, white
settlers were not moving to Green Ba.y nor was IA.we able to maintain his town
due to losses in the fur trade. Infonna.tion on Lawe• s early townsite can be
found in Alice Smith, 11 Daniel Whitney, Pioneer Wisconsin Businessman,,"
Wisconsin Magazine of History, XXIV (1940-1941), 289-292.
4 charles Kappler (ed.) Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties (Washington:
1
Government Printing Office, 1904),, II, pp. ?50-255. This Treaty is also discussed in Smith,, James Doty, p. 79.
5
Kappler (ed..) I Indian Affairs' n, pp. 319-325. A detailed discussion
of treaties affecting Wisconsin lands is contained in William F. Raney,
Wisconsin, A Story of Progress (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940) 1 PP• 7879. Cession of Indian land was often a confused situation in early Wisconsin
because New York tribes had been moved to hisconsin in the 1820's. For a
discussion of the New York Indians see Smith, James Doty, PP• 109-115.

6

Green Ba;y Intelligencer, September 12 1 1835. The newspaper advertised
extensively that a public sale was to take place. An actual description of
the sale has been provided by Elizabeth T. Baird, rrReminiscences of Lite In
Territorial .Jisconsin, 11 !lli.Q, IV, p. 242.
250

251
GeneralJ.y, the region was referred to as Green Bay which encompassed the
townsites of Navarino, Astor, and DePere. In 1S38, Astor and Navarino were
united in the town of Green Ba.y, but each site retained its identity as a
ward of the town. See Neville, Sarah Martin, and Deborah Martin, Historic
Green Bay, Po 260.
8

Daniel Whitney's early career was described in Alice Smith, "Daniel
Whitney, Pioneer Wisconsin Businessman, 11 Wisconsin Magazine of History, XX.IV
(1940-1941), 283-285.

9Ibid., pp. 290-291; Smith, Janes Doty, p. 106.
10
Green Bay Intelligencer, 1Jecember ll, 1833.
11

~.,

February 19, 1834.

12
Alice Smith, "Daniel Whitney,
January 8, 1834.

11

p. 291; Green 3ay Intelligencer,

l3Green Bay Intelligencer, April 12, 1836; June 1, 1836.
14see Chapter VI for a description of Martin's involvement at

~.ilwaukee.

15
James Doty to John Astor, August 20, 18.36, John Astor Papers, Vol. 22,
Baker Library, Harvard University. The John Astor Papers a.re on microfilm and
held by Cudahy Library, Loyola University. Hereafter this collection will be
cited as Astor Papers, Vol. No.
1

6ror a discussion of the process of acquirlng land which was followed
by John Astor and the American Fur Company see Chapter III.
l7Smith, James Doty, p. 160; Kemeth Porter, John Jacob Astor:
lli!!!, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1931), II, p. 855.

Business

18
James Doty• s early career is discussed in the early chapters of Smith,
Jame a Doty, pp. 1-157.
19
statement of Shares held by the Proprietors of Astor, April 16, 1836,
Astor Papers, 22. Also see Smith, James Doty, p. 161.
20

Janes Doty to John Astor, Rams~ Crooks, and Robert Stuart, June 16,
1835; James Doty to John Astor, November 14, 1835, .Astor Papers, 22.

21
John Astor, Robert Stuart, and Ransey Crooks to James Doty, March 5,
1835, Astor Papers, 22; James Doty to John Astor, Novanber 8, 1835, Astor
Papers, 22. Also see Smith, James Doty.

22John Astor, Ramsey Crooks, and Robert Stuart to Janes Doty, March 5,
1835, Astor Papers, 22.
23James Doty to Robert Stuart, July 28, 1835, and Robert Stuart to James
Doty, August 4, 1835, Astor Papers, 22.
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24Ja:nes Doty to John Astor, August 19, 1835, ~.
25
James Doty to John Astor, September 14, 1835,
Astor, April 21.+, 1837, ~.

26James Doty to John Astor, October 18, 1836,

~.; James Doty to John

~.

~.; James Doty to John Astor, April 21.+, 1837, Astor Papers, 22.

27

23

James Doty to John Astor, November 8, 1835, Astor Papers, 22.

29needs of Sale to New York Speculators, 1836, Astor Papers., 22. For a
discussion of the sales to New York investors see Porter, John Astor, II,
PP• 863-864.

30John Astor to Jam.es Doty.,

March

31James Doty to John Astor,

~

10., 18.36., Astor Papers., 22.

2
3 James Doty to John Astor,

~

17., 1836,

4, 1836, Astor Papers, 16.

33Jam.es Doty to John Astor., June 28, 18.36.,

~·
~·

34James Doty to John Astor., October 1., 1836,

!!:!!!!•

35John Astor to James Doty., July 15., 1835, Astor Papers, 16; James Doty
to John Astor., :,fey 19, 1835, Astor Papers., 22.

6

3 James Doty to John Astor, August 19, 1835, Astor Papers, 22.
37John Astor to James Doty, September 8_, 1835; John Astor to Robert
Stuart, October 15., 1835; &..'1.d John Astor to James Doty, March 4, 1836, Astor
Papers., 16.
8
3 James Doty to John Astor., February 14., 1B36, Astor Papers., 22. Also
see James Doty to John Astor., December 21+, 1835; January 1., 18.36., Astor Papers.,
22.
39chaster Jerm.ings, Ramsay Crooks, Charles Butler', James ·,/ebb, T. Roberts.,
Horatio Seymour, 3amuel Stocking, c. Griswold., Wright and Winston to John
Astor, November 16, 1836, Astor Papers, 2,4.
40James Doty to John Astor., June 18, 1836, Astor Papers., 22. Also see
Smith, James Doty, p. 163; Hary Mitchell, "Reminiscences of the Early Northwest.," Wisconsin State Historical Society Proceedings, 1902, P• 182.
4l.James Doty to John Astor, February 6, 1837, and April 21+, 18.37, Astor
Papers., 22.
42Jam.es Doty to John Astor., November 8., 1835; July 25., 1836; and October
18, 1836, Astor Papers., 22.

---
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John Astor to Norris Woodruff, March 17, 1837; John Astor, Samuel
Stocking, November 2.3, 1836; and John Astor to Robert Stuart, Noveci.ber 2.3,
1836, Astor Papers, 16.
44James Doty to John Astor, January ll, 1837, and June 16, 1837 Astor
1
Papers, 2.2.
45James Doty to John Astor, June 28, 1836,

~.

6
4 James Doty to John Astor, April 5, 1837; James Doty to John Astor,
February 3, 1838; James Doty to John Astor, April 1, 1838; James Doty to John
Astor, Mq 28, 1838, Astor Papers, .22.
4 7Doty•s plans for Astor and the territory are discussed. in a letter of
Doty to Astor, September 14, 1835, Astor Papers, 2.2. An excellent discussion
of Doty•s involvement in internal improvements is contained. in Smith, James
Doty, PP• 174-191.
48Smith, Janes Doty, pp. 198-202.
4 9James Doty to John c. Halsey, January 2 1 1836, James Doty Pa.pers,
Vol. I, Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif'ornia. This collection is small
and has been microfilmed. The designation of I, refers to microfilm reel
No. 1. Hereafter cited as Doty Papers, Huntington Library.
50James Doty to John Astor, October 1, 1836; James Doty to Jolm Astor,
February 6, 1837, Astor Papers, 2.2. Also see Smith, James Doty, p, 168.
51rn 1836, Doty received an additional $5,000 to invest all O'rer the
territory. See James Doty to John Astor, October 18, 1836, Astor ~apers, 22.
2
5 James Doty to W.R. Tillon, February 9, 1832, Doty Papers, I 1 Huntington
Library.
53The most authoritative works on sectionalism. in Wisconsin b~tween the
lead mining interest in the southwest and the northern interests at Green Bay
have been written by Orin Grant Libby, 11Signif'icance of the Lead S~ot Trade
In Early Wisconsin History," fil!Q, XIII, pp. 293-334, and iichronicl~ of the
Helena Shot-Tower,"!!!!.£, XIII, PP• 335-374.
5

~organ

L. Martin, '!'Jarrative of Morgan L. Martin, "

!!!.!£, XI, p. 403.

55Martin, History of Brown County, I, P• 173.
56
Martin, flNarrative,
Trade, 11 PP• 313-314.
57Green

Bav

11

P• 403; Libby,

Signif'icance of the

11

Intelligencer, June 1, 1836.

Le~
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
In the mid 1840's, the formative period of town developnent on the
western shore of Lake Michigan had drawn to a close.

Future years would bring

railroads to tap the agrirultural interior, shipping lines to utilize the Great
Lakes system, and a new immigration of fanners, merchants, and capitalists.
Chicago and Milwaukee solidified their positions as the most important cammercial centers, but at the same time each of the secondary townsites developed
their own balanced economies.

The establishment of such viable townsites has

been the focus of this study.
The developnent of the western shore of Lake Michigan went through two
distinguishable stages.

In the first stage the government, the .American Fur

Company, and individual traders were of special importance while in the second
stage land speculation, eastern capitalists, and western entrepreneurs were of
primary consideration.
After the 'viar of 1812, the American government sought to pacify the
Indians and dispel British influence in the lucrative fur trade operating
from centers at Chicago and Green Bay.

The first step was to establish a

military post at Fort Howard at Green Bay and rebuilt Fort Dearborn at
Chic ago.

Then Indian agents were sent to this frontier area to regulate the

conduct of the Indian trade by licensing fur traders an:i assuring that British
influence over the Indian tribes was curtailed.

Finally the factory system

was an ployed to buy Indian furs and sell goods at fair prices.

I
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But the government's policies were poorly conceived and implemented, for
contra.dictions abounded within the system.
then competed with the factory system.
sions of all government institutions.

Indian agents licensed traders who

Frontier traders resented. the intruThe military was to protect the traders

from the Indians when they had maintained friendly relations for generations.
The Indian agent enforced government laws, such as the license law of 1816 1
which required the traders to subnit to regulations in a previously independent frontier business.

The factory was resented because it was a business

enterprise competing for the Indian's furs.

By

18221 the government closed

its factories and assumed a purely regulato:cy role over the frontier and the
fur trade.

While the national government searched for a suitable frontier policy
fran 1815 to 18221 a new institution had entered the picture Fur Company.

the American

Established by John Jacob Astor and managed by Hamsay Crooks and

Robert Stuart, the American Fur Campany was a major business corporation designed to exploit the Indian trade.

In its initial years of operation, the

American Fur Company utilized the confusion surrounding government policy to
entice the fur traders to join the canpany.

The license law of 1816, for

example, changed so often that the fur traders never knew fran one year to the
next whether they could participate in the trade.

Yet the American Fur Com-

pany through influence on national and local officials provided. assurances
that licenses would be available.

The American Fur Company contributed to

the failure of the factory system by aiding local traders in competing with
the government business.

The western shore or Lake Michigan was hardly a

placid and remote wilderness, for the national government and the American Fur
Company competed for control of the Indians and the fur trade.

-Fron l.S22 to l.S33, the American Fur Company was the principal agent of
frontier society.

Trading headquarters were established at the bro centers of

civilization, Chica.go and Green

Da.v.

The company exercised canplete control of

the traders assigning each one to a specific region and regulating the profits
of any selected trader.

'I'he Green Bay and Chicago traders found themselves

unable to garner sufficient profits under this system, and they slowly accumulated huge debts to the American Fur Company.

~·,'hen

the fur trade declined in

the 1830 1 s because of increasing white settlanent and the sale of Indian lands,
the fur traders and the .American Fur Company withdrew leaving few positive
econanic or social contributions to the next stage of frontier society.

The

fur traders la.eked land and capital both having been lost to the American Fur
Canpany for debts <tompiled in the trade.

While they had occupied and solidi-

fied the geographic sites of future towns, such as Green Ba.v and Chicago, and
indicated the usefulness of waterways, such as the Illinois and Hichigan Canal
and the Fox and i·fisconsin Rivers, the fur traders and the American Fur Cozapa.ny
never developed the land or comnercial facilities of the towns because the
fur trade economy required the most primitive conditions.

In

sun, the fur

trade era was a "stage 11 of frontier history designed to exploit the country for
the manent.

Thus the towns on the western shore of Lake m.chigan did not

develop in the period from 1815 to 1833.

The real period of 11westwa.rd

expansion" occurred within a decade from 1833 to 1843 when emigrants .fran the
F..a.st arrived with the necessary capital and technical. skill to build towns
from the primitive fur trade villages.
Leading the westward march to the towns were eastern land speculators.
From Green Ba.¥ to Chicago, these men poured capital into the frontier villages
dreaming of future western metropolises on the lake.

In Chicago, Arthur

Bronson, Charles Butler, and 1'tiward Russell were the major eastern financial
investors who were represented by western agents like h'illiam Ogden an:i Gurdon
Hubbard.

In Hilwaukee, Hicajah

·~.rilliams

of Cincinnati formed a partnership

with Byron Kilbourn while Solomon Juneau turned to Morgan L. Martin of Green
Bay who invested the capital of a group of New York financiers.

At Green

~1

James Doty plotted the town of Astor through the capital resources of John
Astor.

At smller towns, the storJ was the same.

Manitowoc, Kewaunee, and

Racine were all established through the resources of eastern capitalists with
their interests being managed by western entrepreneurs like Gilbert Knapp at
Racine.
Townsites along the western shore of Lake Michigan quickly attracted
the attention of financiers, merchmts, and farmers across the nation.

In the

first. few years, the exchange of town lots represented the principal economic
activity of town residents, for fanners and merchants reached the towns at a
later date.

But the speculators were preparing the WS\Y' by improving streets

and constructing Rtores and houses.

These improvements, of course, brought

higher prices when a particular lot was sold.

Yet the major speculators owned

innumerable lots and profits from sales were often reinvested in other areas
of the to'Wtl.

The eastern financier employed many western agents 'l'tlo E.lll.erged

as leaders of the community in canmerce and politics.
~lilliam

Gurdon Hubbard and

Ogden in Chicago 1 Byron Kilbourn and Solomon Juneau in Milwaukee,

James Doty in Astor, and Gilbert Knapp in Racine owed their economic and
political success partly to their association with eastern speculators in
western towns.
As the towns developed, new areas of corrmerce and retail business opened
up.

The speculators, such as Arthur Bronson and Micajah T. Williams, provided
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the capital to build stores and warehouses which were then rented to merchants
as yet unable to finance the construction of their own establishnwnts.

Her-

chants, for example, were able to borrow capital through William Ogden and
Gurdon Hubbard in Chicago who obtained the funds .from their eastern partners.
Emigrants arriving in these rustling western villages discovered that jobs were
plentiful because of the manpower requirements for constructing stores and
houses.

Gradually a generation of western entrepreneurs directed their inter-

ests to new businesses.

Gurdon Hubbard, for example, opened a commission and

.forwarding b.tsiness while William Ogden and Byron Kilbourn operated land
agencies.
But the continued developnent of the town required a balanced economy.
In their first years, Chicago, Z..filwaukee, and Green Bay purchased all manufactured products and .food supplies fran the

1

·~ast

or marby settled regions.

As the backcountry was settled, farmers were able to ship surpluses to the
towns.

To a lesser extent, tho speculators also played a significant role in

developing the agricultural frontier.

.fi'armers were able to obtain loans for

the purchase of land fran Byron Kilbourn and William Oeden.

These same men

assured the proper functioning of the land system by establishing organizations of fanners to protect their land claims.
Throughout these years, town promoters sought to increase communications
with the interior and the ba.st.

In Chicago, Arthur Bronson and Charles Butler

constantly pushed the Illinois and Michigan Canal, at one point they even
considered financing the canal through a private company.

When construction

was undertaken by the state, Arthur Bronson was one of the heaviest subscribers to canal bonds.

William Ogden and Gurdon Hubbard, the principal

agents of eastern capital at Chica.go, supervised the financing and building
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